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1 Introduction
Whether financial development promotes economic growth or not has been a
contentious research question over the past century. On the one hand, several
economists such as Schumpeter (1911), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and
Levine (2005) conjecture that financial development induces economic growth.
They argue that the financial system provides the following crucial growth-
promoting functions: mobilization of savings, identification of high-return projects,
monitoring of investments, diversification of risks, and facilitation of transactions.
Improvements in the way these functions are provided—which is basically what
financial development amounts to—is expected to generate economic growth by
raising the volume of financial resources available for investment and, most
importantly, by enhancing the efficiency in which those resources are allocated
(World Bank, 1989). On the other hand, Robinson (1952) argues that financial
development does not cause economic growth; rather, it simply responds to
the demand created by economic growth. Similarly, Lucas (1988) forwards a
more conservative view by saying that “the importance of financial matters is
very badly over-stressed.” Another group of economists postulate a bidirectional
relationship between finance and growth. According to these economists, the
financial system and its services develop as a result of the demand generated
by economic growth, and financial development, in turn, causes economic growth
(Patrick, 1966; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). These theoretical expositions have
important policy implications. Clearly, only those theories predicting either a one-
way causality from finance to growth or a bidirectional finance-growth (henceforth
FG) causality entail devising policies to build deeper and more sophisticated
financial systems as a means of promoting economic performance.
The last two decades have seen a surge of interest in empirically testing the
diverse theoretical discourse on the issue of FG nexus.1 However, the literature
has produced largely mixed evidence, both on the direction of causality, and on
the question whether finance matters to growth regardless of the opposite causal
1This surge of interest is attributed partly to the advent of new growth theories which explicitly
incorporate financial intermediation in the growth model (Pagano, 1993) and partly to the study
by King and Levine (1993) that includes alternative measures of financial development in cross-
country growth regressions.
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The goal of this work is to empirically re-investigate some of the main issues
in the FG relationship by applying latest and more flexible econometric methods.
In Chapter 2, we conduct Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the finite sample
performances of heteroskedasticity-robust panel unit root tests (PURTs). Dividing
the causality issue based on time horizon, we examine the long-run FG causality in
Chapters 2–3 by means of PURTs and panel cointegration tests. The causality in
the short-to-medium run is explored in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 investigates state
dependence in the FG nexus using a functional coefficient modeling approach.
Application of this approach proceeds further to Chapter 6, this time with a special
emphasis on trade and financial openness as factors underlying the FG link. Chapter
4 corresponds to the article by Hartmann, Herwartz and Walle (2012) as published in
Economics Bulletin. To make each chapter self-contained and enhance readability,
we introduce relevant literature as well as considered models separately in each
chapter. Below, we will discuss each issue in more detail, highlight the contribution
of this thesis and summarize the main findings.
Recently, a growing number of studies have applied panel cointegration tests to
examine the existence of a long-run relationship between financial and economic
development (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al., 2007; Fowowe, 2010).
The main reason for the focus towards panel cointegration tests is that, being
able to utilize the cross-sectional dimension, these tests significantly overcome the
small sample power deficiency inherent in their time series equivalents. In these
applications, a standard methodological prerequisite involves applying PURTs to
test whether the levels of financial development and economic development are each
integrated of order one. A common assumption underlying most of the PURTs
as in Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003) and Breitung and Das (2005) is that
variances are constant over time. However, it has been shown that volatility beaks
could induce severe size distortions of these tests and, hence, inferences based on
them could be misleading (Herwartz and Siedenburg, 2009; Demetrescu and Hanck,
2012b). Unfortunately, time-varying volatility seems to be more the rule than the
exception as the volatility of several macroeconomic series displays recurrent shifts
2See Levine (2005) and Ang (2008a) for extensive surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the FG nexus.
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or trending behavior. A case in point is the so-called “Great Moderation”—the
substantial decline in the volatility of numerous key macroeconomic variables since
the mid 1980s (see, for instance, Kim and Nelson, 1999, and Stock and Watson,
2003). PURTs that could perform well under time-varying volatility have been
proposed in three recent papers: Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009), and Demetrescu
and Hanck (2012a,b). In Chapter 2, we compare the small sample performances of
these heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs by means of simulation exercises. Our results
show that the Cauchy-based test considered in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b)
is severely undersized when the cross-sectional dimension is not relatively larger
than the time series dimension. In contrast, the White-type test of Herwartz and
Siedenburg (2008) and its Cauchy-instrumented version suggested in Demetrescu
and Hanck (2012a) display reliable size control in most of the considered variance
break scenarios. Another notable result is that Cauchy instrumenting mitigates the
White-type test’s overrejections (usually about 2%) in strongly correlated panels.
This advantage, however, appears to come at a cost of inducing substantial oversizing
of the test in short panels with independent or weakly correlated error terms.
As an empirical illustration, we analyze the long-run FG causality in a panel of 74
economies during 1975–2005 by means of the heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs and
cross-sectional dependence robust panel cointegration tests suggested in Westerlund
(2007). Moreover, taking advantage of the large cross-sectional dimension, we
test the hypothesis put forward by Patrick (1966) that causal effects depend on
economies’ stage of development. This is done by assessing the causality test results
for subgroups of economies classified according to their income levels. We find that
the level of economic development and financial development are each integrated
of order one and, in addition, they are cointegrated. Nevertheless, the direction
of causality depends on the sample of economies considered. On the one hand,
strong evidence of causality running from growth to finance is obtained in the most
comprehensive panel. Similar, but somehow weakened, evidence is diagnosed in
middle- and high-income economies. On the contrary, findings from low-income
economies clearly support the “finance leads growth” hypothesis, and not the other
way round.
In Chapter 3, we revisit the long-run FG causality in SSA. As part of the
extensive search for factors that could boost economic growth in the least developed
3
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part of the world, the FG nexus in SSA has attracted considerable attention in the
policy and academic circles. However, existing studies have provided inconclusive
findings on the direction of causality between financial and economic development
in the region (see, for example, Ghirmay, 2004; Gries et al., 2009; Fowowe,
2010). We re-examine the long-run FG nexus in the region using data from 17
economies over the period 1975-2005. This data set was initially employed in
Fowowe’s (2010) research on the topic. However, he applies panel cointegration
tests that assume cross-sectional independence. We indicate that independence
among SSA economies is a rather unrealistic assumption as the economies are
somehow integrated through regional economic communities—and even through
monetary union, in the case of West Africa. Furthermore, many of them are
small economies which are highly affected by common shocks in global prices of
their natural-resource-intensive exports. Therefore, we apply error-correction-based
panel cointegration tests that take into account cross-sectional dependence among
economies. Our results, unlike those reported in Fowowe (2010), indicate the
existence of a long-run relationship between financial and economic development in
the sub-region. Moreover, our results clearly demonstrate that the long-run causality
runs from financial to economic development, although a muted support for the
reverse causal impact is observed when financial development is measured by the
percentage of liquid liabilities in GDP. The panel cointegration parameter estimated
by means of Dynamic OLS estimation is positive and statistically significant.
Therefore, our results strongly justify policies aimed at developing the financial
sector in SSA in order to promote long-run economic development.
In Chapter 4, we will turn to the short-to-medium-run causality analysis.
Specifically, we will consider causality in a period of less than one decade,
corresponding to typical planning horizons of institutional decision takers. We
investigate the causal impact of financial development on growth and the reverse
direction by means of both in-sample tests and out-of-sample forecast comparisons.
For this purpose, we rely on summarizing economy-specific evidence from bivariate
SUR models. The analysis is performed on the same data set used to test long-run
FG causality. Specifically in this chapter, we presume that the potentially time-
dependent nature of causal relationships might be a reason for the existing mixed
empirical evidences. Therefore, we test for causality in an iterative way, relying
4
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on a short sub-period of the entire time dimension at every estimation step. We
find stronger evidence in favor of the hypothesis that economic growth influences
financial development than for the reverse causal effect. Interestingly, the findings
are consistent across income groups and confirmed by both in-sample and out-of-
sample causality testing.
Subsequently, we will take a different perspective on the question why empirical
findings on the FG nexus have so far been generally inconclusive. Perhaps the most
straightforward way to answering this question could be taking a closer look at
the differences in the econometric methodologies employed and the chosen financial
development measures. Results also vary depending on the type and number of
economies considered as well as the time periods covered in individual studies.
Recently, some studies have considered the possibility that the variations in the
empirical findings regarding the FG nexus may depend on some underlying economic
factors. Theoretically, such a possibility has been suggested since Patrick (1966) who
hinted that economies benefit from financial development at their earliest stages of
development. Empirical investigations have been mostly done either by estimating
the FG relationship for different economies grouped according to a certain economic
criterion (Rioja and Valev, 2004) or by running threshold regressions (Ketteni et al.,
2007; Yilmazkuday, 2011). In Chapter 5, we investigate the state dependence of the
FG nexus by means of a functional coefficient model. In the spirit of semiparametric
estimation, this flexible modeling approach allows the long-run FG nexus to depend
on measurable economic factors. Applying this approach on the same data set used
in Chapters 2 and 4, we find a generally positive effect of income level on the FG
link. In particular, low-income economies obtain the least benefit from financial
development while high-income economies enjoy three times more benefit than low-
income economies. Similarly, financial development has a generally positive effect on
the FG nexus, with the strongest FG link observed in low-income economies with a
high level financial development. There are also cases where financial development
could have an adverse effect on economic growth. This is observed in low- and
lower-middle-income economies when they have very large government sizes or are
extremely open to international trade.
The impact of trade openness on the FG nexus is found to vary between
lower-middle- and upper-middle-income economies as well. Upper-middle-income
5
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economies show a pronounced FG nexus when they are very open to international
trade. Yet, only a moderate level of trade openness is beneficial to lower-middle-
income economies and being extremely open induces a negative FG relationship.
With respect to financial openness, we find moderately increasing financial openness
to strengthen the FG nexus, while, on the contrary, economies with the highest level
of financial openness benefit the least from financial development. Furthermore, the
FG nexus could even be negative if economies are highly open to both international
trade and international finance.
The findings regarding trade and financial openness deserve special attention
in light of the fact that opening trade and capital accounts to foster financial
development is being emphasized by the so-called Rajan and Zingales hypothesis.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbent industrialists and financiers resist
financial development due to fear that it breeds domestic competition. However,
openness could divert their focus to foreign competition, and thereby reduce their
opposition to financial development. In this sense, trade and financial openness are
necessary for financial development to transpire. Obviously, the main reason why
some economists are trying to investigate determinants of financial development is
that they believe financial development brings about economic growth. In the same
way, the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis is founded on the assumption that financial
development always—or at least when an economy is highly open—leads to economic
growth. However, Chapter 5 of this work documents that financial development is
unlikely to spur economic growth in states of simultaneous extreme financial and
trade openness. In Chapter 6, we will revisit the impact of openness on the FG
nexus using a different data set that spans the period 1981-2006 and is available for
78 economies. Most importantly, we employ a smooth financial openness measure,
namely, the percentage of an economy’s foreign assets plus liabilities in GDP. This
measure, unlike the one used in Chapter 5, lends itself to treatment as a factor in
the semiparametric estimation. Moreover, we split the measure into indicators that
represent foreign assets and liabilities holdings. We also disaggregate the measure of
trade openness to enable it to distinguish between imports and exports on the one
hand and between goods exports (imports) and services exports (imports) on the
other hand. To see the impact of simultaneously high trade and financial openness
on the FG nexus, we estimate a bivariate factor model, with trade openness and
6
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financial openness as the first and the second factors. Our findings by and large
confirm the evidence established in Chapter 5. In particular, very high levels of
financial openness erode the growth-promoting role of financial development. With
respect to trade openness, however, the impact depends on the level of economic
development. While high openness leads to a high FG nexus in upper-middle-
income economies, it exerts a deleterious influence in low- and lower-middle-income
economies. Finally, it is only in upper-middle-income economies that we find
simultaneously high trade and financial openness to lead to a significantly positive
FG nexus.
7
2 Small sample performances of heteroskedasticity-
robust panel unit root tests
2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, panel unit root tests (PURTs) have become a
standard tool in testing the order of integration of macroeconomic series, which
is often performed as a prerequisite for examining long-run relationships between
nonstationary variables. For instance, several studies that presume a cointegrating
finance-growth (FG) link repeatedly apply PURTs to test whether the levels of
financial development and economic development are each integrated of order one
(Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al., 2007; Fowowe, 2010). The prospect
that PURTs could overcome the power deficiency of univariate unit root tests by
utilizing the cross-sectional dimension is one of the main reasons behind the growing
attention PURTs are receiving.
Depending on whether the tests allow for cross-sectional dependence among panel
units, PURTs are classified into two generations. The first generation PURTs rely on
the assumption of cross-sectionally independent error terms—an assumption which
can hardly be satisfied in most economic research. This generation of PURTs include
the popular tests suggested in Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003). However,
O’Connell (1998) has shown that failure to satisfy the cross-unit independence
assumption leads to severe size distortions of first generation tests. Consequently,
tests that handle, or are robust to, cross sectional correlation have been suggested,
for instance, in Breitung and Das (2005), Shin and Kang (2006) and Herwartz and
Siedenburg (2008). Such PURTs are called second generation tests.3
Another crucial assumption in PURTs concerns the nature of innovation
volatility. In most PURTs, model disturbances are assumed to be homoskedastic.
However, similar to cross-sectional independence, the constant volatility assumption
is also quite restrictive. For instance, it is well documented that volatilities of
many economic variables exhibited significant decline towards the end of the last
century—a phenomenon that is known as the Great Moderation (Stock and Watson,
2003). Several studies have shown that time-varying volatilities result in pronounced
3See Hurlin and Mignon (2007) and Breitung and Pesaran (2008) for detailed surveys.
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size distortions of—and, hence, inferences based on—univariate unit root tests
(see Hamori and Tokihisa, 1997; Cavaliere and Taylor, 2007a,b, 2008). Likewise,
Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009) show that volatility beaks lead to severe size
distortions of the PURTs suggested in Levin et al. (2002) and Breitung and Das
(2005). Instead, they find that the “White-type” test in Herwartz and Siedenburg
(2008), where the residuals obtained under the null are employed to construct
the involved covariance matrix, display remarkable robustness to volatility shifts.
In recent papers, Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a,b) propose heteroskedasticity-
robust PURTs based on the Cauchy estimator—an estimator that uses the sign
of the lagged variable as an instrument to the lagged variable itself. They argue
that their White-type Cauchy test (Demetrescu and Hanck, 2012a) holds better
size control than the other tests suggested in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b).
No comparison has been made, however, between the Cauchy tests and the test
suggested in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008), which is essentially a White-type
test with out the Cauchy instrumenting. Therefore, in this chapter, we conduct
Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the small sample performances of the three
most important heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs suggested to date: the two White-
type tests and the best among the array of tests in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b).
This comparison helps us to find out the test which is of most empirical relevance.
Furthermore, it allows us to examine the potential small sample gains and losses
of applying the Cauchy instrumenting to the White-type test in Herwartz and
Siedenburg (2008).
Our simulation results confirm that, overall, the Cauchy test suggested in
Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) has the poorest small sample performance of the
considered tests even under time-invariant volatility. This test becomes severely
undersized when the cross-sectional dimension increases faster than the time series
one. In independent and weakly dependent panels, empirical rejection frequencies of
both White-type tests display very small deviations from the nominal level. As an
exception, however, the one with the Cauchy instrumenting is seen to be significantly
oversized for the smallest considered time dimension. When the errors feature a
strong form of cross-sectional dependence, the White-type test of Herwartz and
Siedenburg (2008) is about 2.0 % more oversized than that of Demetrescu and
Hanck (2012a). Shifts in innovation volatility increase the size distortion of the test
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in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) under relatively short time dimension, and, to
some extent, induce similar overrejections for the one in Herwartz and Siedenburg
(2008). However, only early downward and late upward volatility shifts cause the
most severe of the above-mentioned size distortions. On the contrary, early and
middle positive variance breaks appear to dampen the upward size distortions of the
White-type test of Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) in strongly correlated panels.
In sum, we conclude that both White-type tests are the most empirically relevant
heteroskedasticity-robust PURT, although the one without Cauchy instrumenting
is the most dependable one when the time dimension is small, say less than 30.
As an illustrative example, we examine the cointegration relationship between
financial and economic development in a panel of 74 economies over the period 1975-
2005. A graphical representation of the variance profiles of the considered series
reveals that the variances are time-varying. Applying the PURTs, we find that real
GDP per capita and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP are each
integrated of order one. The employed panel cointegration tests indicate that the
finance-growth (FG) causality depends on the stages of economic development. On
the one hand, results from low-income economies clearly support the “finance leads
growth” hypothesis, and not the other way round. The evidence from the remaining
income groups and the comprehensive panel, however, supports the “growth leads
finance” hypothesis.
In Section 2.2, we formally sketch the panel model with variance breaks and
describe the considered PURTs. Section 2.3 introduces deterministic terms and
serial correlation, and discusses existing methods of handling them. Results of
Monte Carlo simulations are provided in Section 2.4. An empirical illustration is
given in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Panel unit root tests
A standard univariate unit root testing problem can be formalized as testing the
hypothesis H0 : ρ = 1 in the following equation:
yt = ρyt−1 + et, t = 1, ..., T, (2.1)
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where et ∼ iidN(0, σ
2
et). In this model, a variance break, which is a typical example
of time-varying volatility, can be introduced as
σ2et =
 σ2e1, if t < ⌊sBT ⌋, (0 < sB < 1)σ2e2, otherwise, (2.2)
where ⌊sBT ⌋ denotes the integer part of sBT .
The panel version of the heteroskedastic model can then be written as
yt = ρyt−1 + et, t = 1, ..., T, (2.3)
where yt = (y1t, ..., yNt)
′, yt−1 = (y1,t−1, ..., yN,t−1)
′ and et = (e1t, ..., eNt)
′ are N × 1
vectors and the index i = 1, ..., N indicates the cross-sectional units.
Homogeneous PURTs (so called because they assume homogeneous ρ across
panel units) are applied to test the hypothesis H0 : ρ = 1 against H1 : ρ < 1
in (2.3). In the following, we describe the three prominent heteroskedasticity-robust
PURTs suggested so far.
2.2.1 The White-type test
Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) put forward a PURT based on a White-type
covariance estimator—an estimator that utilizes residuals obtained under H0.
Formally, the test statistic looks like
tHS =
∑T
t=1 y
′
t−1∆yt√∑T
t=1 y
′
t−1eˇteˇ
′
tyt−1
d
→ N(0, 1), eˇt = ∆yt = et. (2.4)
This test is initially meant to overcome small sample problems of the test in Breitung
and Das (2005) which displays significant size distortions when N is relatively
large compared with T . Later, Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009) show that tHS
is asymptotically Gaussian under variance break. Their claim is supported by
Monte Carlo results in small samples. A major problem highlighted in Herwartz
and Siedenburg (2009) is that the test loses its robustness to heteroskedasticity if
the underlying data generating process (DGP) contains a linear deterministic trend.
Moreover, the cross-sectional correlation they assumed is somehow weaker than the
widely used common factor models (see, for example, Moon and Perron, 2004; Shin
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and Kang, 2006; Demetrescu and Hanck, 2012a,b).
2.2.2 The Cauchy test
PURTs that are based on the so-called Cauchy estimator use the sign of the first lag
as an instrument for the lag itself (Shin and Kang, 2006). Recently, Demetrescu and
Hanck (2012b) have demonstrated that the Cauchy tests proposed by Shin and Kang
(2006), where the employed orthogonalization scheme allows strong cross-sectional
correlation, are also robust to heteroskedasticity. Of these tests, we consider the one
recommended by Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) due to its superior small sample
performance. To briefly sketch the test, we begin by denoting the (prewhitened and
detrended) first differences by εi,t and εt = (ε1,t, ..., εN,t)
′. Next, we compute the
sample covariance matrix as Σ̂ε =
∑T
t=p+2 εtε
′
t/(T−p), where p refers to the number
of lags included in the prewhitening regression discussed in Section 2.3.1. Applying
an appropriate LU decomposition yields Σ̂−1ε = Γ̂Γ̂
′
, which, in turn, are used to
obtain the orthogonalized differences: ε∗t = Γ̂
′
εt. Thus, the orthogonalized Cauchy
statistics τˆIV,i are defined as
τˆIV,i =
∑T
t=p+2 hi(y˜
µ
i,t−1)ε
∗
i,t√∑T
t=p+2 h
2
i (y˜
µ
i,t−1)
, (2.5)
where ε∗i,t are the N elements of ε
∗
t and h(.) is a Huber-type instrument which
is asymptotically equivalent to the sign function. Shin and Kang (2006) and
Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) have shown that, under the null of a unit root,
the following panel statistic τ¯IV is asymptotically Gaussian:
τ¯IV = N
−1/2
N∑
i=1
τˆIV,i
d
→ N(0, 1). (2.6)
A proof that τ¯IV is robust to nonstationary volatility of innovations is provided in
Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b). This robustness is argued to arise from the fact that
the sign function h(.) discounts the lagged level to 1 or -1 regardless of the change in
volatility over time. A major drawback of Shin and Kang’s (2006) orthogonalization
scheme is that T must be greater than N for Σ̂−1ε to exist. Moreover, τ¯IV exhibits
small sample distortions when T is only moderately larger than N . To circumvent
this problem, Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) suggest applying an estimator of the
12
Chapter 2 heteroskedasticity-robust panel unit root tests
sample covariance matrix Σ̂ε initially proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2004). This
estimator is a weighted sum of the sample covariance matrix Σ̂ε and the identity
matrix I. Formally,
ST = κ1T I + κ2T Σ̂ε,
where the weights κ1T and κ2T are built as follows. Given
b¯2T =
1
N
[
T∑
t=p+2
( ε¯′tε¯t
T
)2
−
1
T
tr
(
Σ̂2ε
)]
,
we definemT = tr(Σ̂ε)/N, d
2
T = tr[(Σ̂ε−mT I)(Σ̂ε−mT I)
′]/N, b2T = min(b¯
2
T , d
2
T )
and a2T = d
2
T − b
2
T . Then, κ1T = mT .b
2
T /d
2
T and κ2T = a
2
T /d
2
T .
For the purpose of this work, we only consider τ¯IV with shrinkage, as the one
with out shrinkage is of very limited practical relevance.
2.2.3 The White-type Cauchy test
In another paper, Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) come up with a better alternative
to using shrinkage estimators of the orthogonalization process required by τ¯IV when
T is not sufficiently larger than N . They argue that avoiding the orthogonalization
issue altogether and applying White-corrected standard errors to the IV estimators
yields better sized tests. The White-type IV test is defined as
tDH =
∑T
t=1 sgn(yt−1)
′∆yt√∑T
t=1 sgn(yt−1)
′eˇteˇ
′
tsgn(yt−1)
d
→ N(0, 1), eˇt = ∆yt = et. (2.7)
It should be noted, however, that tHD is essentially a Cauchy version of tHS
given in (2.4). By comparing the small sample performances of tDH and tHS, we
examine the extent to which instrumenting lagged values improves the size of the
test. In addition, we study if any potential gain regarding size precision comes at
the expense of reduced empirical power.
2.3 Deterministic terms and serial correlation
In this section, we discuss how serial correlation and deterministic terms are handled
in panel unit root testing. Focusing on methods recommended in Herwartz and
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Siedenburg (2009) and Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a,b), with the latter ones
referring to Demetrescu and Hanck (2011), we highlight potential implications of
time-varying volatility on those schemes.
2.3.1 Short run dynamics
To cope with serial correlation, all the three papers recommend prewhitening, which
proceeds by running individual-specific ADF regressions under H0, i.e.
∆yit =
pi∑
j=1
cij∆yi,t−j + eit. (2.8)
The estimates ĉi = (ĉi1, ..., ĉip) are then used to obtain prewhitened data as
y∗it = yit − ĉi1yi,t−1 − ...− ĉipiyi,t−pi (2.9)
and
∆y∗it = ∆yit − ĉi1∆yi,t−1 − ...− ĉipi∆yi,t−pi. (2.10)
Any consistent lag-length selection criterion can be applied to decide the lag
lengths pi. Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009) note that if both short run dynamics
and deterministic patterns are present in the data, prewhitening should precede
detrending. Moreover, the prewhitening regression should include an intercept term
if the model features linear time trends under the alternative hypothesis.
2.3.2 Deterministic terms
To illustrate the issues with respect to deterministic terms, we follow the two
formalizations given in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009). The first one is the case
of distinguishing a driftless random walk from a stationary process with individual-
specific intercept terms. Formally, this can be written as
yt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρyt−1 + et, (2.11)
where µ = (µ1, ..., µN)
′ contains individual-specific intercepts. In this case, Herwartz
and Siedenburg (2009) recommend subtracting the first observation from the data
in levels. Breitung and Meyer (1994) have pointed out that the first observation is
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the best estimator of µ under H0. Accordingly, the pooled test regression will be
based on the transformed data
∆yt = φy
∗
t−1 + et, with y
∗
t−1 = yt−1 − y0.
Herwartz and Siedenburg (2009) emphasize the claim by Breitung and Meyer (1994)
that the power of tests based on a regression on the transformed data does not
depend on the individual effects. Nevertheless, our simulation results that are
available upon request do not confirm this claim. Although, power truly remains to
be less sensitive for smaller values of µ, it is seen that the considered tests will be
powerless whenever µ > |10|.
Demetrescu and Hanck (2011) on the other hand recommend the use of recursive
demeaning (Shin and So, 2001) arguing that the Cauchy tests (the univariate
versions) are marginally powerful under this scheme than demeaning by the first
observation. Recursive demeaning proceeds as
y∗t−1 = yt−1 −
(
1
t− 1
)
yct−1, (2.12)
where yct−1 is a vector of the cumulative sums of the observations up to the time t−1.
Our unreported results that available upon request show that centering by the first
observation leads to generally better power of the considered tests than recursive
demeaning, although the gain is marginal as claimed by Demetrescu and Hanck
(2011). However, we observe that, if the errors are heteroskedastic, the considered
tests exhibit better size control when they are performed on recursively demeaned
data than on data centered by the first observation. Therefore, we rely on recursive
demeaning for our small sample performance comparison experiments.
Another empirically relevant formalization of unit root testing with deterministic
terms is the case of distinguishing between a random walk with drift on the one hand
and a trend stationary process on the other. This problem can be written as
yt = µ+ (1− ρ)βt + ρyt−1 + et, (2.13)
where vector β = (β1, ..., βN)
′ stacks panel-specific trend parameters. Although the
data may be detrended by means of popular detrending schemes such as OLS, GLS
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or recursive detrending, the resulting statistics will be dependent on µ and β, and,
hence, necessitate bias-correction terms. A better approach that does not require
bias-correction terms is proposed in Breitung (2000). This approach applies the so-
called Helmert transformation, where the first differences of the data are centered
in a forward looking manner, i.e.
∆y∗t = st
[
∆yt −
1
T − t
(∆yt+1 + ...+∆yT )
]
, and (2.14)
s2t = (T − t)/(T − t+ 1).
Subsequently, yt is detrended as
y∗t = yt − y0 − β̂t = yt − y0 −
yT − y0
T
t. (2.15)
Our simulation results confirm the claim by Breitung (2000) that this detrending
scheme results in PURTs that are completely independent on µ and β, both under
the null and the alternative. As such, this detrending method, albeit inducing
statistical power inferior to the above-mentioned demeaning schemes, can be used
to demean the series in (2.11) if µ are suspected to be very large. The success
of this transformation, however, depends critically on the assumption that ∆y∗t
is a white noise with constant variance. Simulation results reported in Herwartz
and Siedenburg (2009) clearly indicate that this detrending scheme does not yield
pivotal tHS under variance break. Hence, this detrending method is not relevant
for our experiments. Likewise, Demetrescu and Hanck (2011) point out that the
Cauchy estimator loses its robustness to heteroskedasticity if there is a non-zero
intercept under the null. Furthermore, the standard detrending techniques do not
solve the problem as demeaning differences generates nuisance components that
affect the asymptotic distribution of the tests. Instead, Demetrescu and Hanck
(2011) suggest, admitting its practical complexity, that this issue might be tackled
by resorting to Dufour (1990) who proposes a series of steps that involve building
confidence intervals for the autoregressive root as well as the trend parameters.
In conclusion, handling linear trends remains to be the biggest challenge of
unit root testing under time-varying volatility. In view of this, our finite sample
performance comparisons proceed excluding linear trends from the model, i.e., we
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consider the formalization in (2.11).
2.4 Monte Carlo study
2.4.1 The simulation design
To evaluate the relative small sample performances of the three heteroskedasticity-
robust PURTs under different volatility scenarios, we consider the following data
generating process (DGP):
yit = (1− ρ)µi + ρyit−1 + eit, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T.
The DGP formalizes the random walk without drift underH0 with a panel stationary
process with individual effects under the alternative. Rejection frequencies under
H0 are simulated with ρ = 1 whereas empirical power is calculated against the
heterogeneous alternatives ρi ∼ U(0.9, 1.0). Individual effects are generated as µi ∼
U(−1, 1) which amounts to a maximum growth (decline) rate of 100%. As noted in
Section 2.3.2, the choice of µ is not with out loss of generality for empirical power.
Nevertheless, our unreported simulation results indicate that it is only a constant
as high as ten (in absolute terms) that could induce a sharp decline in the power
of the tests. Similarly, power increases with decreasing µ. We consider serially
uncorrelated errors, but we set p = 1 and perform prewhitening so as to capture the
impact of not knowing the true lag length in practice.
As our goal is to find out the most relevant PURT test for empirical
macroeconomic applications, for instance, the FG nexus, we evaluate the robustness
of the tests not only under a range of variance break scenarios but also under varying
degrees of cross-sectional dependence. In this way, we could also examine how
the interaction between variance break and cross-sectional dependence scenarios
impact on the small sample performances of the tests. With respect to cross-unit
dependence, it is worthwhile noting that the test in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008)
is derived under a weaker form of cross-sectional dependence and, hence, how the
test performs under a strong form of dependence remains unclear. In contrast,
the two Cauchy tests in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a,b) are pivotal under a very
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strong form of cross-sectional dependence modeled along a common factor structure.
Accordingly, we will consider three alternative cross-sectional dependence scenarios:
independent, weakly dependent and strongly dependent panels. Cross-sectionally
independent errors are defined as ei,t = e˜i,t, where e˜i,t are independently normally
distributed. For the weak form of cross-unit dependence, we consider the spatial
autoregressive (SAR) error structure given in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008).
Denoting et = (e1t, ..., eNt)
′, the SAR model is defined as
et = (IN −ΘW )
−1e˜t, with Θ = 0.8 and e˜t = (e˜1,t, ..., e˜N,t)
′,
where W is the so-called spatial weights matrix, which in this specific case is a
row normalized symmetric contiguity matrix of the one-behind-one-ahead type (for
more details on spatial panel models see e.g. Elhorst, 2003). Following Herwartz
and Siedenburg (2008), we call this specification as SAR(1) model. For the case of
a strongly correlated panel, the following factor model taken from Demetrescu and
Hanck (2012a,b) is assumed:
ei,t = λiνt + e˜i,t,
where νt ∼ iidN(0, 1) and λi ∼ U(−1, 3).
4
The variance break scenarios are determined by two parameters: the type of
variance shift, and the moment at which the shift occurs. For the homoskedastic
case, we set the variances as σet = σe1 = σe2 = 1. Accordingly, we obtain variance
shifts by adjusting the post-break variance to σe2 = 5, for a positive break, and to
σe2 = 1/5, for a negative one. With respect to the timing of variance breaks, we
first consider cases where the breaks occur at varied moments across panel units,
i.e sB ∼ iidU(0.1, 0.9). As volatilities sometimes show strong correlations among
individual units, we subsequently assume variance breaks to occur at the same time
across all the panel units. In this case, we consider scenarios of early, middle and late
variance breaks by fixing sB = 0.1, sB = 0.5 and sB = 0.9, respectively. At last, we
extend the analysis to cases of multiple variance break per each single time series—
a simulation exercise not reported in all the papers associated with the three tests
4Note that it is also possible to generate a weaker form of cross-sectional dependence from this
factor model by assigning smaller values (in absolute terms) for λi. However, results obtained by
setting λi ∼ U(0, 0.2) as in Pesaran (2007) are qualitatively similar to those under SAR(1) model,
and, hence, are not reported here.
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under consideration. To this end, we allow T/10 subperiods for each individual series
i and then, for each subperiod k, we randomly assign σek ∈ [1/5, 1, 5]. Here, we first
specify the variances in such a way that other series, say j, follow similar variance
shift movements to i, but later relax this assumption and allow contemporaneous
subperiods to experience different volatility shifts.
We generate data for all combinations of N ∈ [16, 26, 56, 106] and T ∈
[25, 50, 100, 200]. Rejection is decided by comparing the calculated values of each
PURT statistic with the 5% critical value of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Empirical rejection probabilities are based on 5000 replications.
2.4.2 Results
Simulation results are documented in Tables 2.1–2.6. Each table has upper, middle
and lower panels representing empirical rejection frequencies obtained under cross-
sectional independence, SAR(1) model and factor structure, respectively. Except
in Tables 2.1 and 2.6, the left-hand side blocks refer to results obtained under
negative variance breaks while the right-hand side blocks represent results under
positive variance breaks. Table 2.1 reports results for the benchmark case of
homoskedasticity against a general form of heteroskedasticity obtained by first
drawing random variance break points for each panel unit (sB ∼ iidU(0.1, 0.9)) and
then randomly assigning either constant (σe2 = 1), negative (σe2 = 1/5) or positive
(σe2 = 5) volatility shifts. While keeping heterogeneity of variance break moments,
we distinguish between the impacts of positive and negative variance shifts in Table
2.2. In the subsequent three tables, emphasis is given to isolating the impacts of the
timings of variance breaks on the relative small sample performances of the tests.
Accordingly, Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 report results for cases in which variance breaks
(homogeneously) occur early (sB = 0.1), halfway (sB = 0.5), and late (sB = 0.9)
in the time series. Finally, results for multiple variance breaks that occur every
tenth data point in each individual time series are documented in Table 2.6. In
this table, the left-hand side block represents simulation results for cases in which
subperiods experience similar shifts across panel units while the right-hand block
refers to results when contemporaneous subperiods are allowed to feature different
volatility shifts. In the following, we discuss notable results documented in each
table.
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Table 2.1: Empirical rejection frequencies under constant variance and variance break
Constant variance Heterogeneous variance shifts
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 25 5.4 5.0 5.5 5.5 52.3 60.9 87.2 99.0 6.4 6.3 5.9 6.5 23.9 27.2 38.1 58.9
50 5.2 4.9 4.7 5.0 73.3 80.7 98.6 100.0 6.1 6.5 5.8 4.9 37.0 41.6 61.2 86.4
100 5.6 5.5 5.6 4.9 79.3 84.9 99.3 100.0 6.8 6.0 5.8 5.2 47.9 52.4 76.7 94.9
200 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 74.7 80.0 97.9 100.0 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.5 53.9 57.7 80.0 94.9
τ¯IV 25 3.8 3.9 2.7 1.5 42.7 50.6 74.2 93.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.4 16.6 18.3 25.1 39.6
50 4.4 4.6 4.3 3.6 76.0 88.4 99.5 100.0 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.6 46.0 54.4 80.0 97.5
100 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 91.4 97.8 100.0 100.0 2.6 2.1 1.1 0.8 75.9 87.1 99.1 100.0
200 5.2 5.0 5.8 5.3 96.7 99.6 100.0 100.0 3.4 2.6 2.0 1.4 90.5 97.7 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 5.6 6.6 7.3 7.8 47.1 60.1 86.3 99.1 6.5 6.7 8.7 10.3 27.5 36.6 59.0 85.2
50 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.8 75.9 88.9 99.6 100.0 5.1 5.8 6.0 6.4 46.6 59.3 88.6 99.4
100 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.5 91.1 97.7 100.0 100.0 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 65.7 79.9 98.6 100.0
200 5.3 5.4 6.1 5.5 96.5 99.6 100.0 100.0 5.0 4.8 5.3 5.4 77.1 91.0 99.9 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 6.0 5.5 5.3 5.8 26.8 30.8 48.7 75.9 6.0 6.6 6.1 6.7 23.7 26.0 38.8 60.7
50 6.6 5.9 5.8 5.0 39.2 46.4 72.4 95.0 6.5 5.9 5.6 4.7 36.4 42.5 60.9 86.8
100 6.6 6.3 5.9 5.1 47.0 52.8 83.0 98.8 6.5 6.0 5.3 5.4 47.9 52.7 75.5 95.1
200 7.1 6.2 5.8 6.0 47.0 53.7 85.5 99.1 6.8 5.9 5.5 5.4 53.4 58.7 79.4 94.6
τ¯IV 25 3.2 3.4 2.6 1.7 20.0 25.4 37.1 58.4 1.7 1.3 0.8 0.2 17.4 18.6 25.5 40.8
50 3.1 3.6 2.8 2.4 36.4 51.0 78.9 97.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 0.5 47.2 56.5 80.9 98.1
100 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.1 52.7 70.6 96.2 100.0 2.8 2.0 1.3 1.1 77.9 88.2 99.4 100.0
200 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.5 61.3 82.1 99.2 100.0 3.1 3.1 2.0 1.4 92.7 98.7 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 5.9 6.2 6.5 7.3 24.9 31.5 52.9 80.8 6.4 7.1 8.3 10.2 28.7 36.1 59.3 86.2
50 5.9 5.7 5.9 5.6 40.2 53.5 82.4 98.5 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 46.7 60.3 87.7 99.4
100 6.1 6.1 6.3 5.4 56.1 70.0 96.1 100.0 4.5 4.7 5.3 5.1 67.1 81.3 98.7 100.0
200 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.6 65.1 81.2 99.1 100.0 5.0 4.9 5.6 5.1 79.4 92.3 99.9 100.0
Factor model
tHS 25 8.1 8.3 8.2 9.3 24.4 23.1 25.2 26.3 6.5 6.4 7.1 7.0 22.5 23.4 28.7 35.2
50 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.6 33.6 29.8 30.6 31.9 6.3 6.4 6.8 7.2 33.7 34.2 41.9 52.4
100 8.5 9.5 9.4 9.9 34.5 32.9 34.7 36.7 7.0 6.4 6.3 7.6 42.7 41.8 51.3 61.7
200 9.0 8.7 9.1 9.1 34.8 33.9 36.1 38.3 7.2 7.0 7.4 7.0 45.6 45.7 56.8 65.4
τ¯IV 25 1.8 1.5 0.3 0.0 17.0 19.8 11.3 7.6 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.1 14.6 17.5 14.9 14.1
50 2.8 2.8 1.4 0.2 42.4 58.0 56.6 64.7 2.0 1.8 1.1 0.4 35.1 47.8 53.8 69.0
100 3.8 3.7 3.2 1.8 62.6 81.0 85.4 92.3 2.7 2.5 1.8 1.0 59.0 74.5 84.6 94.7
200 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.1 72.9 88.0 93.9 98.0 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.1 71.9 87.4 94.9 98.7
tDH 25 6.5 7.2 7.4 7.9 21.6 21.7 22.5 23.5 6.3 6.3 7.1 7.7 22.0 24.0 27.3 30.7
50 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.1 31.4 30.2 30.9 33.3 5.7 6.4 7.0 7.8 33.5 35.6 39.6 45.4
100 6.3 7.2 7.7 7.2 38.1 38.0 39.4 42.0 5.5 6.1 7.1 7.2 46.5 47.8 52.3 56.7
200 6.5 6.8 7.1 8.1 43.6 43.1 44.4 47.6 6.0 5.3 6.9 6.8 55.3 56.3 63.0 65.9
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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We begin our discussion by comparing the finite sample properties of the tests
under homoskedasticity and the three cross-sectional dependence scenarios. In Table
2.1, we see that all the tests display very good size control under the benchmark
case of homoskedasticity and cross-sectional independence. An exception is observed
for the smallest considered time dimension T = 25, in which case both Cauchy
tests become increasingly distorted as N increases. Under weak cross-sectional
dependence, the undersizing of τ¯IV becomes visible even for the remaining time
dimensions, but tDH continues to posses similar size control to tHS unless T is small,
i.e., T = 25. Strong cross-sectional dependence induces further size distortion in all
the three tests. In particular, τ¯IV is virtually unable to reject the null when N is
relatively large compared with T—a result documented in all the six tables of this
section as well as in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a,b). On the contrary, the two
White-type tests become moderately over-sized, with tHS showing about 2% more
over-rejections than tDH . With respect to empirical power, all tests appear to be
equally powerful in independent panels apart from the fact that tHS is less powerful
for the smallest considered cross-sectional dimensions N = 16, and = 26. All the
tests are less powerful under cross-sectional dependence than independence; the
smallest empirical probabilities of rejecting the alternative hypothesis are reported
when the errors are strongly correlated. In the latter case, tHS and τ¯IV become
the least and the most powerful tests, respectively. As generally similar patterns
are seen in other variance break scenarios, we do not discuss empirical power results
anymore and concentrate on documented frequencies of rejecting the null hypothesis.
Nevertheless, we continue to provide empirical power results in the tables for the
sake of completeness.
Turning to the results reported in the right-hand block of Table 2.1, we see in the
upper panel that variance breaks amplify major patterns observed in homoskedastic
and independent panels. Namely, the White-type test tHS is now about 0.5% more
oversized than the homoskedastic case, tDH exhibits pronounced size distortions for
T = 25, and τ¯IV completely loses size control when N is relatively large compared
with T . Results under the heteroskedastic SAR(1) model are broadly similar to those
under independent errors. Strongly cross-unit correlation, however, substantially
reduces the size distortions of tDH for T = 25 and renders the results comparable to
the case of constant variance. Although tHS displays slightly larger size distortions
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under strongly correlated panels than the other two cross-sectional dependence
scenarios, heteroskedasticity seems to dampen the upward size distortions of tHS
induced by strongly correlated errors. As a consequence, tHS appears to display the
best size control of all the considered tests under variance break. However, clarifying
whether this pattern is unique to the assumed specific heteroskedasticity scenario
or could be taken as a general conclusion requires further robustness checks on the
basis of alternative cases of volatility shifts.
Distinguishing between positive and negative variance breaks, we observe in
Table 2.2 that, while most patterns remain qualitatively unchanged, the apparent
good performance of tHS under the factor structure emanates from upward volatility
shifts. When strongly correlated panels feature downward volatility shifts, however,
tHS exhibits significant upward size distortions that are even slightly higher than the
heteroskedastic case: its empirical rejection rates reach 10.1%. On the other hand,
marked small T upward size distortion of tDH observed under variance breaks with
weak or no cross-unit correlation seem to increase when the shift is restricted to be
either negative or positive for all the panel units. Furthermore, similar to tHS, the
Cauchy test tDH is more oversized under negative variance breaks, with its empirical
rejection rates rising up to 13.4%.
Besides the direction, the timing of volatility shifts also determines how distorted
unit root tests become under variance breaks (Cavaliere and Taylor, 2007b, 2008).
Results presented in Table 2.4 demonstrate that the distortionary effects of negative
variance breaks on the considered PURTs are more pronounced when the breaks
occur early in the time series. In this case, a new distortion is displayed by tHS
when T = 25. Likewise, tHD’s over-rejections extend to T = 50, where empirical
sizes climb up to 17.4%. Another striking pattern revealed in this table is that
τ¯IV shows its best size performance under early negative variance break with no
or weak cross-sectional correlation. Indeed, τ¯IV clearly outperforms the two White-
type tests if independent or weakly dependent panels exhibit early negative variance
shifts. Nevertheless, it is also in the same volatility shift scenario, but under strongly
correlated errors, that τ¯IV exhibits its poorest small sample performance, with a
maximum of only 0.2% rejection rates observed in more than half of the considered
T and N combinations. Of the considered heteroskedasticity cases, early positive
variance break, in contrast to the negative one, appears to exert the least adverse—if
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Table 2.2: Empirical rejection frequencies under variance break with heterogeneous break
moments
Negative variance break Positive variance break
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 25 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.9 84.6 92.6 99.6 100.0 6.1 6.0 6.1 7.2 27.8 33.3 53.8 83.0
50 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.6 96.1 97.7 100.0 100.0 5.7 4.6 5.5 5.5 50.5 59.0 84.2 99.0
100 6.2 5.3 5.2 4.7 95.7 97.6 100.0 100.0 5.6 5.5 5.7 4.6 68.8 72.1 94.9 99.9
200 6.1 5.3 5.2 5.2 92.6 95.7 99.8 100.0 6.1 6.3 5.8 5.3 72.1 75.1 95.0 99.8
τ¯IV 25 3.5 3.3 2.6 1.2 53.8 67.8 90.8 99.5 3.8 3.6 2.2 1.4 20.7 23.6 35.1 51.8
50 4.3 3.2 2.7 2.9 85.1 93.9 100.0 100.0 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.1 46.6 58.6 87.3 99.4
100 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 95.0 99.4 100.0 100.0 3.9 3.5 3.8 3.4 74.9 88.0 99.5 100.0
200 4.1 4.0 3.1 3.2 97.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.8 4.5 3.7 3.4 90.6 97.8 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 6.9 8.1 10.9 13.1 62.8 78.6 97.0 100.0 6.8 7.8 8.1 11.1 28.7 38.0 61.3 88.2
50 6.4 5.8 6.4 7.7 86.7 95.2 100.0 100.0 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.6 52.4 66.8 92.1 99.8
100 5.3 5.0 5.8 5.9 95.3 99.4 100.0 100.0 4.7 4.6 5.6 5.5 78.0 90.0 99.7 100.0
200 5.0 4.8 4.5 5.3 97.6 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.8 5.5 4.9 4.8 91.2 98.1 100.0 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 6.3 6.6 7.1 7.5 86.9 92.9 99.7 100.0 5.7 5.0 6.4 7.1 28.2 34.8 55.0 82.6
50 6.0 5.5 5.6 5.3 95.8 98.0 100.0 100.0 5.7 5.1 4.8 5.0 51.7 58.3 85.2 98.7
100 5.5 5.9 5.3 4.6 95.7 97.9 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.8 5.1 4.4 69.5 73.1 95.0 99.8
200 5.9 5.6 5.2 5.4 93.0 95.0 99.8 100.0 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.0 73.0 75.3 95.9 99.7
τ¯IV 25 4.0 3.4 2.1 1.5 57.6 70.2 92.6 99.7 3.5 3.2 2.3 1.6 20.1 24.3 35.2 52.9
50 4.3 4.1 3.6 2.4 87.3 95.5 100.0 100.0 4.4 3.7 3.4 2.7 48.4 60.7 87.4 99.4
100 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.6 96.0 99.5 100.0 100.0 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.2 75.8 88.7 99.6 100.0
200 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4 98.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.5 92.0 98.0 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 7.5 8.7 10.3 13.4 65.7 79.8 97.9 100.0 6.5 7.3 9.2 11.9 28.4 39.2 61.6 88.5
50 6.4 6.8 7.0 7.1 88.6 96.4 100.0 100.0 5.8 5.5 5.9 6.4 54.6 68.6 92.4 99.8
100 5.3 5.2 5.3 6.3 96.3 99.6 100.0 100.0 4.8 4.6 4.6 5.1 79.3 91.4 99.8 100.0
200 4.3 4.6 5.4 5.4 98.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 92.7 98.3 100.0 100.0
Factor model
tHS 25 8.2 8.0 9.0 9.2 24.4 22.5 22.6 23.7 6.4 5.9 6.6 7.1 27.2 30.5 41.8 55.3
50 8.9 8.9 9.5 9.8 28.4 27.4 27.5 28.6 6.0 5.6 6.2 6.4 46.8 51.2 65.6 78.1
100 9.0 8.9 9.4 10.1 30.4 28.1 29.8 30.2 6.3 5.8 6.4 6.6 61.9 63.0 79.9 88.7
200 9.0 8.6 9.6 9.3 29.5 27.8 30.8 29.4 6.5 6.0 6.8 6.2 65.4 65.4 83.5 92.9
τ¯IV 25 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 18.1 25.7 18.0 18.7 4.3 3.8 2.7 1.5 20.8 23.0 28.0 31.1
50 2.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 44.6 66.0 59.5 71.5 4.3 3.9 3.1 1.8 44.0 53.2 68.4 81.8
100 3.1 2.5 2.0 0.9 62.4 81.9 81.4 89.9 4.1 3.9 3.5 2.4 68.9 80.1 92.8 98.4
200 3.5 3.8 3.5 2.5 70.1 86.0 91.2 97.0 4.7 4.5 4.1 3.0 83.0 92.5 98.8 100.0
tDH 25 6.8 6.8 7.7 7.6 21.1 20.7 20.2 22.1 6.6 6.8 8.3 9.3 26.6 30.4 37.9 46.5
50 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.9 27.8 28.6 27.9 29.9 5.6 5.7 6.6 7.2 44.0 50.4 59.9 67.9
100 6.3 6.8 7.6 7.4 33.6 32.7 33.6 35.6 5.3 5.2 6.4 6.6 64.0 69.3 77.7 83.6
200 6.7 6.5 6.7 7.1 36.8 35.9 38.4 37.7 5.7 5.1 5.7 5.3 76.6 81.4 88.5 91.8
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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Table 2.3: Empirical rejection frequencies under early variance break
Negative variance break Positive variance break
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 25 10.5 10.3 11.2 12.9 88.7 93.1 99.5 100.0 5.5 5.2 5.6 6.2 48.1 58.1 84.5 98.8
50 6.4 6.1 7.2 7.9 96.6 98.3 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.2 5.3 4.9 73.0 80.2 98.0 100.0
100 4.8 5.7 5.4 5.2 95.2 97.7 100.0 100.0 5.6 4.8 4.6 4.5 81.6 85.8 99.3 100.0
200 5.1 4.8 5.4 5.2 90.1 96.0 100.0 100.0 5.7 5.2 5.6 5.2 77.7 81.5 98.7 100.0
τ¯IV 25 7.7 6.9 5.8 4.5 83.8 92.4 99.5 100.0 4.6 3.7 2.7 1.4 33.9 43.8 61.9 80.9
50 6.7 6.6 6.3 4.4 96.0 98.9 100.0 100.0 5.2 4.3 4.6 3.7 72.1 85.7 99.1 100.0
100 6.1 5.4 5.6 5.4 97.7 99.8 100.0 100.0 4.5 5.0 4.1 4.4 91.8 98.1 100.0 100.0
200 4.9 4.6 4.8 5.8 98.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.8 5.0 5.4 4.6 97.5 99.8 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 8.6 10.4 13.2 13.3 86.9 95.3 99.7 100.0 6.2 6.0 7.9 9.9 40.0 53.8 81.7 98.2
50 8.1 8.8 12.6 17.4 93.9 97.8 100.0 100.0 5.7 5.2 6.4 6.0 72.9 86.8 99.3 100.0
100 6.8 6.4 6.8 8.7 95.8 99.5 100.0 100.0 4.7 5.1 4.8 5.0 91.8 98.0 100.0 100.0
200 5.1 4.9 5.0 6.9 97.5 99.8 100.0 100.0 4.9 5.0 5.4 4.9 97.5 99.8 100.0 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 8.9 10.6 11.3 11.8 92.7 95.6 99.7 100.0 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.7 47.3 59.1 84.2 99.0
50 6.1 6.9 7.5 7.4 97.8 99.0 100.0 100.0 5.2 4.5 4.3 5.0 73.5 81.1 98.0 100.0
100 5.3 5.7 5.0 5.4 96.4 98.6 100.0 100.0 5.4 4.7 4.6 4.7 81.8 86.2 99.5 100.0
200 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.2 91.7 96.6 100.0 100.0 5.8 5.3 5.3 4.7 78.2 81.4 98.3 100.0
τ¯IV 25 7.9 7.6 5.5 4.4 90.2 95.9 99.9 100.0 4.5 3.6 2.8 1.5 34.5 44.4 61.7 80.5
50 6.9 6.9 6.0 3.9 97.3 99.5 100.0 100.0 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.1 71.7 85.6 98.9 100.0
100 5.5 5.4 6.2 5.7 98.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.6 91.7 97.8 100.0 100.0
200 4.7 5.5 5.3 5.4 99.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 4.4 4.5 4.1 97.5 99.9 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 9.3 10.9 12.5 13.3 90.8 96.5 99.9 100.0 6.2 6.8 7.5 8.9 41.6 54.8 81.8 98.0
50 7.6 9.4 13.0 16.2 95.1 98.9 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.3 71.9 86.6 99.3 100.0
100 6.7 6.6 8.0 9.6 97.2 99.8 100.0 100.0 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.3 91.4 97.7 100.0 100.0
200 5.0 6.0 5.9 6.2 98.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.1 4.5 4.8 4.2 97.4 99.8 100.0 100.0
Factor model
tHS 25 8.6 8.5 8.9 9.1 17.3 16.4 16.0 17.6 5.7 5.4 6.0 6.8 45.0 53.7 72.5 87.2
50 9.5 9.2 9.5 10.0 20.2 19.7 19.9 20.0 5.6 5.3 5.2 6.1 69.9 74.1 91.7 97.2
100 9.7 9.4 9.3 9.9 22.2 19.9 21.1 21.2 5.4 5.2 5.1 4.9 78.8 81.2 96.2 99.1
200 9.7 9.2 9.9 9.1 21.2 20.0 21.6 20.5 5.9 5.8 6.1 5.7 75.1 78.2 96.0 99.4
τ¯IV 25 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 21.4 15.6 25.1 4.4 3.4 2.2 1.2 31.7 39.1 50.6 61.9
50 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 31.7 55.5 38.6 53.5 4.8 4.0 3.2 2.1 68.2 79.2 94.4 98.8
100 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.1 45.2 69.6 54.6 67.4 4.8 4.9 4.0 2.0 88.8 95.8 99.6 100.0
200 2.5 1.8 1.5 0.8 54.3 73.6 71.1 81.8 4.5 4.3 4.4 3.0 96.3 98.8 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 7.1 6.4 7.1 7.7 16.0 15.6 15.5 16.3 6.4 6.3 7.3 8.7 37.8 48.4 67.2 81.7
50 6.8 7.4 7.6 8.3 19.7 19.5 19.7 20.7 5.4 5.8 5.8 6.6 66.8 76.9 90.0 94.9
100 6.7 7.2 7.7 7.3 22.2 22.0 22.7 23.5 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.3 86.4 92.1 97.6 99.2
200 7.0 6.6 7.3 7.4 24.6 24.2 25.8 24.1 4.6 5.0 6.3 5.5 94.1 97.1 99.5 99.9
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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not beneficial—impact on the small sample performances of the tests. In fact, the
impact of strong cross-unit correlation on tHS ’s performance is no more observed
now and, hence, of all variance break scenarios, the test displays its best size control
under early positive variance break.
Table 2.4 reports empirical rejection frequencies when volatility shifts occur in
the middle of the time series. A notable observation here is that as the timing of
variance breaks is delayed, size distortions associated with early negative variance
break subside down while those of early upward shift become more pronounced. This
general tendency is also strengthened by results obtained under late variance break
as documented in Table 2.5. In particular, it is only as long as the shift does not
occur late in the time series that positive variance break mitigates size distortions
of tHS in strongly correlated panels. Conversely, it is only when the break occurs
early or halfway, but not late, in the time series that this test displays significant
size distortions associated with negative variance break for T = 25.
As a last simulation exercise, we consider cases of multiple variance breaks
per each individual time series in a panel. The left-hand side block of Table 2.6
reports empirical rejection frequencies of the considered tests when contemporaneous
subperiods are restricted to feature similar volatility shifts. In this case, and
when the errors additionally feature weak to no cross-sectional correlation, tHS
holds superior size control while tDH is oversized for small values of T and τ¯IV
is undersized if T is not relatively larger than N . In strongly dependent panels,
tDH has the best size control of all the considered tests, as τ¯IV becomes even more
undersized and tHS shows about 0.5% overrejections than tDH . Yet, it is evident
that the presence of multiple variance breaks reduces tDH ’s advantage over tHS for
strongly correlated panel. Therefore, tHS overall exhibits the best size precision of
all tests under multiple variance breaks that follow identical trends across panel
units. The right-hand side block of Table 2.6 documents results obtained by
allowing contemporaneous subperiods to experience randomly different volatility
paths. With the new setting, tHS performs even better than under the former
variance break scenario as the impact of strongly correlated errors appear to be
offset by asynchronous volatility shifts. Although the distortions of both Cauchy
tests, τ¯IV and tDH , appear to be slightly smaller than their respective counterparts
documented in the left-hand side, they, however, remain visibly substantial. In
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Table 2.4: Empirical rejection frequencies under middle variance break
Negative variance break Positive variance break
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 25 6.4 6.5 8.3 9.1 98.4 99.7 100.0 100.0 5.6 6.0 7.9 8.9 25.1 32.4 52.1 77.2
50 5.6 5.0 5.1 5.6 99.8 99.9 100.0 100.0 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.7 51.2 60.1 86.2 99.0
100 4.8 5.1 4.7 5.1 99.3 99.9 100.0 100.0 5.0 5.4 5.1 4.6 72.3 78.0 97.3 100.0
200 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.9 98.1 99.7 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.1 77.0 82.5 98.6 100.0
τ¯IV 25 4.8 3.7 2.4 1.3 63.3 75.7 95.7 99.9 4.6 3.5 2.5 1.2 20.5 23.6 30.9 40.4
50 4.4 4.7 4.1 3.2 90.6 97.3 100.0 100.0 5.1 4.6 3.9 3.2 50.2 62.5 86.7 99.1
100 4.8 5.0 4.6 4.7 97.6 99.6 100.0 100.0 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.1 78.9 91.1 99.8 100.0
200 4.5 5.1 4.7 4.4 98.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.1 4.7 5.9 4.9 93.3 98.7 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 7.4 8.0 10.5 13.7 68.8 81.5 97.9 100.0 6.4 7.3 10.0 11.5 27.0 36.5 58.6 83.3
50 5.4 5.8 6.1 7.3 89.5 96.7 100.0 100.0 5.6 5.4 5.5 6.3 52.2 65.1 89.9 99.6
100 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.8 96.7 99.4 100.0 100.0 4.5 5.1 5.0 4.8 78.7 91.0 99.8 100.0
200 4.6 5.1 5.0 5.1 98.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.0 4.9 5.8 5.0 92.9 98.5 100.0 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 6.6 7.3 6.8 8.8 99.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 6.2 6.6 7.3 9.4 26.1 30.9 50.0 79.0
50 5.3 4.6 5.7 6.0 99.7 99.9 100.0 100.0 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.3 50.2 59.9 86.6 99.2
100 5.0 5.2 4.8 4.8 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.5 4.4 5.0 5.3 72.8 78.7 97.6 100.0
200 5.6 5.2 4.8 5.0 98.4 99.8 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.2 5.5 5.1 77.8 82.2 98.7 100.0
τ¯IV 25 4.3 4.0 2.5 0.8 65.9 77.9 97.1 100.0 4.8 3.7 2.4 0.9 21.4 24.2 30.4 41.8
50 4.9 4.6 4.2 2.9 92.1 98.3 100.0 100.0 4.5 4.5 3.7 3.4 50.7 62.9 87.9 99.2
100 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.1 98.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.5 80.0 92.2 99.9 100.0
200 5.0 5.2 4.3 4.6 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.6 5.0 5.2 4.6 93.9 98.8 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 7.3 8.2 9.9 13.2 71.1 82.9 98.6 100.0 7.4 7.2 9.0 12.3 28.0 37.4 56.7 84.0
50 5.9 5.6 6.2 7.2 90.8 97.9 100.0 100.0 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.6 52.9 66.2 91.0 99.7
100 4.9 5.5 5.5 5.4 97.8 99.8 100.0 100.0 4.8 4.9 5.6 5.3 79.9 91.9 99.8 100.0
200 5.1 5.3 4.8 4.8 98.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.7 5.3 5.5 5.0 93.8 98.7 100.0 100.0
Factor model
tHS 25 8.8 8.3 8.5 8.9 24.6 23.0 23.5 24.8 6.4 6.7 7.7 8.9 24.8 28.8 38.5 47.0
50 9.7 9.3 9.3 9.9 30.2 28.1 28.3 29.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 7.7 44.7 47.9 60.9 72.0
100 9.5 9.2 9.2 10.0 31.9 29.2 30.3 31.2 6.2 6.6 6.0 6.5 62.3 64.2 78.4 85.7
200 9.9 9.0 9.8 9.2 30.6 28.1 31.5 29.4 6.0 5.8 7.2 6.3 68.4 67.6 84.6 91.7
τ¯IV 25 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.0 19.5 26.8 18.8 22.8 5.5 4.3 3.6 2.0 21.6 23.0 25.7 28.7
50 2.3 1.5 0.4 0.1 47.8 69.1 61.4 72.2 5.1 5.1 3.1 2.0 44.8 51.0 63.4 75.3
100 3.3 2.9 1.9 0.5 64.4 84.2 82.5 89.9 5.4 4.9 3.4 2.1 70.4 80.3 91.1 97.1
200 4.3 3.6 3.3 2.3 72.9 87.6 92.0 96.7 4.9 4.3 4.3 2.7 85.3 92.9 98.8 99.8
tDH 25 6.9 6.3 7.1 7.4 21.8 21.8 22.0 23.1 7.1 7.0 8.5 9.3 23.9 27.6 35.6 41.6
50 6.4 6.9 6.9 7.9 29.1 29.2 29.2 31.0 5.8 6.5 6.2 7.8 42.4 46.7 55.6 63.0
100 6.0 6.6 7.1 7.8 34.9 34.9 35.1 37.0 5.9 6.2 5.8 6.4 63.4 67.9 74.5 80.2
200 7.0 6.5 7.1 7.4 38.7 36.6 40.0 39.9 5.7 5.0 6.3 6.2 77.3 79.3 87.5 90.4
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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Table 2.5: Empirical rejection frequencies under late variance break
Negative variance break Positive variance break
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 25 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.5 58.1 68.6 91.7 99.6 5.2 4.8 4.7 5.2 34.4 41.4 56.2 72.9
50 5.3 5.4 5.2 4.7 83.2 88.6 99.7 100.0 4.4 4.7 5.3 4.3 34.4 38.8 59.6 82.2
100 5.3 4.8 5.1 5.2 88.7 92.0 99.9 100.0 4.9 4.2 4.9 4.7 32.2 35.0 57.9 85.0
200 4.9 5.5 4.7 4.8 83.5 89.4 99.5 100.0 4.7 5.3 4.8 4.6 34.3 35.9 59.6 86.1
τ¯IV 25 4.1 3.8 2.4 1.3 44.1 54.9 78.0 95.3 4.1 3.6 2.4 1.6 28.6 38.0 58.5 86.3
50 4.9 5.0 4.5 3.0 79.1 90.1 99.9 100.0 4.6 4.6 3.7 2.3 45.4 56.4 88.8 99.9
100 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.1 94.5 98.9 100.0 100.0 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 53.5 69.7 95.1 100.0
200 4.6 5.1 4.7 5.1 97.7 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.3 5.6 4.7 4.5 65.3 83.8 99.1 100.0
tDH 25 5.5 6.1 6.9 7.8 48.2 63.5 89.3 99.6 6.5 7.4 8.3 10.4 39.1 50.8 73.1 91.1
50 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.3 79.1 90.4 99.7 100.0 6.0 6.3 7.0 8.1 51.1 62.4 86.5 98.2
100 5.1 4.9 5.4 5.5 93.5 98.9 100.0 100.0 5.2 5.2 5.4 6.2 56.4 71.1 94.6 99.9
200 4.8 5.3 4.9 5.2 97.4 99.8 100.0 100.0 4.9 5.9 5.4 5.3 66.8 83.6 98.9 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 5.6 5.1 5.8 6.5 57.9 69.3 92.1 99.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.8 34.3 40.2 57.1 72.4
50 5.4 5.1 4.8 5.1 83.5 89.6 99.5 100.0 4.9 5.0 4.5 4.3 36.0 40.2 60.8 82.7
100 5.5 5.0 4.7 5.0 89.3 92.4 100.0 100.0 4.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 32.8 36.0 59.3 85.5
200 5.3 4.6 5.1 5.5 84.9 88.9 99.7 100.0 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.6 36.8 37.1 60.9 87.0
τ¯IV 25 4.4 3.9 2.6 1.7 44.9 56.0 80.4 96.5 3.8 3.4 2.3 1.2 28.4 37.4 61.0 88.6
50 4.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 80.8 92.2 99.8 100.0 4.3 4.5 3.5 2.9 46.0 60.1 90.4 99.8
100 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.2 94.9 99.1 100.0 100.0 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 56.2 72.0 96.6 100.0
200 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.1 98.7 99.9 100.0 100.0 4.6 4.2 5.1 4.8 72.0 86.3 99.4 100.0
tDH 25 6.0 6.2 7.6 8.0 49.4 64.3 91.1 99.6 6.7 7.8 8.7 9.9 39.1 51.6 74.5 91.5
50 5.1 5.7 4.8 6.4 80.5 92.2 99.9 100.0 5.5 6.3 6.8 8.0 51.7 65.3 88.2 98.3
100 4.9 5.1 5.1 4.7 94.6 98.9 100.0 100.0 5.2 5.1 5.7 6.0 58.3 72.7 95.5 99.9
200 4.8 4.6 5.5 5.3 98.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.1 72.0 86.8 99.3 100.0
Factor model
tHS 25 7.9 8.3 8.6 8.7 25.3 23.8 24.7 26.3 8.2 8.8 9.0 9.1 22.4 22.0 22.7 25.3
50 8.6 8.5 9.2 9.2 31.3 30.1 31.4 32.6 7.5 7.7 8.4 9.4 26.4 25.7 29.5 32.6
100 8.6 8.5 9.0 9.4 34.6 32.6 34.5 35.8 7.5 6.9 7.6 8.4 27.4 27.3 33.0 37.1
200 8.6 8.7 9.1 9.2 34.6 33.8 35.5 35.0 7.2 7.5 8.2 7.7 31.2 29.8 36.6 39.0
τ¯IV 25 2.2 1.1 0.3 0.0 18.0 21.7 14.0 9.9 2.3 1.4 0.4 0.1 15.5 19.0 16.1 13.9
50 3.2 2.7 1.2 0.2 44.4 61.6 60.9 70.1 2.7 2.4 1.2 0.3 31.0 43.3 53.6 67.4
100 3.8 3.4 3.1 1.6 64.7 82.8 85.6 93.2 3.6 3.3 2.1 1.1 42.5 60.3 74.6 89.0
200 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.2 74.5 89.1 94.6 98.5 4.1 3.9 3.4 2.5 52.7 69.5 85.9 95.6
tDH 25 7.1 6.8 7.2 7.3 22.3 22.0 23.6 24.9 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.3 22.1 22.0 23.5 25.5
50 6.4 6.5 7.9 7.7 31.4 30.4 31.8 34.0 6.4 7.0 7.8 8.4 28.8 29.1 31.6 34.9
100 6.0 6.8 7.0 7.8 38.1 38.4 39.5 40.8 5.3 6.7 7.2 7.9 34.9 37.2 40.5 42.6
200 6.5 5.6 7.3 6.9 43.1 42.2 45.7 45.5 5.8 5.5 6.9 6.9 42.5 44.2 49.2 49.9
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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Table 2.6: Empirical rejection frequencies under multiple variance break
Homogenous variance breaks Heterogenous variance breaks
size power size power
T N 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106 16 26 56 106
CS independence
tHS 30 6.4 6.2 7.3 8.6 65.7 70.5 82.2 92.0 6.1 6.8 6.1 6.8 61.7 69.5 89.0 99.0
50 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.3 77.8 81.6 92.1 96.9 5.6 5.4 5.0 5.1 76.6 81.6 97.1 100.0
100 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 82.1 86.7 96.7 99.7 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.7 83.0 84.8 98.6 100.0
200 5.3 4.9 5.0 4.3 79.5 82.5 97.7 100.0 5.1 5.1 4.6 5.1 79.0 81.5 97.9 100.0
τ¯IV 30 5.0 4.2 3.3 1.6 49.2 57.7 71.9 81.6 2.8 3.6 2.4 1.8 32.2 41.8 66.1 90.4
50 5.7 5.2 4.1 2.9 71.1 80.5 92.9 97.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.1 64.9 77.5 97.8 100.0
100 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.3 89.7 96.4 99.6 99.9 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.1 89.4 96.7 100.0 100.0
200 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.7 96.8 99.5 100.0 100.0 5.0 4.2 4.3 4.3 96.8 99.5 100.0 100.0
tDH 30 6.9 7.5 9.7 12.8 52.3 63.6 82.3 93.0 6.3 7.9 8.8 11.1 45.6 58.9 86.8 99.0
50 6.1 6.0 7.4 9.3 72.5 81.7 94.4 98.6 6.7 6.1 7.5 8.5 70.6 83.8 99.0 100.0
100 5.0 5.4 5.9 5.9 89.6 96.1 99.6 99.9 5.2 5.5 6.2 6.4 89.9 97.4 100.0 100.0
200 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 96.5 99.4 100.0 100.0 5.3 4.7 5.1 5.1 96.8 99.5 100.0 100.0
SAR(1) model
tHS 25 5.7 6.0 6.5 8.2 66.5 72.0 83.6 92.5 6.0 5.2 6.2 6.3 60.2 68.8 89.3 99.2
50 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.2 77.4 83.0 93.1 97.3 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.2 76.2 81.5 97.1 99.9
100 5.0 5.1 4.2 4.2 83.1 86.3 97.4 99.8 5.2 5.2 4.3 4.1 83.4 85.2 98.8 100.0
200 5.3 4.9 5.0 4.6 78.8 82.9 97.8 99.9 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.8 79.2 82.1 98.0 100.0
τ¯IV 25 4.7 4.3 2.8 1.7 50.6 59.1 75.1 85.8 2.9 2.6 2.0 2.0 33.6 42.8 68.1 91.3
50 5.1 4.8 4.7 3.1 72.3 83.3 94.1 98.1 4.0 4.0 3.5 2.9 65.1 79.3 98.0 100.0
100 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.7 90.9 96.3 99.7 100.0 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.9 90.2 97.3 100.0 100.0
200 4.5 5.2 5.0 5.1 97.2 99.7 100.0 100.0 4.8 5.3 3.8 4.7 97.3 99.8 100.0 100.0
tDH 25 6.6 7.1 9.4 12.1 55.1 67.1 84.9 95.2 6.9 6.7 8.5 11.1 45.0 59.2 88.4 99.3
50 6.4 6.8 7.5 8.6 73.7 84.4 95.3 99.1 6.4 6.8 7.4 7.9 71.2 84.1 98.9 100.0
100 5.5 5.9 5.6 6.3 90.2 96.2 99.8 100.0 5.2 5.6 5.5 6.0 90.9 97.6 100.0 100.0
200 4.4 5.0 5.1 5.7 96.8 99.5 100.0 100.0 5.2 6.1 4.8 5.9 97.4 99.8 100.0 100.0
Factor model
tHS 30 7.6 8.1 8.0 8.1 47.7 49.2 53.9 58.4 6.2 6.7 6.6 7.1 51.0 54.6 63.4 72.7
50 6.8 6.8 7.9 8.0 59.2 59.6 67.3 71.4 6.1 5.5 6.2 6.8 63.2 64.2 76.1 82.6
100 6.1 6.2 6.9 6.4 68.3 69.8 78.8 83.1 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.1 70.5 70.6 83.2 88.1
200 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.7 68.6 68.8 82.5 87.2 5.9 6.3 6.2 6.4 69.5 68.8 83.5 90.1
τ¯IV 30 3.4 2.7 1.8 0.8 36.4 43.3 48.0 52.4 3.1 3.2 2.2 0.8 31.7 38.8 44.7 52.4
50 3.7 2.9 1.5 0.5 57.7 66.3 72.4 78.0 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.0 57.8 68.7 83.0 93.4
100 3.7 3.1 1.6 0.6 79.1 88.1 93.4 95.9 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.0 83.2 92.3 98.9 99.8
200 3.9 3.5 2.3 1.1 92.0 96.5 98.9 99.7 4.7 4.4 4.3 2.6 93.2 98.5 99.9 100.0
tDH 30 6.6 7.6 7.8 8.3 39.6 44.5 50.0 53.2 6.0 7.1 8.4 8.4 37.5 42.7 48.7 55.0
50 6.2 6.4 6.6 8.2 54.6 58.3 64.0 68.2 5.9 6.2 6.9 8.2 55.9 60.8 69.8 76.1
100 5.1 6.1 6.5 6.9 72.5 76.7 82.5 84.3 5.3 5.4 6.4 6.7 75.7 81.2 87.0 91.3
200 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.5 85.1 87.3 92.6 93.4 5.6 5.0 5.6 5.7 86.0 88.9 94.8 96.5
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7).
Simulation results are based on 5000 replications and the nominal size equals 5%. All
tests are computed on prewhitened and (recursively) detrended data.
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particular, the empirical sizes reach as small as 0.8% for τ¯IV and as high as 11.1%
for tDH while rejection frequencies of tHS range between 4.1–7.1%.
2.4.3 Summary of simulation results
Overall, the main findings of the Monte Carlo study on the comparative small sample
properties of tHS, τ¯IV and tDH can be summarized as follows.
1. There are noticeable small sample performance differences among the three
tests even under time-invariant volatility. In this case, the two White-type
tests, tHS and tDH , exhibit very good size properties in independent and
weakly dependent panels except that tDH is slightly over-sized for the smallest
considered time dimension (T = 25). In strongly correlated panels, however,
tHS is about 2.0 % more over-sized than tDH . Of the three tests, τ¯IV displays
the most severe size distortions, with its empirical size completely vanishing
as N increases for a given T , and especially so under strong cross-sectional
correlation.
2. The impact of volatility shifts on the empirical rejection frequencies of the
tests depend on both the direction and timing of the breaks. In general, the
most severe size distortions are observed when all the panel units uniformly
experience early downward volatility shifts. In this setting, and under weak or
no cross-unit dependence, even tHS rejects the null hypothesis too frequently
(12.9%) when T = 25 although tHD’s over-rejections are seen when T = 50 as
well, with its empirical sizes becoming as high as 17.4%. The two tests do not
exhibit such distortion associated with small T for strongly correlated panels,
however. In the latter case, it is τ¯IV that displays most severe size distortions,
with a maximum of only 0.2% rejection rates observed in more than half of
the considered T and N combinations.
3. On the contrary, positive variance break significantly distorts empirical sizes
of the tests when it occurs late in the time series. The effects of late positive
variance break, albeit being somehow muted, are by and large similar to
those of early negative variance break. Interestingly, early and middle positive
variance breaks appear to offset the upward size distortions of tHS in strongly
correlated panels observed even under homoskedasticity. In this volatility shift
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scenario, tHS clearly outperforms the two Cauchy tests irrespective of the type
of cross-sectional dependence present in the data.
4. The occurrence of multiple variance breaks per each panel unit does not
appear to pose additional challenges to the small sample performances of
the considered tests. On the contrary, it allows tHS to take advantage of
the available early to middle upward volatility shifts and, thereby, display the
best size control of all the considered tests in all the cross-sectional dependence
scenarios.
5. All tests appear to be equally powerful in independent and weakly dependent
panels apart from the fact that tHS is less powerful for the smallest considered
cross-sectional dimensions N = 16, and = 26. Moreover, all tests are less
powerful under cross-sectional dependence than independence; the smallest
empirical probabilities of rejecting the alternative hypothesis are reported
when the errors are strongly correlated. In most of the volatility shift cases
involving strongly correlated errors, tHS and τ¯IV appear to be the least and the
most powerful tests, respectively, although tHS is only marginally less powerful
than tDH .
2.5 An empirical application: the long-run causality in the
finance-growth nexus
2.5.1 Economic background
The relationship between financial development—improvements in the quality and
quantity of financial instruments and services—and economic growth has been
extensively discussed in the past century. Existing theoretical predictions on the
direction of causality between finance and growth can be grouped into three.
First, Schumpeter (1911), McKinnon (1973) and Levine (2005) emphasize that
the financial sector development induces economic growth by enhancing both
the volume and efficiency of investment through various ways. For instance, a
developed financial sector mobilizes a larger volume of savings and more efficiently
identifies high-return projects. It also allows economic agents to diversify inter-
temporal and cross-sectional risks. Furthermore, it facilitates the exchange of
30
Chapter 2 heteroskedasticity-robust panel unit root tests
goods and services, thereby reducing transaction costs. The latter is in particular
crucial for technological innovation which increasingly demands a higher degree of
specialization that, in turn, entails an increased number of transactions (Greenwood
and Smith, 1997). Second, Robinson (1952) argues that financial development does
not cause economic growth; rather, it simply occurs in response to the demand
generated by a growing real sector. Third, Patrick (1966) and Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990) hypothesize that the causality between finance and growth is
bidirectional. This group also propose that the direction of causality depends
on an economy’s level of development. According to Patrick (1966), the finance-
growth (FG) causality runs from finance to growth at an earlier stage of economic
development, and in the reverse direction as the economy develops. In contrast,
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) emphasize that the creation and deployment
of financial institutions is very costly. As a result, they predict that financial
development arises—and, hence, starts to promote economic growth—endogenously
at a later stage of economic development.
Empirically, the FG causality has attracted several contributions in the past
two decades. However, the evidence remains generally mixed. On the one hand,
several cross-country studies consistently document that financial development has
a positive impact on economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000;
Beck et al., 2000b; Hassan et al., 2011). Although most of these studies apply certain
econometric tools to ensure that the potential endogeneity of financial development
does not yield biased estimates, they, however, do not explicitly test whether growth
indeed causes finance. On the other hand, the evidence from economy-specific
time series studies, which usually apply cointegration tests, is inconclusive (see
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Xu, 2000; Ang and McKibbin, 2007). These time-
series-based contributions are, however, constrained by a typically small number
of observations, making the reliability of the results from the cointegration tests
questionable. For this reason, application of panel cointegration tests in the FG
causality has received considerable attention in recent years (Christopoulos and
Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al., 2007). Using data from ten developing economies,
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) find a unidirectional causality from financial
depth to economic growth. On the contrary, Apergis et al. (2007) diagnose a
bidirectional causality between finance and growth in a panel of 15 OECD and 50
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non-OECD economies. These results, however, have to be interpreted carefully,
as the employed PURTs exhibit significant size distortions under time-varying
innovation variances. In the following, we will analyze the FG causality using
data from 74 economies spanning the period 1975–2005. To this end, we first
demonstrate the existence of volatility breaks in the employed economic growth
and financial development measures. Subsequently, we apply the three PURTs
considered in this chapter, utilize error-correction-based panel cointegration tests
and discuss estimation results.
2.5.2 Data
Our data set covers 74 economies over the period 1975–2005. The economies are
selected depending on data availability. To examine whether causal effects depend on
stages of economic development, we classify economies into four income groups: low-
income (19), lower-middle income (18), upper-middle income (16), and high-income
(25) economies. The list of economies in each group is provided in Chapter 5.B.
We measure financial development using credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions to the non-financial private sector as a percentage of GDP
(PRV ). This data is taken from the 2008 update of the Financial Development
and Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000a)5. PRV is a widely used measure
of financial development for the reason that it excludes credit to the public sector
and, moreover, it leaves out credit issued by the central bank (Beck et al., 2000a;
Levine et al., 2000). Following standard practice in the FG nexus literature (e.g.,
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al.,
2007), we measure economic growth by real GDP per capita (GDPPC). Summary
statistics and a broader discussion of the data can be found in Chapter 5.3.1.
To get an impression of the volatility processes governing the sample data, we
estimate variance profiles ϑˆi(s) of GDPPC and PRV , and their first differences,
DGDPPC and DPRV (see Cavaliere and Taylor, 2007b for details and alternative
estimators of variance profiles). Variance profiles ϑi(s) are calculated as
ϑˆi(s) =
∑⌊sT ⌋
t=1 eˆ
2
it + (sT − ⌊sT ⌋)eˆ
2
i⌊sT ⌋+1∑T
t=1 eˆ
2
it
, (2.16)
5http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
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where the eˆit’s are residuals from the first order autoregression of the considered
process. Figure 2.1 displays estimated variance profiles of the time series for the
comprehensive cross section (74 economies). The broken 45¨ı¿1
2
line represents
a (perfectly) homoskedastic variance profile, and significant deviations from the
diagonal indicate time-varying volatilities. The figure reveals that variances are time
Figure 2.1: Estimated variance profiles, 74 economies
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varying for most economies. Moreover, while estimated variance profiles markedly
differ across economies, financial development exhibits greater volatility than
economic growth. In the following, we apply heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs to
examine the order of integration of GDPPC and PRV . Subsequently, we diagnose
the long-run FG casuality by means of error-correction-based panel cointegration
tests.
2.5.3 Panel unit root test results
Testing the existence of a long-run FG relationship involves a two-step procedure. In
the first step, the order of integration of GDPPC and PRV should be diagnosed.
These variables are expected to be integrated of order one, denoted as I(1). To
confirm this, it is necessary that we fail to reject the null of unit root when the
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variables are used in levels (GDPPC and PRV ), but not when the variables are
first-differenced (DGDPPC and DPRV ). The second step involves testing whether
the two I(1) variables are cointegrated.
To test if GDPPC and PRV are I(1) variables, we first prewhiten the raw
data according to the procedure discussed in Section 2.3.1. The lag length of
the first-differenced series in the prewhitening regression is set to one.6 Assuming
that the variables contain a non-zero mean under the stationary alternative, we
recursively demean the prewhitened data. In the FG literature, it is common to
report PURT results with and with out trends. In fact, it seems more realistic to
expect GDPPC and PRV to be either random walks with drift or trend stationary
processes. However, we have discussed in Section 2.3.2 that in such cases available
PURTs and detrending schemes do not yield sensible results under time-varying
volatility, which we have shown is the case in our data. As a result, we restrict
ourselves to testing unit roots on recursively demeaned data, and hence, the results
should be interpreted with caution.
Table 2.7 documents PURT results of the empirical application. Entries in the
upper panel of the table refer to PURT statistics for the levels while the lower panel
report results for first differences. Numbers in parentheses are p−values obtained
from the standard Gaussian distribution. Results documented in the upper left
block of Table 2.7 indicate that, in all considered cross sections, the null of a unit
root for GDPPC cannot be rejected at 5% significance level. Indeed, the minimum
p-value we could obtain is 26%. This result is in line with our expectation and
consistent with related literature (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al.,
2007). Regarding PRV , results documented in Table 2.7 indicate that applying
either of the three tests leads to rejection of the null of nonstationarity of PRV
in low-, upper-middle-, and high-income economies. For the panel of lower-middle
income economies as well as for the comprehensive panel, however, the employed
tests offer contradicting evidence about the order of integration of PRV . As we have
established using Monte Carlo simulations that τIV displays severe downward size
distortions for N not relatively smaller than T , its suggestion not to reject the null
cannot be taken seriously. Observed patterns from the simulation exercise might also
6We prefer a common lag length to economy-specific lag lengths in order to retain a balanced
panel.
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Table 2.7: Panel unit root test results
GDPPC PRV
Cross section tHS τ¯IV tDH tHS τ¯IV tDH
Variables in levels
Low income -0.642 0.492 0.385 -1.096 -0.510 -0.243
(0.260) (0.689) (0.650) (0.137) (0.305) (0.404)
Lower middle 0.824 0.617 0.952 -1.774 -1.227 -1.522
(0.795) (0.731) (0.830) (0.038) (0.110) (0.064)
Upper middle 1.452 1.799 2.038 -1.527 -0.778 -0.947
(0.927) (0.964) (0.979) (0.063) (0.218) (0.172)
High income 1.137 0.587 1.009 0.704 1.676 2.325
(0.872) (0.721) (0.843) (0.759) (0.953) (0.990)
World 0.719 1.600 1.777 -1.949 0.238 -0.284
(0.764) (0.945) (0.962) (0.026) (0.594) (0.388)
Variables in first differences
Low income -2.380 -5.323 -3.960 -3.387 -4.043 -3.928
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lower middle -3.103 -4.420 -3.514 -2.782 -3.210 -3.950
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Upper middle -3.881 -4.195 -3.570 -3.941 -3.839 -3.838
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High income -3.131 -3.398 -2.910 -3.092 -3.190 -3.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
World -3.507 -6.312 -4.386 -4.089 -4.786 -4.564
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000)
Notes: tHS , τ¯IV and tDH refer to the PURT statistics defined in (2.4), (2.6),(2.7).
Numbers in parentheses are p−values.
help in explaining the fact that tHS but not tDH supports rejection of the null at the
5% significance level. Considering that T = 31 in our data, financial development
is correlated across economies, and the series display significant heteroskedasticity,
we expect a higher rejection probability of the null by tHS and of the alternative by
tDH . Accordingly, the obtained results are somehow indicative of nonstationarity
of PRV . In the lower panel of Table 2.7, the tests suggest stationarity of the first
differences of GDPPC and PRV in all the cross sections. This implies that, in all
cross sections, the employed financial development and economic growth measures
are integrated of order one.
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Table 2.8: Panel cointegration test results
Dependent var.: GDPPC Dependent var.: PRV
Statistic Z-value P-value Robust
P-value
Z-value P-value Robust
P-value
Low income Gt -4.466 0.000 0.000 -1.052 0.146 0.095
Ga -1.035 0.150 0.013 0.126 0.550 0.115
Pt -4.316 0.000 0.005 -1.511 0.065 0.086
Pa -3.899 0.000 0.004 -1.370 0.085 0.056
Lower middle Gt 1.253 0.895 0.643 -1.941 0.026 0.020
Ga 2.645 0.996 0.923 0.545 0.707 0.170
Pt 2.019 0.978 0.826 -1.756 0.040 0.130
Pa 1.982 0.976 0.851 -0.371 0.355 0.230
Upper middle Gt 1.253 0.895 0.643 -4.061 0.000 0.000
Ga 2.645 0.996 0.923 0.366 0.643 0.073
Pt 2.019 0.978 0.826 -2.425 0.008 0.033
Pa 1.982 0.976 0.851 -0.440 0.330 0.121
High income Gt 6.606 1.000 1.000 -1.942 0.026 0.018
Ga 4.537 1.000 0.998 0.517 0.697 0.055
Pt 5.643 1.000 0.993 -1.224 0.110 0.160
Pa 3.876 1.000 0.991 -1.113 0.133 0.071
World Gt 5.483 1.000 0.986 -4.522 0.000 0.000
Ga 5.342 1.000 0.980 1.187 0.882 0.019
Pt 5.090 1.000 0.941 -3.654 0.000 0.015
Pa 4.310 1.000 0.935 -1.220 0.111 0.030
Notes: Both variables are used in their logarithmic forms. Fixed effects, and one
lag and one lead of the first differences are included in the test equations. The null
hypothesis in all the tests is no cointegration. Pa and Pt (called panel statistics), have
an alternative hypothesis such that a rejection of the null hypothesis should be taken
as evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole. For Ga and Gt (called group
mean statistics), a rejection should imply cointegration for at least one cross-sectional
unit. Bold-faced values indicate rejections of the null at the 5%significance level. The
number of bootstrap replications used to calculate robust p-values is 5,000. The tests
are computed in STATA 11 using the user written command ‘xtwest’ of Persyn and
Westerlund (2008).
2.5.4 Panel cointegration test results
We now move on to investigating the existence of a cointegrating relationship
between finance and growth. Here, it should be noted that testing cointegration by
applying panel unit root tests on the residuals obtained from regressions of GDPPC
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on PRV and vice versa, as in Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), could be misleading.
Although residual-based cointegration tests typically apply unit root tests on the
residuals from regressions of I(1) variables, the tests will have to account for the
fact that the residuals are estimated values. This implies that the usual PURT
critical values are no longer appropriate and the distributional properties of the
tests have to be adjusted accordingly. This adjustment is required even when testing
cointegration between variables for a single cross-sectional unit. Accordingly, several
panel cointegration tests have been forwarded in recent years. Among the existing
panel cointegration tests, those suggested in Pedroni (1999, 2004) are perhaps the
most popular ones. Notable applications of Pedroni’s cointegration tests in the FG
literature include the works of Apergis et al. (2007) and Fowowe (2010). A major
limitation of these tests is, however, that they are not robust to cross-sectional
dependence. To handle this issue, Pedroni (2004) suggests applying the tests on data
demeaned with respect to common time effects; but, it is obvious that demeaning
removes only a very specific form of cross-sectional dependence. In the increasingly
integrated world, the presence of cross-sectional correlation among economies is
unquestionable. As a result, we employ the tests suggested in Westerlund (2007)
where the recommended bootstrapping procedure takes care of a more general form
of cross-unit dependence.7 It is not clear, however, whether the bootstrapping
procedure is immune to the nonstationary volatility observed in our data. Therefore,
the results should be interpreted with some degree of caution.
Westerlund’s (2007) tests are error-correction-based tests, i.e., they are founded
on the fact that two variables cointegrate if and only if there exists an error-correction
representation for either or both of the variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). The null
hypothesis for all his tests is that there is no error correction (no cointegration). Two
of his tests, Pa and Pt (called panel statistics), have an alternative hypothesis such
that a rejection of the null hypothesis should be taken as evidence of cointegration
for the panel as a whole. For the other two, Ga and Gt (called group mean statistics),
a rejection should imply cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit.
7Another merit of these tests is that, being error-correction-based tests, they do not impose
potentially invalid common-factor restrictions that are inherent in the residual-based cointegration
tests. Specifically, residual-based cointegration tests invoke the assumption that the long-run
cointegrating vector for the variables in their levels is equal to the short-run adjustment process
for the variables in their (first) differences (Westerlund, 2007).
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Estimation results are reported in Table 2.8. As argued above, we base
our decision on the bootstrap (cross-sectional-dependence-robust) p-values. The
results documented in the table indicate that the causality evidence varies across
income groups. In low-income economies, there is strong evidence of long-run FG
relationship, with the causality running from finance to growth. This is in line with
Patrick’s (1966) argument that finance matters most at earlier stages of economic
development. In the other cross sections, we cannot reject the null of no error
correction if GDPPC is used as a dependent variable. Evidence of a long-run
FG relationship with the causality running from the real to the financial sector is
obtained on the comprehensive cross section of 74 economies. Although all the four
tests do not usually lead to the same conclusion, some degree of support to the
view that “where enterprise leads finance follows” (Robinson, 1952) is also found in
middle- and high-income economies. In these cross sections, at least the Gt statistic
suggests rejection of the null of no cointegration and, hence, implies a long-run FG
nexus in at least one economy.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated the small sample performances of the three most
important heteroskedasticity-robust panel unit root tests (PURTs) suggested to
date. These tests are the White-type test in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008), the
Cauchy test in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) and the Cauchy version of the White-
type test as proposed by Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a). After formally defining
the tests, we discussed recommended methods of handling serial correlation and
deterministic terms. Notably, it is underlined that all the tests—and, hence, all
PURT we are aware of—do not work if the data feature non-zero intercepts under
the null of unit root with time-varying volatility. Neither do standard detrending
schemes effectively remove the trend when the errors are heteroskedastic. Focusing
on distinguishing between a driftless random walk and a stationary process with
cross section specific intercepts, we conduct Monte Carlo experiments for a wide
range of cross-sectional dependence and volatility break scenarios.
Our simulation results clearly demonstrate that the Cauchy estimator in
Demetrescu and Hanck (2012b) is severely undersized when N is relatively larger
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than T . In contrast, the two White-type statistics display reliable size control
in most of the considered variance break cases and sample dimensions. In the
smallest considered time dimension, T = 25, however, the Cauchy-instrumented
White-type test of Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) is markedly oversized. Shifts
in innovation volatility increase these size distortion of the test in Demetrescu and
Hanck (2012a) under relatively small time dimension, and, to some extent, induce
similar overrejections for the one in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008). However, only
early negative and late positive variance breaks cause the most severe of the above-
mentioned size distortions. On the contrary, early and middle positive variance
breaks appear to offset the upward size distortions of the White-type test of Herwartz
and Siedenburg (2008) in strongly correlated panels. Therefore, we conclude that
both White-type tests are empirically relevant heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs,
although the one without Cauchy instrumenting is the most dependable one when
the time dimension is small.
As an empirical illustration, the cointegration relationship between financial
development and economic growth is considered using data from 74 economies
during 1975-2005. Applying the heteroskedasticity-robust PURTs, we find that
both financial development and economic growth are integrated of order one. The
employed error-correction-based panel cointegration tests of Westerlund (2007)
generally indicate the existence of a long-run relationship between financial
development and economic growth. The direction of causality, however, differs
across income groups. Strong evidence of the “finance leads growth” hypothesis
is diagnosed in low-income economies. In the remaining income groups, however,
the causality runs from growth to finance, and not vice versa. As a consequence,
the latter evidence turns out to be the dominant direction of causality observed in
the comprehensive panel, supporting Robinson’s (1952) view that “where enterprise
leads finance follows.”
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3 The long-run finance-growth nexus in Sub-
Saharan Africa
3.1 Introduction
The role of financial intermediaries in the process of technical innovation and
economic development has been recognized since, at least, Schumpeter’s (1911)
work. Since then, a number of economists and institutions like McKinnon (1973),
Shaw (1973), the World Bank (1989) and Levine (2005) have highlighted that
development in the financial sector could foster economic development by raising
the level of investment and facilitating the allocation of resources to their best uses.
However, others like Robinson (1952) believe that it is the demand from a growing
real sector that stimulates financial development, and not vice versa. Another
group of economists such as Patrick (1966) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)
argue that the causal relationship between financial development and economic
growth is bidirectional. According to Patrick (1966), the financial system and
its services develop as a result of the demand generated by economic growth
(called “demand-following” phenomenon) and financial development in turn causes
economic growth (called “supply-leading” phenomenon). Over the last two decades,
extensive empirical research works have tried to clarify the finance-growth (FG)
causality using a range of econometric tools and data sets. The evidence, however,
remains to be largely mixed.8
The inconclusiveness of the worldwide evidence and the ambiguity on the impact
of the level of economic development on the FG nexus (Ghirmay, 2004) have triggered
several region-specific empirical studies. In this regard, a few studies have tried to
examine the FG causality in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies. For instance,
Ghirmay (2004), using economy-specific time series analysis, finds one cointegrating
vector linking finance and growth in 13 SSA economies. But, the obtained evidence
on the direction of FG causality is mixed. In particular, he finds evidence for
bidirectional FG causality in six, for the “finance leads growth” hypothesis in eight
and for the “growth leads finance” hypothesis in nine economies. On the other
8See Levine (2005) and Ang (2008a) for extensive surveys of the theoretical and empirical FG
literature.
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hand, applying a trivariate Vector Autoregressive model, Gries et al. (2009) find a
long-run relationship in only six out of 16 SSA economies and conclude that the
results in Ghirmay (2004) are generated by a misspecified (i.e., bivariate) model.
However, it is also possible that the lack of cointegration in their study might be
a result of the decreasing degrees of freedom due to the increase in the number of
model parameters or their usage of a different proxy for financial development.
Aiming at exploiting the superior statistical power of panel cointegration tests,
Fowowe (2010) examines the FG nexus in 17 SSA economies over the period 1975–
2005 by means of residual-based panel cointegration tests suggested in Pedroni
(1999, 2004). Although Fowowe (2010) finds a homogeneous short-run bidirectional
causality, he cannot reject the null of no cointegration (no long-run relationship)
between finance and growth. However, these results should be interpreted carefully
for two methodological reasons. First, residual-based panel cointegration tests
like those in Pedroni (1999, 2004) are less powerful when the so-called “common-
factor restrictions” are invalid (Westerlund, 2007).9 Thus, it is possible that the
obtained results are generated by the failure to satisfy those restrictions. Second,
Fowowe (2010) does not take into account the cross-sectional dependence that could
most likely exist among SSA economies. For instance, SSA economies are small
economies that are highly dependent on export of unprocessed primary commodities
like minerals and agricultural products (Wood and Mayer, 2001). The prices of these
products are determined in the international market where small economies are often
price takers. In line with this argument, Kose and Riezman (2001) show that trade
shocks explain almost half of the aggregate output fluctuation in Africa. Therefore,
it is very likely that SSA economies are vulnerable to common global macroeconomic
shocks—a typical source of cross-sectional dependence considered in the econometric
literature (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). On the other hand, every economy in SSA is
a member of one or more of the regional economic blocks—or even of a monetary
union in the case of West Africa (Geda and Kebret, 2008). This regional economic
integration lends a considerable interdependence to economic performances of SSA
economies. Therefore, one can also imagine that the results in Fowowe (2010) are
partly generated by the unrealistic cross-sectional independence assumption.
9Common-factor restriction is the assumption by residual-based cointegration tests that the long-
run cointegrating vector for the variables in their levels is equal to the short-run adjustment process
of the (first) differenced variables (Westerlund, 2007).
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To overcome the problems associated with residual-based tests, Westerlund
(2007) proposes error-correction-based tests that do not impose common-factor
restrictions. Moreover, he suggests bootstrapping procedures that yield cross-
sectional dependence robust p-values. Capitalizing on these two crucial merits of
the tests in Westerlund (2007), we examine the long-run FG causality in SSA. This
way, we check if the results in Fowowe (2010) would change when panel cointegration
tests in Westerlund (2007), instead of those in Pedroni (1999, 2004), are applied on
the same data.
In particular, this paper contributes to the literature on the FG nexus in SSA
in at least two ways. First, given the typically small number of observations of
annual macroeconomic data, it is not clear whether the inability to reject the null of
no cointegration in economy-specific time series analyses is a small sample problem
of the tests or indeed evidence of lack of long-run relationships. By pooling time
series data of 17 SSA economies, we use information in an efficient way and make
cointegration tests more powerful. Second, among panel cointegration tests, we
exploit the ones proposed by Westerlund (2007), which do not impose potentially
invalid common-factor restrictions, and take into account cross-sectional dependence
among SSA economies.
Our results indicate the presence of a long-run relationship between financial
development and economic growth in SSA. Although the direction of causality
appears to depend somehow on the employed measures of financial development,
there is unambiguous evidence that financial development has a long-run impact on
economic growth. Furthermore, the long-run FG nexus estimates are positive and
statistically significant, justifying policies aimed at developing the financial sector
in SSA in order to promote long-run economic development.
Section 3.2 outlines the nature and measurement of the data. Section 3.3 briefly
describes the employed unit root and cointegration tests as well as the dynamic
OLS estimator of the long-run coefficients. Section 3.4 discusses empirical results.
Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Data
One of the main challenges in the FG literature has been measuring financial
development, mainly because the concept is very broad, which in turn is related
to the size of the financial sector. In this study, we employ two of the most
widely used financial development indicators. The first indicator is LIQUID,
which equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and
other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This is the broadest indicator of
financial intermediation (Beck et al., 2000a). A major weakness of LIQUID is that
it incorporates claims of financial intermediaries on both the public (governments
and public enterprizes) and the private sector. It is generally agreed upon that a
financial system that lends its resources to the public sector is less growth-promoting
than a financial system that allocates credit to the private sector (King and Levine,
1993). The second measure, PRV , mitigates this problem by singling out credit
to the private sector. Specifically, PRV equals credit by deposit money banks and
other financial institutions to the non-financial private sector as a percentage of
GDP. As such, it also excludes credit issued by the central bank. Therefore, PRV
measures the activity of financial intermediaries in channeling savings to investors,
and consequently, is well-suited to assess the impact of financial development on
investment and economic growth (Beck et al., 2000b).
The stock-flow problem arising from dividing financial variables measured at the
end of the year by nominal GDP measured over the year is addressed according
to Beck et al. (2000a). Accordingly, real financial variables are obtained by
deflating end-of-year financial variables by end-of-year consumer price index, and
subsequently average real financial variables from year t and t − 1 are divided by
real GDP at year t.
Following a standard practice in the FG literature, we measure economic
development by real GDP per capita (e.g., Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Ghirmay,
2004; Fowowe, 2010). We pull together panel data of 17 SSA economies over the
period 1975-2005.10 The selection of economies is based on availability of data on
financial variables for a sufficiently long time period. Furthermore, this is the cross-
10The economies are Burundi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana,
Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Seychelles and
Togo.
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section of economies studied by Fowowe (2010).11
Both LIQUID and PRV are obtained from the 2008 update of Financial
Development and Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000a)12, while real GDP per
capita is drawn from the 2009 edition of World Development Indicators.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Unit root tests
Panel unit root tests are usually more powerful than their time series equivalents
as they utilize both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of data. This
property makes them more desirable in studies that involve short time series data
like ours where statistical power of time series tests is generally low. However,
switching from time series to panel unit root tests creates some new challenges
such as specification of the alternative hypotheses and handling of cross-sectional
dependence among the panel units. The former challenge gives rise to the so-called
homogeneous and heterogeneous panel unit root tests and the latter triggers the
first generation and second generation panel unit root tests (Breitung and Pesaran,
2008).
Rejecting the null hypothesis in homogeneous panel unit root tests like Levin
et al. (2002), and Breitung and Das (2005) is considered as evidence of stationarity
for the panel as a whole. Yet, in the alternative hypothesis of heterogenous panel
unit root tests such as Im et al. (2003), some time series can still be nonstationary.
Applying the first generation unit root tests such as those in Levin et al.
(2002) and Im et al. (2003) to macroeconomic series is problematic as economies
are becoming increasingly integrated. When the cross-sectional independence
assumption is violated, the first generation unit root tests exhibit marked size
distortions (Breitung and Das, 2005). The second generation tests are those tests
which are robust to cross-sectional dependence. This generation include tests
suggested in Breitung and Das (2005) and Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008). Given
their geographical proximity, their vulnerability to similar global price shocks and
11One of the difficulties in comparing empirical FG nexus evidence in SSA is the fact that researchers
usually select different samples of economies. By sticking to Fowowe’s (2010) sample, we not only
make our results easily comparable to his, but also intend to make this sample somewhat standard
and invite others to use this set of economies in the future.
12http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
44
Chapter 3 The long-run finance-growth nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa
their participation in various regional economic blocks, we argue that cross-sectional
dependence among SSA economies cannot be ruled out. Hence, our decision about
the stationarity of the series should be based on cross-sectional dependence robust
panel unit root tests. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, most of the existing
panel unit root tests display severe size distortions if the considered series feature
time-varying volatility. Therefore, in this paper, we employ the tests suggested in
Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) and Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) —tests that
are robust to cross-sectional dependence as well as variance shifts.
3.3.2 Error-correction-based panel cointegration tests
As in unit root testing, the potential improvement in statistical power emanating
from the use of both the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of data is
the main merit of panel cointegration tests in comparison with their time series
counterparts. Perhaps the most widely used panel cointegration tests are those
suggested in Pedroni (1999, 2004). These tests follow the Engle and Granger (1987)
method of testing for unit roots in the residuals that are obtained from a standard
OLS regression. However, Westerlund (2007) shows that such residual-based tests
impose common-factor restrictions, which, when violated, can significantly reduce
the power of the tests. Instead, Westerlund (2007) suggests error-correction-
based tests that are founded on the famous representation theorem of Engle and
Granger (1987) that two variables cointegrate if and only if there exists an error-
correction representation for either or both of the variables. A notable property of
error-correction-based tests is that they do not impose common-factor restrictions.
To handle cross-sectional dependence among the panel units, Westerlund (2007)
suggests a bootstrapping procedure that yields p-values that are robust to a very
general form of cross-unit correlation. Therefore, in this study, we apply error-
correction-based tests to examine if there exists a long-run relationship between
financial development and economic growth in SSA.
In another similarity with unit root testing, there are two ways of specifying
the alternative hypothesis of no cointegration. Two of the four error-correction-
based tests proposed by Westerlund (2007), Pa and Pt, are called panel statistics.
In these tests, the alternative hypothesis is specified such that a rejection of the
null hypothesis is taken as evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole. For
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the other two tests, Ga and Gt, called group mean statistics, a rejection implies
cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit.
An important assumption for the power of these tests is that the explanatory
variable should be weakly exogenous with respect to the short-run and long-run
parameters. This assumption is equivalent to saying that the explanatory variable
should not be error correcting. In cases where the weak exogeneity assumption may
not be satisfied, Westerlund (2007) recommends inclusion of leads, in addition to
lags, in the error-correction equation to increase the power of tests.13
3.3.3 Estimating the cointegration parameter
The mere finding of a cointegration relationship between finance and growth in SSA
economies is not sufficient to conclude that the economies benefit from financial
development, as the relationship could also be negative, or very weak. Several
estimators of cointegration parameters in panel data have been proposed in the
literature. Of these estimators, the so-called Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and Fully
Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimators appear to have gained considerable attention
among practitioners. Kao and Chiang (2000) shows that the DOLS estimator
outperforms FMOLS, and especially so in small samples. Accordingly, we estimate
the long-run FG nexus by means of the DOLS estimator. This estimator is an OLS
estimator of a cointegration equation in levels augmented with lags and leads of
the explanatory variables in their first differences. The lag and lead augmentation is
shown to be instrumental in mitigating estimation problems arising from endogeneity
and serial correlation (Saikkonnen, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993). Lastly, it is
worth mentioning here that applying DOLS on panel data requires taking care of
the economy-specific (fixed) effects as well as the cross-sectional dependence among
panel units. The former issues is handled through the within and random effects
estimators while the latter is addressed by employing cross-sectional dependence
robust standard errors suggested in Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
13Computational work is done in STATA 11 using the user written command “xtwest” of Persyn
and Westerlund (2008).
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3.4 Empirical results
An important prerequisite for the existence of a long-run relationship between
financial and economic development is that both variables should be integrated of
order one. Accordingly, we test for unit roots in real GDP per capita (GDPPC), the
percentage of liquid liabilities in GDP (LIQUID), and credit to the private sector
as a percentage of GDP (PRV), first in levels and then in first differences. Table
3.1 reports results from unit root testing. The results indicate that the null of unit
root for GDPPC and PRV cannot be rejected (at the 5% level of significance) by
applying either of the heteroskedasticity-robust panel unit root tests. Nevertheless,
the two tests offer contradicting evidence on the order of integration of LIQUID:
while the test in Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) suggests rejecting the null of
nonstationarity of LIQUID, the one in Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) implies
that the variable may not be integrated of order one. Hence, some caution should
be exercised when interpreting the ensuing results on the “cointegration” relation
between GDPPC and LIQUID as really cointegrating (long-run) ones.
Table 3.1: Panel unit root test results
Statistic GDPPC LIQUID PRV DGDPPC DLIQUID DPRV
HS 0.648 -1.280 -1.470 -4.020 -4.476 -3.649
(.742) (.100) (.071) (.000) (.000) (.000)
DH 1.469 -1.785 -0.070 -4.210 -4.291 -3.997
(.929) (.037) (.472) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Notes: All variables are in logarithmic forms. DGDPPC, DLIQUID, and DPRV refer to the first
differences of GDPPC, LIQUID, and PRV, respectively. Entries corresponding to HS and DH
are obtained by applying homogeneous panel unit root tests of Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008)
and Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a), respectively. The tests are computed on data that are first
prewhitened, to account for serial correlation, and then recursively demeaned. The number of lags
included in the prewhitening regression is one. The null hypothesis in both tests is nonstationarity.
P -values are given in parentheses and boldface values indicate rejections of the null hypothesis at
the 5% level of significance.
We now proceed to conducting cointegration testing to examine whether a
long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth exists
or not. Table 3.2 reports estimation results obtained by applying the four error-
correction-based cointegration tests suggested in Westerlund (2007) on our data.
Two important remarks are in order before discussing the results. First, it should
be noted that rejection of the null when GDPPC is used as a dependent variable
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implies a cointegration FG relationship with a causality running from finance to
growth. Similarly, if the tests suggest rejection of the null when PRV or LIQUID is
the dependent variable, we consider it as evidence of a long-run causality from growth
to finance. Second, we have argued in Section 3.1 that cross-sectional dependence
among SSA economies is a more realistic assumption. In this section, we perform
a simple test to empirically augment our claim. Results from the Breusch and
Pagan (1980) test of independence reported in Table 3.3 confirm that cross-sectional
independence among SSA economies can be rejected at any conventional level of
significance in all the considered cases. Accordingly, we base our discussion only on
p-values that are robust to cross-sectional dependence.
Table 3.2 presents the cointegration test results, which display very high
dependence on the specification of the error-correction equation regarding the
deterministic terms as well as the lags and leads of the first differences of the
explanatory variables. Therefore, drawing the most plausible conclusion from the
documented results requires a somehow detailed analysis of each scenario. In general,
when the model features only a constant, the evidence varies with the type of
financial development indicator we consider; namely, employing PRV yields a long-
run causality from finance to growth while using LIQUID obtains the reverse causal
link. With linear trend, however, clear evidence of causality from finance to growth
emerges provided that the test equation contains three leads and lags of the first
differences of the explanatory variables.
It is well known in the cointegration literature that over-parametrization induces
a substantial loss of statistical power (Ng and Perron, 1995). However, the use
of leads, in addition to lags, could offset the loss of power of error-correction-
based tests arising from a failure to fulfill the weak exogeneity assumption of the
regressors (Westerlund, 2007). In light of this reasoning, we include additional
lags and leads until the obtained marginal benefit—in terms of rejecting the null—
becomes negligible. For the data at hand, using three leads (and lags) appears to
be a reasonable balance between over-parametrization and failing to fulfill the weak
exogeneity assumption. In fact, our results, not reported here, confirm that further
increasing the number of leads does not cause any qualitative change in the results
obtained by using only three leads. If any, in the model with a linear trend, robust
p-values are drawn down to zero when GDPPC is used as a dependent variable.
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Table 3.2: Panel cointegration test results
1 lag and 1 lead 2 lags and 2 leads 3 lags and 3 leads
Dependent
variable
Explanatory
variable
Test P -values Robust P -values Robust P -values Robust
Deterministic term: constant
GDPPC LIQUID Gt 0.302 0.180 0.933 0.600 0.975 0.595
Ga 0.924 0.576 0.982 0.638 0.998 0.559
Pt 0.248 0.242 0.559 0.326 0.772 0.314
Pa 0.828 0.598 0.951 0.668 0.981 0.437
PRV Gt 0.723 0.484 0.940 0.640 0.969 0.382
Ga 0.887 0.478 0.989 0.767 0.999 0.046
Pt 0.898 0.704 0.925 0.643 0.994 0.002
Pa 0.940 0.791 0.949 0.684 0.992 0.045
LIQUID GDPPC Gt 0.001 0.001 0.106 0.040 0.764 0.322
Ga 0.222 0.011 0.839 0.224 0.994 0.653
Pt 0.032 0.056 0.392 0.256 0.904 0.490
Pa 0.099 0.048 0.465 0.157 0.935 0.451
PRV Gt 0.138 0.075 0.920 0.602 0.998 0.870
Ga 0.813 0.231 0.994 0.809 1.000 0.964
Pt 0.034 0.057 0.719 0.395 0.964 0.614
Pa 0.264 0.093 0.867 0.437 0.987 0.721
Deterministic terms: constant, trend
GDPPC LIQUID Gt 0.272 0.204 0.643 0.249 0.547 0.022
Ga 0.859 0.204 0.997 0.445 1.000 0.033
Pt 0.603 0.475 0.791 0.374 0.996 0.004
Pa 0.599 0.256 0.973 0.486 1.000 0.016
PRV Gt 0.059 0.069 0.495 0.196 0.852 0.085
Ga 0.553 0.031 0.966 0.149 1.000 0.011
Pt 0.142 0.185 0.734 0.319 0.999 0.000
Pa 0.264 0.087 0.808 0.162 1.000 0.011
LIQUID GDPPC Gt 0.002 0.007 0.923 0.526 0.888 0.327
Ga 0.862 0.103 0.998 0.547 1.000 0.894
Pt 0.380 0.331 1.000 0.870 0.992 0.467
Pa 0.881 0.504 0.996 0.708 1.000 0.868
PRV Gt 0.068 0.071 0.459 0.169 0.151 0.055
Ga 0.750 0.048 0.995 0.341 1.000 0.433
Pt 0.230 0.227 0.994 0.751 0.900 0.244
Pa 0.711 0.248 0.989 0.677 1.000 0.672
Notes: All variables are in logarithmic forms. The null hypothesis in all the tests is no cointegration.
Boldface values denote rejections of the null at the 5% level of significance. The number of bootstrap
replications used to compute cross-sectional dependence robust p-values is 5000. The tests are
computed in STATA 11 using the user written command ‘xtwest’ of Persyn and Westerlund (2008).
Therefore, the results clearly demonstrate the existence of a statistically
significant long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth
in the 17 SSA economies under consideration. This is in direct contrast to Fowowe
(2010) who, using the same data set, concludes that there is no long-run relationship
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Table 3.3: Breusch- Pagan test of cross-sectional independence
Dependent
variable
Explanatory
variable
Chi-squared Statistic P -values
GDPPC LIQUID chi2(136) = 916.889 0.000
GDPPC PRV chi2(136) = 755.822 0.000
LIQUID GDPPC chi2(136) = 411.160 0.000
PRV GDPPC chi2(136) = 737.996 0.000
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. A constant is included in the regressions. The null
hypothesis is independence in the residuals obtained from economy-specific regressions.
between finance and growth in SSA economies. It is worth noting here, however, that
we would have arrived at a similar conclusion to Fowowe (2010) if we had not used
robust p-values. Therefore, the contrast between our results and those of Fowowe
(2010) should be attributed to our explicit handling of cross-sectional dependence
among economies rather than to the avoidance of the potentially invalid common-
factor restrictions.
Another notable result of this study is that the direction of log-run causality
between finance and growth varies with the type of financial development considered.
In particular, financial development as measured by PRV exerts a long-run causal
impact on economic growth, but not vice versa. This result is independent of
the inclusion of a linear trend in the test equation. With respect to LIQUID,
however, contrasting causal effects are observed depending on whether a linear trend
is assumed in the test regression. When only a constant is assumed in the equation,
the evidence supports the “growth leads finance” hypothesis. Yet, incorporating a
linear trend obtains results that imply that “finance leads growth”, as is the case
with measuring financial development by PRV .
Table 3.4 presents the long-run FG nexus estimates obtained by applying the
DOLS estimator on our data. The results show that the relationship is strongly
positive. This finding is robust to the use of fixed effects or random effects estimators,
the number of lags and leads of the first-differenced explanatory variable, and the
use of cross-sectional dependence robust or non-robust p-values. Hence, the results
are overall supportive of policy measures that target developing the financial sector
of SSA economies in order to bring about the much needed economic development
50
Chapter 3 The long-run finance-growth nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa
Table 3.4: Cointegrating parameter estimates using DOLS
2 lags and 2 leads 3 lags and 3 leads
Explanatory
variable
FE RE FE RE
LIQUID 0.177 0.180 0.197 0.199
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
PRV 0.137 0.138 0.149 0.149
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The dependent variable is GDPPC. All variables are in logarithmic forms. FE stands for
the fixed effects model (within) estimator and RE represents the random effects model estimator.
The p-values are given in parentheses. Boldface values indicate the cross-sectional dependence
robust p-values obtained by using Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors, applicable only for
the fixed effects model.
in the region.
3.5 Conclusion
The impact of financial development on economic growth remains to be controversial
despite extensive research on the issue. Moreover, the correlation between this
impact and the level of economic development is not clear. As a result, a few studies
have empirically examined the FG nexus in SSA. We contribute to this strand of
literature by applying error-correction-based panel cointegration tests (Westerlund,
2007), which, unlike their residual-based counterparts, do not impose common-factor
restrictions. Without handling the problem of cross-sectional dependence, however,
we fail to reject the null of no cointegration between financial development and
economic growth in 17 SSA economies. However, after properly taking care of the
cross-sectional dependence among these economies, we are able to observe a long-
run relationship between financial development and economic growth. Measuring
financial development by the percentage of credit to the private sector to GDP,
financial development is found to be weakly exogenous implying that the long-
run causality runs from finance to growth. Employing the percentage of liquid
liabilities in GDP as a measure of financial development yields results that hint at
the possibility that growth might also affect finance. Overall, our results clearly
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demonstrate that financial development has a long run impact on economic growth.
Furthermore, the dynamic OLS estimates of the long-run FG parameters are positive
and statistically significant highlighting the long-run benefit SSA economies could
enjoy by developing their financial systems.
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4 In-sample and out-of-sample evidence on the
short-to-medium run finance-growth causality
4.1 Introduction
Whether financial development causes economic growth or vice versa is highly
debated. On the one hand, several economists such as Schumpeter (1911),
McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Levine (2005) emphasize the importance of a
developed financial system as a prerequisite for economic growth. They argue that
a developed financial system enhances the mobilization of savings, identifies high
return projects, diversifies risks and facilitates transactions. These functions might
promote both the overall level and the efficiency of investment. On the other hand,
arguments in favor of the reverse causal direction have been put forth by Robinson
(1952), who asserts that “where enterprise leads finance follows”. According to
this view, the financial system develops in response to the demand generated by a
growing real economy. Thirdly, a bidirectional causality between finance and growth
has been explicitly asserted by Patrick (1966) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).
Patrick (1966) refers to the view that the financial system develops as a result
of the demand emanating from growth in the real sector as “demand-following
phenomenon”. Likewise, he calls the claim that the development of the financial
sector ahead of demand induces economic growth as “supply-leading phenomenon”.
The literature also suggests that the direction of the finance-growth causality
may depend on the level of economic development. In this respect, Patrick (1966)
conjectures that “supply-leading” might be more dominant at earlier stages of
economic development while “demand-following” plays a significant role at later
stages. In the growth model by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), however, financial
development occurs endogenously at a later stage of economic development, since
the creation and deployment of financial institutions is costly.
Extensive empirical research on the causality between finance and growth has
provided conflicting evidence. Cross-country studies repeatedly show that financial
development impacts positively on economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993;
Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000b; Hassan et al., 2011). However, most of these
studies do not explicitly test the possibility that growth might also affect finance.
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On the other hand, time series based studies arrive at ambiguous conclusions (see
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Xu, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis
et al., 2007; Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Ang, 2008a; Hassan et al., 2011). Similarly,
the evidence with regard to the dependence of the causal directions on the level of
economic development is inconclusive. Contrary to Patrick’s conjecture, Xu (2000)
reports weaker and, for some economies negative, causality from finance to growth
in low-income economies and a strong causal impact of finance on growth in high-
income economies. However, Hassan et al. (2011) find evidence for bidirectional
causality between finance and growth for most geographic regions and evidence of
causality from growth to finance in two of the poorest regions. These findings
apparently support the predictions of the model by Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990).
We contribute to the empirical literature in three aspects. Firstly, we investigate
the causal impact of financial development on growth (abbreviated FG henceforth)
and the reverse direction (GF) by means of both in-sample (IS) tests and out-of-
sample (OS) forecast comparisons. To this end, we rely on summarizing economy-
specific evidence from bivariate SUR models. We focus on causal relations regarding
the short-to-medium term, hence we examine growth rates of the observed time
series. This means that causality tests refer to short and medium term periods
of less than one decade, corresponding to typical planning horizons of institutional
decision takers. Furthermore, impulse response functions are employed to investigate
the direction and dynamic behavior of the causal relations.
Secondly, a large cross section dimension allows us to examine whether causal
effects depend on an economy’s individual stage of development (Patrick, 1966).
Hence, we examine causality test results for subgroups of economies, which are
distinguished according to their level of income. Thirdly, the potentially time-
dependent nature of causal relationships might be a reason for conflicting empirical
evidence. Therefore, we test for causality in an iterative way, relying on a short
subperiod of the entire time dimension at each estimation step. The remainder of
this study begins with an introduction of the data in Section 4.2. The IS and OS
approaches to causality testing are described in Section 4.3, followed by a discussion
of results. Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.2 Data
We employ annual data from 74 economies covering the period 1975–2005.
Economies are classified into four income groups based on their latest (2005) real
GDP per capita and the World Bank’s classification criteria in 2006. The list of
economies in each group is provided in Chapter 5.B. We employ a widely used
measure of financial development, namely credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions to the non-financial private sector as a percentage of GDP
(PRIV , in growth rates). This data is taken from the 2008 update of the Financial
Development and Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000a)14. The merits of PRIV
are that it singles out credit to the private sector and, moreover, excludes credit
issued by the central bank. Consequently, it is argued to be more suitable to examine
the impact of financial development on economic growth than other measures, as,
for instance, the ratio of monetary aggregates M2 or M3 to GDP (Levine et al., 2000.
Economic growth is expressed by the growth rate of real GDP per capita (GROW ).
We control for inflation and an economies’ openness to trade as two widely used
determinants of economic growth and financial development (Levine et al., 2000;
Baltagi et al., 2009; Bittencourt, 2011; Badinger and Nindl, 2012). Inflation obtains
as the growth rate of the GDP deflator (INFL). Trade openness is the growth rate
of the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (OPEN). All data series except PRIV
are drawn from the 2009 edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database. Summary statistics and a broader discussion of the data can be found in
Chapter 5.3.1.
4.3 Causality testing
Subsequently, we describe the IS and OS approach to testing for causality and discuss
the results.
14http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
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4.3.1 In-sample schemes
ForGROW and PRIV in economy i at time t, we estimate bivariate SUR regressions PRIVit
GROWit
 =
 µi1
µi2
+
 a11,i a12,i
a21,i a22,i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ai
 PRIVi,t−1
GROWi,t−1
 (4.1)
+Bi
 x•i,t−1
x•i,t−1
+
 vi1t
vi2t
 , i = 1, ..., Ng,
t = τ − E + 1, ..., τ,
where (vi1t, vi2t)
′ ∼ (0,Ωi) and τ denotes the end of the estimation window E
and Ng ∈ {19, 16, 14, 25} refers to the number of economies in each income group.
To address potential structural changes in causal relations, we estimate (4.1) in a
stepwise manner for τ = T − T0, ..., T − 1. Overall evidence on causality is obtained
by subsuming time-local evidence across economies. Predetermined influences are
represented as x•i,t−1 ∈ {OPENi,t−1, INFLi,t−1}. Distinct control variables x
•
i,t−1
are included in (4.1) interchangeably to retain a parsimonious model structure
for economy-specific estimation. Analyzing annual observations, the choice of a
single lagged term seems sufficient to model the dynamics in PRIV and GROW .15
The parameters in Ai and Bi express the impact of finance, growth and further
predetermined variables, respectively. We distinguish five related null hypotheses
of noncausality. In all cases, the alternative hypothesis is that both causal effects
hold jointly, i.e. H1 : a12 6= 0 ∧ a21 6= 0 in (4.1). Conversely, the most restrictive
assertion is that both causal effects are absent, i.e. H0 : a12 = a21 = 0. Rejections
of H01 : a12 = 0 or H02 : a21 = 0 indicate that GROW influences PRIV in the
former, or the reverse causal effect in the latter. Furthermore, by consideration of
the conditional hypotheses H03 : a12 = 0 | a21 = 0 and H04 : a21 = 0 | a12 = 0, we
focus on those instances where only a single causal effect is present, meaning that
only one of the unconditional hypothesis H01 and H02 can be rejected. Rejections of
H03 or H04 provide more clear-cut evidence on the respective importance of the two
alternative causal directions. More pronounced evidence for H03 than for H04 means
15Inferential results are qualitatively unaffected by consideration of higher lag orders or the joint
incorporation of OPENi,t−1 and INFLi,t−1 and are available from the authors upon request.
Furthermore, we employ several diagnostic tests regarding disturbances from (4.1) to assess the
admissibility of the model specification.
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that where growth increases, the financial development of an economy is likely to
follow. For hypotheses testing, we consider F -tests at the 5% significance level.16
4.3.2 Out-of-sample schemes
Causality may also be detected with reference to forecasting ability. Within each
subperiod, one-step predictions obtain as P̂RIV (◦)i,τ+1|t
ĜROW
(◦)
i,τ+1|t
 =
 µˆi1
µˆi2
+ Aˆ(◦)i
 PRIV i,τ
GROW i,τ
 + Bˆi
 x•i,τ
x•i,τ
 , (4.2)
where τ = T − T0, ..., T − 1 and ‘◦’ refers to estimates under distinct hypotheses
◦ ∈ {H01, H02, H1}.
17 At the end of each estimation window τ , forecasts are obtained
from estimates µˆi1, µˆi2, Aˆ
(◦)
i , Bˆi. Forecasting accuracy is evaluated by means of
absolute forecast errors
AE
(◦)
τ+1|τ(yi) = |yˆ
(◦)
i,τ+1|t − yi,τ+1|, (4.3)
with yi,τ+1 ∈ {PRIV i,τ+1, GROW i,τ+1}. Cases where AE
(◦)
τ+1|τ (yi) are lower for
predictions from (4.2) under H1 than under H01 or H02 are regarded as evidence for
the GF or FG hypothesis, respectively. Rejections of H0 obtain if predictions under
H01 and H02 are both outperformed by those under H1. In addition, we consider
the binary directional accuracy (DA)
DA
(◦)
τ+1|τ(yi) = I(yˆ
(◦)
i,τ+1|τ × yi,τ+1|τ ≥ 0),
where I(·) is an indicator function. Thus, if the sign of a prediction yˆ
(◦)
i,τ+1|τ matches
the one of yi,τ+1|τ , positivity of yˆ
(◦)
i,τ+1|τ × yi,τ+1|τ indicates a directionally accurate
forecast. Since, in contrast to AE
(◦)
τ+1|τ (yi), DA
(◦)
τ+1|τ (yi) increases with predictive
accuracy, higher DA under H1 indicates evidence for the GF or FG hypothesis
in this case. The most recent T0 ∈ {10, 15} years are considered as alternative
16Test outcomes are qualitatively similar for alternative significance levels of 1% or 10% and are
available from the authors on request.
17The testing procedure could equivalently depart from imposing an a priori constraint on Ai
according to H0 and, consequently, regarding H01, ..., H04 and H1 as alternative hypotheses.
However, since this setting might give rise to omitted variables bias, we regard H1 as the superior
reference.
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evaluation samples.
4.3.3 Results
Firstly, the specification of (4.1) is evaluated by means of residual diagnostics. The
total number of tests conducted for each income group of economies is Tg = T0 (time
instances) ×Ng (economies). To test for serial correlation, LM tests as introduced by
Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978) are employed, whereas ARCH-LM tests (Engle,
1982) serve as a means to assess heteroskedastic features in the estimated residuals.
Additionally, we test for nonnormality of the residuals from (4.1) by means of the
Lilliefors (2007) test. Since residual characteristics might differ across economies
and given the relatively large number of model evaluations Tg, the application of
a nonparametric test might be preferable to more restrictive testing procedures.
Test results are summarized in Table 4.1. On average over economies and time
instances, we find only little evidence for serial correlation. Rejection frequencies
hardly exceed the significance level of 5%. The ARCH-LM tests and nonnormality
tests additionally indicate that SUR disturbances may be characterized as white
noise processes in the majority of cases.
The outcomes of the IS tests and OS results are reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3,
respectively. Summary statistics for IS tests refer to fractions of all Tg cases where
F tests indicate rejections of H0, ..., H04 with 5% significance. The results of the OS
study in table 3 are summarized analogously as percentages of all Tg cases where
the prediction scheme in (4.2) obtains higher AE losses or lower (DA) gains than
under H0, H01 or H02 than under H1. Given a significant amount of evidence for
bidirectional causality, the results in Table 4.2 show that evidence in favor of the GF
effect is stronger than for the reverse causal impact. Rejection frequencies forH01 are
in almost all cases higher than for H02, irrespectively of further control variables.
The outcomes are also robust across income groups. Rejections of H03 and H04
reinstate these findings, i.e. for cases where causality points in only one direction,
the impact of growth on finance is more pronounced than vice versa. Similarly, the
higher rejection frequencies in Table 4.3 suggest that there is stronger OS evidence
against H01 than against H02. Hence, the incorporation of GROW as a predictor
variable for PRIV is more likely to decrease the AE (and increase DA) of forecasts
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Table 4.1: Residual diagnostic tests results
T0 = 15 (1991-2005) T0 = 10 (1996-2005)
Dep. var.: PRIV GROW PRIV GROW
Serial correlation LM test
low 0.70 3.16 0.53 3.16
lower middle 8.75 7.50 6.88 6.88
upper middle 3.81 1.90 0.71 2.14
high 8.27 5.33 7.60 6.80
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH-LM) test
low 10.53 10.18 13.16 12.11
lower middle 13.75 12.08 14.37 15.63
upper middle 10.48 6.67 10.71 9.29
high 15.20 9.87 17.60 10.00
Nonnormality test (Lilliefors test)
low 8.07 12.98 6.32 12.11
lower middle 12.92 12.08 15.00 15.63
upper middle 12.38 15.71 14.29 14.29
high 14.13 8.80 18.40 9.60
Note: Reported numbers represent percentages of Tg instances where test statistics
indicate rejections of the null hypotheses of 1.) no first order serial correlation, 2.)
no conditional heteroskedasticity or 3.) no deviations from normality in estimation
disturbances from (1) at the 5% level. Results for alternative significance levels of 1%
or 10% are qualitatively similar and available from the authors upon request.
than the reverse way.18
Apart from the direction of causality, the sign and the dynamics of the relation
between PRIV and GROW might be of interest for economic policy. To investigate
these issues, we report generalized impulse response functions (IRF) as introduced
by Pesaran and Shin (1998). This sort of IRF addresses the potential emergence
of instantaneously correlated shocks without being affected by the ordering of
the variables in (4.1), in contrast to orthogonal IRFs based on the Cholesky
decomposition.19 In Figure 4.1, these IRFs display the dynamic responses as implied
by estimation of (4.1) to shocks in PRIV and GROW , on average across Tg
instances. The graphs show that the impact of shocks in GROW on PRIV and the
reverse effect are positive for lower and intermediate income groups. However, the
18The DA statistics are throughout above 50%, which implies that all model specifications deliver
economically meaningful predictions. To economize on space, we do not report DA statistics for
predictions under each hypothesis. However, corresponding results are available from the authors
upon request.
19The results obtained with orthogonalized IRFs as implied by the Cholesky decomposition are,
however, qualitatively equivalent to the ones reported in Figure 4.1 and may be obtained from the
authors upon request.
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Table 4.2: In-sample results
T0 = 15 (1991-2005)
Control var.: none OPENi,τ−1 INFLi,τ−1
H0 H01 H02 H03 H04 H0 H01 H02 H03 H04 H0 H01 H02 H03 H04
low 16.49 13.33 11.23 12.28 10.18 9.82 12.28 10.88 11.58 10.18 11.93 10.18 12.28 9.12 11.23
lower middle 24.58 22.08 12.92 19.17 10.00 30.42 25.83 13.33 22.08 9.58 22.92 23.33 8.33 20.83 5.83
upper middle 29.05 23.81 21.43 14.29 11.90 25.71 20.00 21.90 10.48 12.38 20.95 18.10 16.67 10.00 8.57
high 30.40 32.53 14.13 25.87 7.47 29.33 30.40 13.07 25.33 8.00 30.40 29.33 14.93 24.27 9.87
T0 = 10 (1996-2005)
low 17.89 12.63 11.58 12.11 11.05 8.95 15.79 6.84 15.79 6.84 10.53 12.63 9.47 12.11 8.95
lower middle 27.50 25.00 13.75 21.88 10.63 31.87 29.38 11.88 25.62 8.13 25.62 25.00 7.50 21.88 4.38
upper middle 30.71 22.86 20.00 15.71 12.86 25.00 18.57 19.29 10.00 10.71 20.00 16.43 15.00 9.29 7.86
high 35.20 36.80 16.00 28.00 7.20 32.40 33.60 14.80 27.20 8.40 34.00 33.20 16.80 25.60 9.20
Note: Cell entries report rejection frequencies of distinct null hypotheses of noncausality at the 5% significance level. Evidence for GF obtains
as rejections of H01 and H03, respectively, whereas evidence for FG is measured by rejection frequencies of H02 and H04. Rejecting H0 indicates
bidirectional influence. Columns OPENτ−1 and INFLτ−1 refer to cases where (1) includes additional control variables.
60
Chapter 4 Evidence on the short-to-medium run finance-growth causality
Table 4.3: Out-of-sample results
T0 = 15 (1991-2005) AE criterion
Control var.: none OPENi,τ−1 INFLi,τ−1
H0 H01 H02 H0 H01 H02 H0 H01 H02
low 22.63 50.53 42.63 20.53 45.26 45.26 24.74 46.84 50.00
lower middle 27.50 51.88 49.38 24.38 47.50 49.38 23.13 51.25 46.88
upper middle 23.57 51.43 45.00 19.29 50.00 44.29 21.43 47.14 49.29
high 24.40 56.80 44.00 22.00 53.20 41.60 21.20 53.20 40.80
T0 = 10 (1996-2005)
low 23.16 45.79 43.68 22.63 43.68 47.37 23.16 47.89 46.32
lower middle 23.75 53.75 43.13 21.25 56.25 42.50 24.38 53.75 43.13
upper middle 25.00 57.14 44.29 17.86 52.14 37.86 21.43 56.43 38.57
high 20.80 52.00 42.80 20.80 50.40 42.00 22.40 52.80 46.40
T0 = 15 (1991-2005) DA criterion
low 1.05 7.37 6.84 0.53 10.00 3.68 0.00 8.95 5.26
lower middle 0.63 6.88 2.50 0.00 6.88 3.13 0.63 8.13 4.38
upper middle 0.00 6.43 5.00 0.00 8.57 2.86 0.00 5.71 5.00
high 0.00 4.40 4.40 0.00 7.60 2.40 0.00 7.20 3.20
T0 = 10 (1996-2005)
low 1.05 10.00 4.21 0.53 9.47 4.21 0.00 10.00 4.74
lower middle 0.00 8.25 3.63 0.00 6.25 3.75 0.00 10.00 3.13
upper middle 0.00 9.00 3.86 0.00 9.29 2.14 0.00 8.57 5.00
high 0.00 6.80 4.00 0.00 8.00 2.00 0.80 9.60 4.00
Note: Cell entries in columns H01 and H02 denote fractions of Tg cases where
AE(H01) >AE(H1) or AE(H02) >AE(H1), respectively. Instances of H0 obtain as the
number of cases where evidence for both AE(H01) >AE(H1) and AE(H02) >AE(H1) is
found. Conversely, in the lower panel, DA(H01) <DA(H1) means rejection of H01.
instantaneous effect of PRIV on GROW and vice versa are significantly negative for
high-income economies, though the impact of GROW on PRIV is relatively small
in magnitude. The most pronounced negative impact points from PRIV to GROW
for high-income economies. These findings are largely in line with those obtained,
e.g., by Hassan et al. (2011). In sum, evidence from both IS and OS schemes more
strongly supports the view that “where enterprise leads finance follows” (Robinson,
1952) than the ”finance leads growth” hypothesis.
4.4 Conclusions
We find stronger evidence for the hypothesis that economic growth influences
financial development than for the reverse causal effect. Our findings are consistent
across income groups and confirmed by in-sample and out-of-sample causality
testing. By means of impulse response functions we document that the positive
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Figure 4.1: Impulse response functions
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association between finance and growth might turn negative in the short run for
high-income economies.
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5 State dependence in the finance-growth nexus:
a functional coefficient approach
5.1 Introduction
The importance of services and instruments of the financial system to the real
economic sector has been recognized in the literature at least since Schumpeter
(1911). However, there are economists who argue that finance does not matter to
economic development. According to this view, either the financial system passively
responds to the demand arising from the real sector and not vice versa (Robinson,
1952) or there is not at all a meaningful relationship between finance and growth
(Lucas, 1988). The extensive research on the finance-growth (FG) nexus in the
last two decades has documented mixed results. While there are many studies
showing that financial development promotes economic growth (e.g., Christopoulos
and Tsionas, 2004; King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000), there are others
which report that it is economic growth which leads to financial development (Ang
and McKibbin, 2007). In addition, there are a few studies that diagnose a negligible
FG relationship (Andersen and Tarp, 2003).
The inconclusiveness of empirical evidence has recently triggered a growing body
of literature that attempts to investigate underlying economic factors which might
determine the FG nexus. This has been mostly done either by estimating the
FG relationship for different economies grouped according to a certain economic
criterion (Rioja and Valev, 2004) or by applying threshold regressions (Ketteni
et al., 2007; Yilmazkuday, 2011). So far, the levels of economic and financial
development, government size, inflation and openness to trade have been identified
to have an impact on the FG nexus (Rioja and Valev, 2004; Rousseau and Wachtel,
2002; Rousseau and Yilmazkuday, 2009; Yilmazkuday, 2011). However, contrasting
evidence has emerged with regard to their impact on the FG nexus. For instance,
three studies have associated the highest positive FG nexus with three different
stages of economic development: low (Huang and Lin, 2009), medium (Yilmazkuday,
2011) and high (Deidda and Fattouh, 2002). Moreover, existing studies have not
uncovered conditions which could lead to a negative FG relationship observed by
Xu (2000).
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We contribute to the empirical literature on the state dependence of the FG
nexus in five directions. Firstly, most studies, including Ketteni et al. (2007), Rioja
and Valev (2004) and Yilmazkuday (2011), have utilized the same data set that was
initially employed by Levine et al. (2000). In this data set, annual time series have
been converted to five-year averages to immunize empirical results against the effects
of business cycle fluctuations. However, the problems of averaging data have not
gone unnoticed in the literature. For example, Ang (2008a) argues that averaging
may induce a new type of correlation between time-averaged variables which could
markedly differ from the correlation between non-averaged series. Besides, averaging
obviously entails a significant (80%) reduction of the sample (Baltagi et al., 2009).
In this study, we employ (non-averaged) annual data for 74 economies spanning the
period 1975–2005.
Secondly, in the literature thus far, the effects of each factor on the FG nexus
have been mostly taken as invariant across stages of economic development or, when
considered variant, the association has been made only indirectly. For example,
Yilmazkuday (2011) interprets results for economies with small governments to be
characteristics for low-income economies by noting that the former have the lowest
average income level. Such kind of associations might be problematic especially if
the correlation between the considered factor and the income level is low. In this
contribution, we subdivide economies into four income groups by means of the World
Bank’s classification criteria to examine the inter- and intra-group variations of the
impacts of the considered economic factors on the FG nexus.
Thirdly, except Ketteni et al. (2007), the related literature has imposed a rather
strong linear FG relationship below, above or within threshold levels. We relax this
assumption by employing a data driven functional coefficient modeling approach.
In the spirit of non-parametric kernel estimation, this method attaches more weight
to observations close to, and less weight to observations farther away from a local
point at which the FG nexus is to be evaluated.
Fourthly, recent studies have shown that financial openness has a significantly
positive impact on both economic growth (Bekaert et al., 2011) and financial
development (Baltagi et al., 2009). This suggests a positive effect of financial
openness on the FG nexus. However, financial openness may replace financial
development in terms of key growth-promoting roles, for instance, the provision of
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risk diversification (Obstfeld, 1994). As a consequence, financial openness might also
exert a negative impact on the FG link. In light of conflicting economic reasoning,
thus, we empirically assess the net impact of financial openness on the FG link.
Finally, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) argue that the FG nexus has weakened
over time. This trend is supposed to reflect the recent acceleration of financial
development that, in turn, has eventually led to financial crises. However, they
have employed five-year averaged data. In this work, we test if their finding is
consistent across income groups and is robust to the use of non-averaged annual
data by conducting estimations on cross sections split into two subperiods, 1975–
1989 and 1990–2005.
To preview some results, the average FG link is found to be positive and increase
with the average income level. Yet, there are significant variations within each
income group. For instance, increasing financial development appears to strengthen
the FG nexus while increasing government size is generally associated with a
weakening of the FG link. On the other hand, a negative FG nexus is diagnosed in
low-income and lower-middle-income economies where the government size is very
large or when they are highly open to international trade. Finally, while the average
FG nexus initially increases with the average level of financial openness, economies
with the highest level of financial openness stand to benefit the least from financial
development. In sum, the FG nexus is found to depend on the levels of economic
development, financial development, government size, trade openness and financial
openness. Moreover, the impacts of these factors vary across distinct stages of
economic development and financial openness.
Section 5.2 reviews briefly the literature on the state dependence of the FG
nexus. Section 5.3 describes the data and provides parametric estimation results.
Section 5.4 briefly sketches the functional coefficient model and discusses empirical
functional estimates. Section 5.5 concludes. Some technical issues of functional
modeling are addressed in Appendix 5.A.
5.2 Literature review
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on the state
dependence in the FG nexus. Several factors have been suggested in the literature
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to affect the FG nexus. We discuss each potential determinant in turn.
1. Level of economic development. The debate on the possible dependence of
the FG link on the level of economic development can be traced back to Patrick
(1966) who conjectures that finance leads to economic growth at earlier stages of
economic development while growth induces financial development at later stages.
The view that financial development is more beneficial to less developed economies
is also shared by Fry (1995) and McKinnon (1973). However, Deidda (2006)
and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that minimum size requirements or
huge startup and maintenance costs necessitate a certain critical level of economic
development before financial development may foster economic growth. In view of
these conflicting conjectures, it has become quite common to test the FG nexus
on distinct samples of high-income and low-income economies. The results are
mixed, however. A cross-sectional study by De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) shows
that the FG link is stronger in low-income economies in comparison with high-
income economies. These findings are supported by recent evidence from panel
data based threshold analysis in Huang and Lin (2009). On the contrary, based on
country specific Granger causality tests, Xu (2000) reports a weaker, and for some
economies a negative, causality from finance to growth in low-income economies.
Similarly, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) and Hassan et al. (2011) have obtained a
significantly positive FG nexus for high-income economies and a negligible FG
relationship for low-income economies. On the other hand, Yilmazkuday (2011)
finds that economies need to have a per capita income of $665 in order to benefit
from financial development and the benefits start declining once the income level
reaches $1636.
2. Level of financial development. Rioja and Valev (2004) have examined if the
level of financial development impacts on the FG nexus. They find that a certain
threshold level of financial development is required for a meaningful FG nexus.
This is attributed to economies of scale that financial intermediaries could enjoy in
agglomerating savings and financing high-return investments. Yet, they have also
diagnosed the FG nexus to be smaller in economies with a very high level of financial
development than in economies with a medium level of financial development. This is
supposed to imply the existence of diminishing marginal returns to improvements in
the financial sector. However, Ketteni et al. (2007) have questioned the robustness of
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the findings in Rioja and Valev (2004) arguing that the likely nonlinear relationship
between economic growth and other growth determinants, i.e. initial income and
human capital, have been ignored in Rioja and Valev (2004).
3. Level of inflation. A few studies have also shown that finance leads to
economic growth only when the level of inflation is low (Huang et al., 2010; Rousseau
and Wachtel, 2002; Rousseau and Yilmazkuday, 2009; Yilmazkuday, 2011). This is
argued to be a result of the growth-damaging effects of inflation. Inflation is believed
to have a negative impact on economic growth because it is usually associated
with increased variations in relative prices, which in turn are considered to impact
adversely on long-term investments (Temple, 2000; Yilmazkuday, 2011).
4. Government size. A potential determinant of the FG nexus that has not
attracted much attention yet is government size. Yilmazkuday (2011) finds that
low-income economies benefit from financial development when they have large
governments. This indicates that certain types of government expenditures (like
on securing property rights, national defence and the legal system) are important
for a growth-promoting financial system. Meanwhile, high-income economies are
found to achieve a comparably strong FG linkage only if they are characterized by
relatively small government sizes. These results are attributed to the possibility that
the private sector might be crowded out by the government.
5. Degree of openness to international trade. Yilmazkuday (2011) has also
considered trade openness as a possible factor to affect the FG link. He finds that
trade openness strengthens the FG link in low-income economies, but its effect is
minimal in high-income economies. He argues that increased access to low-cost
intermediate inputs, large and high-income markets, and technologies benefits open
low-income economies. However, the FG nexus in high-income economies is less
affected by trade openness as those economies have their own large domestic markets.
Instead, higher financial development coupled with high trade and financial openness
might lead to higher vulnerability to international shocks.
6. Degree of financial openness. The impact of financial openness on the FG
nexus has not been studied so far. However, there are studies which imply that
financial openness could have two opposite effects on the FG nexus. On the one
hand, Bekaert et al. (2011) have found a significantly positive impact of financial
openness on economic growth. Moreover, Baltagi et al. (2009) have shown that the
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increasing global trend in financial openness significantly explains the recent surge
in the level of financial development. Accordingly, we may expect a positive impact
of financial openness on the FG nexus. On the other hand, financial openness could
play some of the most important roles of financial development in economic growth,
for instance, risk diversification (Obstfeld, 1994). This implies a negative effect of
financial openness on the FG nexus. Because of these two contrasting effects, the
direction and strength of the impact of financial openness on the FG nexus is not
clear at the outset. In this study, we examine empirically the dependence of the FG
nexus on the level of financial openness.
In sum, there appears to be a broad consensus that the FG nexus is state
dependent. Levels of economic development, financial development, inflation,
government size and openness to trade have been shown to affect the FG nexus.
However, the empirical evidence has been largely inconclusive in terms of both
the sign and magnitude of the effects of each factor on the FG nexus. In re-
examining this issue, we conjecture that applying a more direct way of classifying
economies as well as introducing the middle-income categories might solve some of
the contradictory results and uncover new important dependencies. We also use
functional coefficient modeling that does not impose a linear relationship between
finance and growth within estimation windows. Moreover, we introduce financial
openness as a new potential determinant of the FG relationship.
5.3 Data and preliminary analysis
5.3.1 Data
To investigate state dependence in the FG nexus, we construct panel data sets
comprising 74 economies for the period 1975–2005. The economies are selected
with regard to data availability of all variables for a sufficiently long time period.
As a broad concept involving improvements in the quality and quantity of various
financial intermediary services measuring financial development is always difficult.
We use the arguably most common measure, namely, credit by deposit money banks
and other financial institutions to the non-financial private sector as a percentage of
GDP (PRV). It excludes credit to public institutions and credit issued by the central
bank. As a result, it measures the activity of financial intermediaries in channeling
68
Chapter 5 State dependence in the finance-growth nexus
Table 5.1: Summary statistics, 1975–2005
Variable Mean Max Min Std CV Mean Max Min Std CV
World, 74 economies
GDPPC 7469.0 40617.8 107.0 8939.3 1.20
PRV 44.4 200.6 1.4 37.2 0.84
GOV 16.5 54.5 3.2 6.3 0.38
OPEN 71.9 220.4 6.3 36.7 0.51
FOPEN 0.1 2.5 -1.8 1.5 18.97
INF 11.6 439.0 -23.5 22.6 1.94
Low-income economies, 19 Low-FOPEN economies, 19 (10,5,2,2)
GDPPC 357.2 1106.7 107.0 185.4 0.52 2492.7 18136.4 107.0 4060.2 1.63
PRV 16.3 41.2 1.4 8.8 0.54 30.2 160.9 1.4 30.6 1.01
GOV 14.7 54.5 5.9 6.7 0.46 14.4 38.8 3.2 5.8 0.40
OPEN 59.6 187.7 6.3 33.7 0.57 67.3 194.8 6.3 39.8 0.59
FOPEN -0.8 2.5 -1.8 0.8 -0.94 -1.1 1.7 -1.8 0.5 -0.46
INF 12.0 165.7 -12.3 16.3 1.36 14.6 439.0 -12.3 27.5 1.88
Lower-middle-income economies, 16 Lower-middle-FOPEN economies, 18 (8,6,3,1)
GDPPC 1542.1 3561.3 368.7 655.9 0.43 1654.2 13801.8 149.7 2089.8 1.26
PRV 31.4 166.0 3.6 25.3 0.81 26.3 144.6 3.5 20.9 0.79
GOV 13.8 38.8 3.2 6.0 0.44 15.0 43.0 5.7 5.9 0.40
OPEN 73.0 209.4 24.9 32.5 0.45 77.5 209.4 26.6 35.3 0.46
FOPEN -0.6 2.5 -1.8 1.1 -1.88 -0.5 2.5 -1.8 0.9 -1.59
INF 12.6 439.0 -23.5 26.0 2.06 10.8 334.6 -20.8 20.1 1.86
Upper-middle-income economies, 14 Upper-middle-FOPEN economies, 18 (1,5,5,7)
GDPPC 4801.0 16429.0 830.8 2578.7 0.54 8095.8 40617.8 306.6 8683.7 1.07
PRV 37.1 155.3 3.7 26.9 0.73 44.3 197.4 6.5 30.4 0.69
GOV 16.7 38.8 5.0 6.4 0.38 16.1 54.5 5.0 6.8 0.43
OPEN 94.4 220.4 16.5 43.4 0.46 69.3 148.3 16.5 27.1 0.39
FOPEN 0.3 2.5 -1.8 1.5 4.70 0.2 2.5 -1.8 1.4 6.04
INF 15.8 334.6 -20.8 27.9 1.77 14.5 390.7 -23.5 26.4 1.83
High-income economies, 25 High-FOPEN economies, 19 (0,0,4,15)
GDPPC 18161.4 40617.8 2595.1 7297.2 0.40 17360.4 38971.8 1430.6 8018.7 0.46
PRV 78.3 200.6 19.3 36.7 0.47 75.9 200.6 3.7 40.9 0.54
GOV 19.5 43.4 10.4 4.8 0.25 20.4 38.8 9.8 4.8 0.24
OPEN 67.9 184.7 16.0 31.2 0.46 73.4 220.4 16.0 41.5 0.57
FOPEN 1.1 2.5 -1.8 1.4 1.37 1.7 2.5 -1.8 1.0 0.57
INF 8.4 390.7 -1.8 20.6 2.44 6.8 106.8 -18.6 12.3 1.81
Note: Full definitions of the variables and data sources are given in the text. Except GDPPC
and FOPEN, all variables are measured as percentage values. Max, min, std and CV represent
maximum, minimum, standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively. Entries next to
the number of economies in each financial openness category denote, respectively, the number of
low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income economies that belong to
the corresponding financial openness category.
savings to investors. Consequently, it is argued to be more closely associated with
the impact of financial development on investment and economic growth than other
measures like the percentage of monetary aggregates M2 or M3 in GDP (Levine
et al., 2000). Following standard practice in the FG nexus literature (e.g., Apergis
et al., 2007; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996),
economic development is measured by means of real GDP per capita (GDPPC).
Government size is approximated in terms of government consumption expenditure
as a percentage of GDP (GOV). Due to several missing values in the data for inflation
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implied by the Consumer Price Index, we instead use the growth rate of the GDP
deflator (INF). Trade openness is measured as the percentage of imports plus exports
in GDP (OPEN). We employ the financial openness measure (FOPEN) suggested
in Chinn and Ito (2008). FOPEN is derived as the first principal component of
the reverse of four dummy variables that indicate major restrictions on cross-border
capital transactions as reported in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions of the IMF.
PRV is obtained from the 2008 update of the Financial Development and
Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000a)20 while FOPEN is taken from Menzie
Chinn’s website.21 The remaining time series are drawn from the 2009 edition of
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
To get deeper insights into each factor’s effects on the FG link across stages of
economic development, we categorize the 74 economies into four by their latest
(2005) income level according to the World Bank’s contemporary classification
criteria.22 In particular, economies whose latest real per capita GDP (in constant
2000 US Dollar) fall in the ranges less than 876, 876–3465, 3466–10725, and over
10725 are classified as low-income (19 economies), lower-middle-income (16), upper-
middle-income (14) and high-income (25), respectively.23 The list of economies
included in each sample is provided in Appendix 5.B. The low-income category
includes 15 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies plus India, Nepal, Pakistan and
Papua New Guinea while the high-income group adds Bahamas and Cyprus to 23
OECD economies. The remaining 14 Latin American economies considered in this
study are equally divided into lower- and upper-middle-income economies.
As an alternative means of classifying sample information, we categorize
economies into four groups with respect to their average level of FOPEN.
Additionally, we subdivide each cross section into two subperiods, 1975–1989 and
20http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
21http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html
22http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history.
23As in the standard growth literature, we measure economic development by means of GDP per
capita. Accordingly, to see the state dependence of the FG nexus across stages of economic
development, we classify economies based on their GDP per capita. However, the World Bank
classifies economies based on their per capita Gross National Income (GNI). Moreover, noting that
economy specific quotes of GNI per capita and GDP per capita may differ markedly, there are five
economies which we group differently than the World Bank. These are Algeria, Cameroon, Malta,
Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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1990–2005, to test recent findings by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) that the FG
nexus is weakening over time.
Table 5.1 shows some descriptive statistics of the data covering the full-sample
period. It provides the means, maximum and minimum values and standard
deviations for the different cross sections. It can be seen that the data set is
characterized by considerable variations within/between cross sections. The mean
of the financial development measure PRV increases with the stage of economic
development. However, across stages of financial openness, both average PRV and
average per capita income GDPPC initially decrease and later increase with financial
openness, indicating positive but nonlinear PRV-FOPEN and GDPPC-FOPEN
relationships. The table also documents how economies in a certain category of
financial openness are distributed over the income groups. In particular, low-income
economies predominate in low and lower-middle financial openness categories while
high-income economies take the largest shares in upper-middle and high financial
openness categories.
5.3.2 Parametric regression results
Before moving to the functional coefficient modeling in the next section, we first
look at parametric estimations of the FG nexus across distinct income groups and
categories of financial openness. This allows comparability with related studies.
Moreover, as the economies are classified with regard to their income level (financial
openness), differences in the parametric FG nexus estimates could also hint at the
impact of economic development (financial openness) on the FG nexus. For this
purpose, we employ a standard panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach where GDP
per capita is regressed on financial development and a few control variables (Ang,
2008b; Apergis et al., 2007; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004). In DOLS estimation,
the explanatory variables in levels are augmented with the lags and leads of their first
differences to account for potential endogeneity and serial correlation (Saikkonnen,
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1991; Stock and Watson, 1993). Formally, the model reads as
GDPPCit = µi + β1PRVit + β2GOVit + β3OPENit + β4INFit +
1∑
j=−1
c1j∆PRVit+j
+
1∑
j=−1
c2j∆GOVit+j +
1∑
j=−1
c3j∆OPENit+j +
1∑
j=−1
c4j∆INFit+j + uit,
t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N,
(5.1)
where GDPPCit, PRVit, GOVit, OPENit, and INFit represent GDP per
capita, financial development, government size, openness to trade, and inflation,
respectively, in time t and economy i. Moreover, ∆ is short for the first difference
operator, e.g. ∆PRVit = PRVit − PRVit−1, µi are fixed effects and uit ∼ (0, σ
2
u).
24
Equation (5.1) can be written compactly as
yit = x
′
itβ + z
′
itγ + uit, (5.2)
where yit = GDPPCit, xit = (PRVit, GOVit, OPENit, INFit)
′, and zit collects the
fixed effects and lags and leads of first differences of the explanatory variables.
Accordingly, β = (β1, β2, β3, β4)
′ while γ contains the parameters attached to
the fixed effects and short-run dynamics. To allow for heterogeneous short-run
coefficients, we partial out zit from (5.2). To this end, we denote matrices collecting
observations in yit,xit and zit for economy i by Yi,Xi and Zi, respectively, and
henceforth consider the partial system
y˜it = x˜
′
itβ + u˜it (5.3)
where y˜it, x˜it and u˜it are typical elements of, respectively, Y˜i =MiYi, X˜i =MiXi
and u˜i =Miui;Mi = Ii−Zi(Z
′
iZi)
−1Z ′i; and Ii denotes the (T×T ) identity matrix.
The left and right hand sides of Table 5.2 document estimation results using data
from the four categories of income and financial openness, respectively. Moreover,
full sample results (74 economies) are shown. Results on the full-period samples
demonstrate a statistically and economically significant, positive, long-run impact
24Estimation results are qualitatively unaffected by consideration of higher lag and lead orders.
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Table 5.2: Parametric regression results
Cross sections
Variables Low Lower- Upper- High Low Lower- Upper- High World
income middle middle income FOPEN middle middle FOPEN
Panel 1: 1975–2005
PRV 0.118 0.142 0.268 0.345 0.219 0.215 0.246 0.114 0.226
(.016) (.021) (.031) (.016) (.019) (.023) (.024) (.015) (.010)
GOV 0.033 -0.304 -0.099 -0.017 -0.157 -0.039 -0.004 -0.460 -0.120
(.024) (.039) (.089) (.070) (.039) (.042) (.041) (.068) (.021)
OPEN 0.168 0.268 0.242 0.378 0.135 0.057 0.264 0.715 0.215
(.026) (.029) (.062) (.042) (.029) (.043) (.040) (.038) (.018)
INF 0.211 0.026 0.003 -0.173 0.096 -0.568 -0.099 -0.526 -0.067
(.055) (.057) (.103) (.031) (.050) (.162) (.035) (.071) (.026)
Serial corr. 10.526 12.500 28.571 8.000 15.789 5.556 22.222 10.526 13.514
Poolability 8.584 3.487 2.968 7.948 3.691 1.246 8.108 11.627 6.570
HS -3.893 -3.466 -2.791 -3.344 -3.735 -3.628 -3.194 -3.313 -4.333
DH -4.031 -3.366 -2.743 -3.587 -3.935 -3.973 -3.716 -3.455 -4.415
Panel 2: 1975-1989
PRV 0.065 0.087 0.093 0.380 0.110 0.189 0.118 0.166 0.155
(.027) (.024) (.054) (.024) (.028) (.036) (.041) (.025) (.016)
GOV 0.128 -0.312 -0.165 -0.073 -0.055 -0.020 0.008 -0.611 -0.092
(.038) (.048) (.118) (.100) (.059) (.061) (.066) (.106) (.032)
OPEN 0.219 0.131 0.272 0.246 0.207 0.038 0.273 0.455 0.213
(.039) (.034) (.113) (.064) (.039) (.061) (.065) (.069) (.026)
INF 0.141 0.059 -0.062 -0.022 0.091 -0.018 -0.011 -0.304 0.018
(.068) (.082) (.155) (.033) (.071) (.199) (.044) (.133) (.034)
Serial corr. 21.053 25.000 14.286 12.000 36.842 5.556 11.111 15.789 17.568
Poolability 7.073 3.159 1.769 11.283 4.593 1.432 4.229 17.882 9.597
HS -2.690 -2.864 -2.086 -2.328 -2.647 -2.206 -1.772 -2.494 -2.874
DH -2.644 -2.952 -2.637 -2.756 -2.638 -2.178 -2.428 -2.732 -2.974
Panel 3: 1990-2005
PRV 0.120 0.152 0.283 0.307 0.241 0.204 0.259 0.061 0.224
(.022) (.022) (.041) (.022) (.027) (.027) (.030) (.022) (.014)
GOV -0.029 -0.124 0.078 -0.008 -0.136 -0.100 0.070 -0.327 -0.090
(.035) (.044) (.124) (.092) (.051) (.052) (.064) (.093) (.029)
OPEN 0.135 0.267 0.175 0.413 0.079 0.104 0.216 0.692 0.196
(.035) (.039) (.097) (.054) (.045) (.054) (.056) (.052) (.026)
INF 0.234 0.034 -0.131 -0.243 0.077 -0.782 -0.077 -0.409 -0.036
(.064) (.045) (.137) (.062) (.054) (.173) (.068) (.079) (.036)
Serial corr. 31.579 18.750 7.143 12.000 21.053 22.222 22.222 5.263 17.567
Poolability 9.044 5.875 5.461 5.491 3.245 3.930 12.456 13.079 7.490
HS -3.061 -2.788 -2.573 -2.863 -3.094 -2.983 -2.944 -2.589 -3.377
DH -3.040 -2.837 -2.563 -2.985 -2.965 -2.693 -3.287 -2.654 -3.323
Notes: The dependent variable is GDPPC. The model includes a constant and contemporaneous
as well as one lag and lead of the first differences of all explanatory variables. Apart from INF,
all variables are in logarithmic form. The values provided in parentheses are estimated standard
errors. Boldface values indicate rejections of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
Reported numbers of the serial correlation tests of Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978) represent
percentages of economy specific regressions where tests indicate rejections of the null hypothesis
of no first order serial correlation with 5% significance. Entries corresponding to HS and DH are
obtained by applying homogeneous panel unit root tests of Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) and
Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a), respectively, on the pooled residuals. The null hypothesis of the
employed poolability test is that reported long-run parameter estimates are not systematically
different from mean group estimates.
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of financial development on economic growth in all the cross sections. This positive
impact is in line with much of the empirical FG literature (see Levine, 2005, for a
broad survey). Furthermore, the estimated coefficients are the larger the higher is
the income level of the subsamples. In particular, the FG coefficient estimate for
high-income economies is three times larger than that for low-income economies.
This underpins the dependence of the FG nexus on the income level.
The right hand part of Table 5.2 indicates that economies with the highest level
of financial openness benefit the least from financial development. Moreover, the
weakest FG link in those economies is observed in the recent period. This negative
impact of very high financial openness on the FG nexus could be explained by
noting that both financial development and financial openness might serve the same
beneficial roles to economic development. For example, providing risk diversification
and hence increasing the probability of investment in high-risk, high expected-return
projects is generally considered as an important function ascribed to both financial
development (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 2005) and financial openness
(Bekaert et al., 2011; Obstfeld, 1994).
On the other hand, breaking the samples into two periods (Panels 2 and 3 of
Table 5.2) reveals that, in contrast to the findings in Rousseau and Wachtel (2011),
most of the cross sections are characterized by a stronger FG nexus in the recent
period. It is only in high-income and in high-financial openness economies that we
find a weakened FG link. The result in high-income economies might be explained by
noting that the financial development occurring outside the banking sector, which is
not be captured by PRV, makes up a large and growing share of the overall financial
development in those economies.
Table 5.2 also documents some model diagnostics with respect to the presence
of serial correlation and unit roots in the residuals as well as poolability tests. In
most cross sections, we obtain satisfactory results for all the three diagnostic tests.
Specifically, in all cross sections, the null hypothesis of a panel unit root using
the diagnostics of Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) and Demetrescu and Hanck
(2012a) is rejected. Thus, at the panel level the performed DOLS regression does
not suffer from spurious dependence. Poolability test results also indicate that
the pooled regression estimates are not systematically different from mean group
estimates for most cross sections. Thus, after allowing for fixed effects and cross-
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section-specific transitory dynamics, pooling is not overly restrictive to uncover
the long-run determinants of per capita income. Mitigating this overall evidence
slightly, however, results from high financial openness economies show a failure to
satisfy the poolability restrictions in both the full-period and sub-period regressions.
Therefore, a fair degree of caution should be given in interpreting the corresponding
FG estimates. Finally, the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation is
rejected for about 13% of the economies, a large proportion of which are upper-
middle-income economies. Although the empirical rejection frequency exceeds the
nominal significance level of the diagnostic tests to some extent, we refrain from
model respecification for two reasons. First, serial correlation diagnostics improve
if we use more than one lag of the first differences in the DOLS regression while
higher order transitory dynamics leaves the evaluation of the FG link qualitatively
unaffected. Second, eventual residual correlation does not invalidate consistency of
the long-run DOLS parameter estimates.
5.4 Functional coefficient modeling
In this section, we first briefly outline the functional coefficient model that allows
the long-run parameters in (5.1) to depend on potential economic states and then
discuss empirical results. Issues of estimation and inference within the functional
coefficient model are deferred to Appendix 5.A.
5.4.1 The semiparametric model
We denote a factor or state variable, for instance, the degree of trade openness, by
ω. The full list of factors that we actually employ is provided below. As we are
interested in the state dependence of the long-run parameters, we presume that all
the short-run parameters and the deterministic terms are factor invariant. Thus, we
generalize (5.3) towards a functional representation. The functional model reads as
y˜it = x˜
′
itβ(ωit) + u˜it, ωit = {σt(ω˜)}
−1(ω˜it − ω¯t), (5.4)
where ω¯t = N
−1
∑N
i=1 ω˜it and σt(ω˜) are the time-specific cross-sectional mean and
standard deviation of the factor observations ω˜it, respectively. Equation (5.4) allows
the relation between economic development and its long-run determinants to depend
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on the measurable economic factor ω˜it.
As outlined in Appendix 5.A, kernel-based estimates of the semiparametric
model can be interpreted as weighted pooled regression estimates, where the weights
attached to particular observations {y˜it, x˜it} depend on the time local position of
the factor in the cross section of time series. As we are interested only in the
functional dependence of the FG nexus, our discussion is, henceforth, restricted to
βˆ1(ωit). Functional estimates βˆ1(ωit) can be displayed graphically. Noting that we
have standardized the factor, the following grid is used:
βˆ1(ω), ω = −2 + 0.1κ, κ = 0, 1, 2, ..., 40. (5.5)
Thus, estimates βˆ1(ω) reflect the effect of attaching relatively high kernel weights to
economies which are above (ω > 0), close to (ω = 0) or below (ω < 0) the factor’s
average time path.
5.4.2 Functional coefficient estimates
In this section, we discuss results obtained from the functional coefficient model
in (5.4)25. Potential factor variables are mainly selected in light of the related
literature (Rioja and Valev, 2004; Yilmazkuday, 2011). They include the level of
the government size (GOV), financial development (PRV), openness to international
trade (OPEN), and inflation (INF). As it is generated from four dummy variables,
the financial openness measure, FOPEN, has poor scale properties. Therefore, we
do not employ it as a factor in the functional coefficient modeling. Instead, we
examine its impact on the state dependence of the FG nexus by considering cross
sections of distinct degrees of financial openness.
To test if the FG nexus is dependent on a particular factor, we apply the factor
based bootstrap approach proposed in Herwartz and Xu (2009). A brief discussion
of the tests is provided in Appendix 5.A. We first look at the global factor-invariance
test results and then discuss the factor-dependent FG nexus with respect to local
parametric estimation. The conventional 5% significance level is used to decide if a
given factor has a statistically significant impact on the FG nexus.
The global factor-invariance test results documented in Table 5.3 show that the
25All computations are done in MATLAB 2011a.
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Table 5.3: Global factor invariance test results
Income groups FOPEN categories
Factor period low lower-
middle
upper-
middle
high world 1st 2nd 3rd 4th pooled
GOV 1975–2005 .000 .015 .000 .024 .003 .000 .000 .015 .065 .005
1975-1989 .000 .180 .015 .195 .182
1990-2005 .000 .035 .074 .004 .040
PRV 1975–2005 .000 .000 .149 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1975-1989 .012 .015 .099 .172 .000
1990-2005 .000 .000 .011 .001 .000
OPEN 1975–2005 .000 .000 .014 .000 .001 .042 .432 .016 .000 .014
1975-1989 .003 .019 .053 .304 .011
1990-2005 .001 .000 .003 .004 .083
INF 1975–2005 .355 .654 .241 .829 .010 .362 .353 .133 .253 .013
1975-1989 .891 .920 .850 .408 .545
1990-2005 .143 .567 .106 .895 .005
Notes: Apart from INF, all variables are in logarithmic form. Reported numbers are (bootstrap)
p-values. The number of bootstrap replications is 1000. The columns corresponding to “FOPEN
categories” refer to p-values obtained by applying the test on the four quartiles of the pooled data
sorted with respect to the level of FOPEN.
null hypothesis of a constant FG nexus can be rejected if we use government size,
financial development or trade openness as a state variable. One exception is when
financial development is employed as a factor in upper-middle-income economies.
As it turns out, inflation fails to be a significant determinant of the FG link in all
the cross sections except the most comprehensive sample. Consequently, we will not
take inflation as a factor in the ensuing discussions.
5.4.2.1 Government size Figure 5.4.2.1 depicts the estimated functional FG
nexus obtained by employing government size as a factor variable. The displayed
functional estimates show that in low-income and high-income economies the FG link
weakens with increasing government size. More importantly, we obtain a negative
FG nexus in low- and lower-middle-income economies with large government sizes.
This result supports the conjecture raised by Xu (2000) that a high degree of
government regulation could be the reason for the negative FG nexus in low-
income economies. In upper-middle-income economies, a medium government size
appears to be favorable for a higher FG relationship while economies with very small
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Figure 5.1: Functional FG estimates conditional on the level of government size (GOV).
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
or very large governments tend to lose the growth promoting effects of financial
development. This is in accordance with findings in Yilmazkuday (2011). These
results likely underscore the importance of certain types of government expenditure
like on securing property rights, national defense and the legal system that facilitate
the efficient functioning of the financial sector. Yet, the fact that the FG nexus
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becomes low when the size of the government is large hints at the prevalence
of excessive government regulations in such economies. In high-income (OECD)
economies, governments are relatively larger (see Table 5.1) and strong legal systems
that enforce property rights and financial contracts are already in place. As a result,
additional government consumption mainly crowds out the private sector. This leads
to a lesser efficiency in the utilization of the funds channeled to the private sector
(PRV), and hence a decline in the FG link. In line with this reasoning, functional
estimates in the fourth column of Figure 1 show that in high-income economies small
governments are associated with a very strong FG link and increasing government
size weakens the FG nexus.
Additionally, the second and the third rows of Figure 5.4.2.1 illustrate that the
functional dependence of the FG nexus on the government size remains largely
similar in the two subperiods. If any, large government sizes in upper-middle-
income economies are associated with a negative FG nexus in the first period,
casting additional doubt on the benefit of having large governments even in those
economies. Furthermore, a negative relationship between government size and the
FG nexus is obtained in all categories of financial openness. This strengthens the
general implications from the above discussion that large government sizes adversely
affect the FG nexus.
5.4.2.2 Financial development Figure 5.4.2.2 displays the estimated func-
tional dependence of the FG nexus with respect to the level of financial development.
It can be seen that low-income economies with high level of financial development
show a relatively high FG nexus. In general, there is an increasing FG nexus
for additional degrees of financial development, most likely because the scale of
the growth-promoting functions of the financial sector (Levine, 2005) increases as
the financial system develops. For example, the financial sector has to reach a
certain threshold of development before it could agglomerate savings that are high
enough to finance indivisible, high return, investments (Rioja and Valev, 2004). The
risk diversification and high-return project identification (Rioja and Valev, 2004)
functions also require a relatively high level of financial development.
Splitting full-period cross sections into two obtains that most of the functional
relations discussed above prevail in both subperiods. However, the higher FG
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Figure 5.2: Functional FG estimates conditional on the levels of financial development
(PRV).
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
nexus in low-income economies with very high level of financial development is not
diagnosed in the second subperiod. Results documented in the fourth row of Figure
2 illustrate that the effect of financial development on the FG nexus depends on the
level of financial openness. A moderate level of financial openness is associated with
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a beneficial role of financial development on the FG nexus. However, the average FG
link is apparently the weakest in states of higher financial openness. These findings
highlight that the similar growth-promoting roles of financial openness and financial
development (Obstfeld, 1994) are likely complementary for moderate levels of both
trigger variables.
5.4.2.3 Openness to trade Trade openness can result in two opposite effects on
the overall macroeconomic performance of an economy. On the one hand, it may lead
to enhanced efficiency by providing access to new raw materials and products, low-
cost intermediate goods, larger markets and latest technologies (Yanikkaya, 2003).
On the other hand, it could also induce macroeconomic instability (Rodrik, 1992)
and increase vulnerabilities to international shocks (Yilmazkuday, 2011). Trade
openness may also impact on financial development. Rajan and Zingales (2003)
argue that trade openness, if coupled with financial openness, can weaken the
industrial and financial incumbents’ resistance and promote financial development.26
In testing this claim, Baltagi et al. (2009) find that trade openness induces financial
development even in financially closed economies. As a result, the possible effect of
trade openness on the FG nexus is not clear at the outset.
The results depicted in Figure 5.4.2.3 indicate that the impact of trade openness
on the FG nexus varies across stages of economic development. In low- and lower-
middle-income economies, a moderate level of trade openness stimulates the FG
nexus, but extreme openness could lead to a negative FG relationship. Except the
negative FG link, the hump-shaped relationship between trade openness and the FG
nexus corroborates the results reported in Yilmazkuday (2011). The negative FG
nexus might highlight the failure of domestic firms in extremely open low- and lower-
middle-income economies to withstand foreign competition. In contrast, upper-
middle-income economies show a marked FG nexus when they are highly open to
trade. This might be because of the better utilization of credits by firms in those
economies when they are given access to a broader international market and/or when
they face strong competition of foreign firms. However, we do not observe any clear
pattern for the impact of openness on the FG nexus in high-income economies. For
26Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbents in the industrial and financial sector are opposed
to financial development because it generates competition and erodes their rents.
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Figure 5.3: Functional FG estimates conditional on the levels of trade openness (OPEN).
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
most income groups, subperiod estimation results are qualitatively similar to the
full-period estimates. However, the FG link in upper-middle-income economies that
are less open to international trade turned out to be negative in the recent period.
This might imply that, in a period when most upper-middle-income economies have
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become increasingly open to international trade, those economies with a lower level
of trade openness are most likely poor performing ones.
The effects of trade openness on the FG nexus also differ across categories
of financial openness. When financial openness is low, moderate trade openness
increases the FG nexus while a very high level of trade openness induces a declining
FG link. When financial openness is high, however, the negative relationship
between trade openness and the FG nexus begins with the minimum level of
trade openness under consideration. This result supports our conclusion from the
parametric estimations that both financial openness and financial development play
similar roles in economic development. More importantly, the fact that the FG
nexus could even be negative if trade openness is also very high underscores the
increased vulnerability to international shocks in such states.
5.5 Conclusions
We investigate the state dependence in the FG nexus by means of semiparametric
functional coefficient models on a data set comprising 74 economies over the period
1975–2005. We find that the FG link is dependent on an economy’s level of economic
and financial development, government size, trade openness and financial openness,
but not on the level of inflation. Moreover, the effects of the economic factors
on the FG link are diagnosed to be variant across the distinct stages of economic
development.
We find a generally positive effect of income level on the FG link. In particular,
low-income economies obtain the least benefit from financial development while
high-income economies enjoy three times as much benefit. Similarly, financial
development has a generally positive effect on the FG nexus, with the strongest
FG link observed in low-income economies with a high level financial development.
There are also cases where financial development could have an adverse effect on
economic growth. This is observed in low- and lower-middle-income economies when
they have very large governments or are extremely open to international trade. The
impact of openness to trade varies even between lower-middle- and upper-middle-
income economies. Upper-middle-income economies show a pronounced FG nexus
when they are highly open to international trade. Yet, only a moderate level of
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trade openness is beneficial to lower-middle-income economies and being extremely
open is found to induce a negative FG relationship. Finally, while increasing
financial openness to some extent strengthens the FG nexus, economies with the
highest level of financial openness are found to benefit the least from financial
development. Furthermore, the FG nexus could even be negative if economies are
highly open to both international trade and international finance. This implies not
only substitutability in the roles of financial openness and financial development
in economic development but also an accompanying high degree of vulnerability to
international shocks.
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5.A Semiparametric modeling
5.A.1 Estimation
We apply a semiparametric estimator of β(ω) similar to the Nadaraya-Watson
estimator (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964) which is given by
βˆ(ω) = X−1(ω)Y (ω), (5.6)
where X(ω) =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 x˜itx˜
′
itKh(ωit − ω) and Y (ω) =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 x˜ity˜itKh(ωit −
ω), Kh(·) = K(·/h)/h, with K(.) being a kernel function and h the
bandwidth parameter. In this study, Kh(·) is the Gaussian kernel, K(·/h) =
(2pi)−1/2 exp(−0.5(·/h)2). To select the bandwidth h, we apply Scott’s (1992) rule
of thumb, h = 1.06σˆω(NT )
−1/5, where σˆω is the estimated standard deviation of the
factor observations. Note that σˆω approximately equals to unity as we standardize
the factors.
5.A.2 Inference
For inferential purposes, we follow the factor-based bootstrap approach of Herwartz
and Xu (2009) that contrasts the factor invariant coefficient model with the state
dependent model. Herwartz and Xu (2009) suggest two types of tests for factor
dependence, global and local. The global test is a bootstrap approximation of an F-
statistic and contrasts the residual sum of squares under the factor dependent model
to that under invariant coefficients. The local test on the other hand examines the
factor dependence for a given value of the factor. Confidence intervals under the null
of a factor invariant FG nexus are constructed using bootstrap FG nexus estimates
βˆ∗(ω) obtained by means of pseudo samples ω∗it of factors that are drawn with
replacement from the given factor variables ωit keeping other variables unchanged.
This bootstrap resampling scheme destroys any systematic relationship between the
model parameters and ω∗it. For any local point ω, if an estimate βˆ1(ω) lies outside
its 95% confidence interval (based on 1000 bootstrap replications), then we reject
the null hypothesis of constant FG nexus at 5% level of significance.
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5.B List of economies included in each sample
5.B.1 Low-income economies
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, India, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
5.B.2 Lower middle income economies
Algeria, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala,
Honduras, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand.
5.B.3 Upper middle income economies
Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia, Seychelles, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
5.B.4 High-income economies
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States of America.
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6.1 Introduction
Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesize that both trade and financial openness are
crucial for financial development. They argue that financial development is opposed
by incumbent industrialists and financiers who are wary of the ensuing competition
and, hence, erosion of their rents. However, trade openness, together with financial
openness, could mute industrial and financial incumbents’ resistance to financial
development for two important reasons. On the one hand, incumbents who are
doing well in an open economy environment may not oppose financial development
as they may see domestic competition less pressing. On the other hand, firms that
are struggling to survive foreign competition will need to invest a lot, and, as a
result, they will push for financial development so as to get better access to external
credit. In this sense, openness could be considered as an important determinant of
financial development. In a partial support for this claim, Baltagi et al. (2009) find
that opening up either the trade or the capital accounts—but not necessarily both—
could induce financial development. Evidently, the principal reason why Rajan and
Zingales (2003) forward their hypothesis is that they believe financial development
brings about economic growth. However, it is now widely accepted that finance
does not always promote economic growth. More specifically, the impact of financial
development on economic growth could depend on the level of trade and financial
openness (Yilmazkuday, 2011). We have also documented in the preceding chapter
that financial development is unlikely to spur economic growth in states of extreme
financial or trade openness.
In this chapter, we will revisit the impact of openness on the finance-growth nexus
using a different panel data set from 78 economies during the period 1981-2006. This
data set differs from the one employed in the preceding chapter in two respects. First
and foremost, we now employ a continuous financial openness measure, namely,
the percentage of the economy’s aggregate foreign assets and liabilities in GDP.
Due to its smoothness, this measure, unlike the one used in the previous chapter,
can be treated as a factor in the semiparametric estimation. Second, we utilize
disaggregated openness measures. The financial openness measure is divided into
two indicators: foreign asset holdings and foreign liability holdings indicators.
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Similarly, the trade openness measure is disaggregated so that it distinguishes
between imports and exports, on the one hand, and between goods exports (imports)
and services exports (imports), on the other. Taking advantage of the smoothness
of the new financial openness measure, we pursue a new empirical strategy of
estimating a bivariate factor model, with trade openness and financial openness
as the first and the second factors, respectively. This method helps to investigate
whether financial development is beneficial when an economy has simultaneously
high levels of trade and financial openness.
Our findings by and large confirm the evidence established in Chapter 5. To recap
some of them, the impact of trade openness on the FG relationship varies across
stages of economic development. While openness enhances the FG nexus in upper-
middle-income economies, it exerts a negative impact in low- and lower-middle-
income economies. On the other hand, very high level of financial openness tends
to erode the growth-promoting role of financial development. We ascribe this result
to the fact that financial openness is a likely substitute to financial development
in its growth-promoting roles such as risk diversification (Obstfeld, 1994). Finally,
it is only in upper-middle-income economies that we find simultaneously opening
the trade and capital accounts to significantly enhance the FG nexus. Therefore,
our results offer only a partial support to the Ragan and Zingales hypothesis that
suggests opening up both trade and capital accounts as a means of fostering growth-
promoting financial development.
Section 6.2 describes the data and presents results from parametric estimation.
Section 6.3 introduces the functional coefficient model and discusses empirical
functional estimates. Section 6.4 concludes. It should, however, be noted that
this and the preceding chapter have a lot of similarities, especially with respect to
the concept of state dependence and the functional coefficient modeling approach.
Accordingly, we will not repeat the technical details of functional modeling provided
in Appendix 5.A. Likewise, we only mention in passing that a brief review of the
literature on the impact of openness on the FG nexus is discussed in Section 5.2.
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6.2 Data and preliminary analysis
6.2.1 Data
The data set we have been utilizing in the previous three chapters is not suited for
this chapter as the data for the new financial openness measure as well as for the
disaggregated trade and financial openness indicators are not available for the same
economies and the period 1975–2005. The new panel data set covers the period 1981-
2006 and comprises 78 economies whose selection is dictated by data availability.
Except the openness measures, indicators and data sources of all the remaining
variables are similar to the data employed in the preceding chapters (see Section
5.3.1 for the detail). We measure financial development using credit by deposit-
money banks and other financial institutions to the non-financial private sector as
a percentage of GDP (PRV). Our measure of economic development is real GDP
per capita (GDPPC). Government size is measured by government consumption
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (GOV) and the growth rate of the GDP deflator
is used to measure inflation (INF).
Trade openness is approximated in terms of the percentage of imports plus
exports in GDP (OPEN). Furthermore, we will do a sensitivity check by employing
the following alternative trade openness measures: the volumes of imports (IMP),
exports (EXP), goods imports (GIMP), services imports (SIMP), goods exports
(GEXP), or services exports (SEXP), all taken as a % of GDP. To measure financial
openness, we use the financial globalization indicator (FOPEN) suggested in Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). FOPEN is the volume of an economy’s foreign assets
plus liabilities holdings as a percentage of GDP. The robustness checks in this case
are done by utilizing the percentage of foreign assets (FA) or foreign liabilities (FL)
in GDP.
PRV is obtained from the November 2010 update of the Financial Development
and Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000a)27 while FOPEN is taken from Philip
Lane’s website.28 The remaining series are drawn from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
As the impact of openness on the FG nexus is likely to vary across stages of
27http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
28http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html
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economic development, we categorize the 78 economies four according to the World
Bank’s contemporary classification criteria, based on their latest (2006) GDP per
capita.29 In particular, economies whose latest real per capita GDP (in constant 2000
US Dollar) fall in the ranges less than 905, 906–3595, 3596–11115, and over 11115 are
classified as low-income (17 economies), lower-middle-income (17), upper-middle-
income (19) and high-income (25), respectively. The list of economies included in
each sample is provided in Appendix 6.A.
Table 6.1: Summary statistics, 1981–2006
Variable Mean Max Min Std CV Variable Mean Max Min Std CV
World (78 economies)
GDPPC 7810.4 41245.8 102.2 9550.8 1.22 IMP 42.0 204.5 3.0 26.3 0.63
PRV 51.0 269.8 1.4 41.1 0.81 EXP 37.6 234.4 3.2 25.0 0.67
GOV 16.1 43.0 3.2 6.2 0.39 GIMP 32.3 182.5 3.4 22.3 0.69
INF 10.5 390.7 -23.5 19.6 1.86 SIMP 9.9 47.0 0.7 6.6 0.67
OPEN 79.6 438.9 6.3 49.2 0.62 GEXP 27.0 197.9 0.9 20.8 0.77
FOPEN 169.2 2381.4 7.5 178.4 1.05 SEXP 10.7 66.3 0.1 10.6 0.99
FA 65.0 1189.9 1.5 95.8 0.39
FL 104.2 1191.5 6.0 90.8 0.87
Low income (17)
GDPPC 361.0 976.1 102.2 189.1 0.52 IMP 34.7 147.7 3.0 26.1 0.75
PRV 16.6 41.2 1.4 9.2 0.55 EXP 23.5 82.1 3.2 13.4 0.57
GOV 13.6 43.0 4.8 6.3 0.46 GIMP 27.4 134.1 3.4 24.3 0.89
INF 14.1 165.7 -8.2 20.8 1.48 SIMP 8.9 35.4 1.1 5.5 0.61
OPEN 58.2 187.7 6.3 34.5 0.59 GEXP 18.7 75.1 0.9 12.8 0.68
FOPEN 118.6 628.2 7.5 74.9 0.63 SEXP 5.3 22.7 0.1 3.5 0.67
FA 20.4 83.0 1.5 14.1 0.66
FL 98.2 561.8 6.0 65.8 0.67
Lower middle (17)
GDPPC 1498.1 3561.3 407.7 637.4 0.43 IMP 43.0 105.8 13.0 19.4 0.45
PRV 35.9 166.0 4.8 27.1 0.76 EXP 35.7 100.9 11.5 15.6 0.44
GOV 13.7 37.2 3.2 6.1 0.44 GIMP 32.9 87.6 9.8 15.3 0.47
INF 9.3 102.8 -23.5 10.5 1.12 SIMP 9.5 31.5 1.9 5.7 0.60
OPEN 78.8 202.8 24.9 33.8 0.43 GEXP 25.3 92.8 5.0 14.2 0.56
FOPEN 113.5 340.0 32.3 55.5 0.49 SEXP 10.5 47.7 0.5 9.4 0.89
FA 37.2 260.0 2.4 35.1 0.42
FL 76.3 238.6 23.7 34.5 0.45
Upper middle (20)
GDPPC 4733.4 15413.9 1213.8 2059.2 0.44 IMP 51.1 106.9 9.4 23.9 0.47
PRV 42.9 155.3 6.5 27.1 0.63 EXP 48.8 121.3 8.2 21.5 0.44
GOV 16.7 38.8 5.0 6.0 0.36 GIMP 38.5 84.5 8.0 19.3 0.50
INF 13.0 139.7 -20.8 21.0 1.62 SIMP 13.1 35.9 0.7 7.3 0.56
OPEN 100.0 220.4 21.1 43.4 0.43 GEXP 32.2 106.3 2.1 19.0 0.59
FOPEN 168.6 1324.5 26.1 153.7 0.91 SEXP 16.4 66.3 0.8 14.4 0.88
FA 64.6 604.0 4.2 75.5 0.33
FL 104.1 720.5 11.2 87.1 0.84
High income (24)
GDPPC 20122.3 41245.8 3510.0 8097.5 0.40 IMP 38.9 204.5 6.9 30.2 0.78
PRV 92.8 269.8 22.0 38.9 0.42 EXP 39.6 234.4 7.2 33.2 0.84
GOV 19.2 41.5 8.2 5.0 0.26 GIMP 30.2 182.5 4.9 25.7 0.85
INF 6.7 390.7 -4.8 21.5 3.21 SIMP 8.2 47.0 1.4 6.3 0.77
OPEN 78.5 438.9 16.0 63.2 0.80 GEXP 29.6 197.9 4.1 27.7 0.94
FOPEN 245.0 2381.4 33.0 260.6 1.06 SEXP 9.9 50.8 1.2 8.7 0.88
FA 116.8 1189.9 7.7 139.5 0.28
FL 128.2 1191.5 16.9 124.2 0.97
Note: Full definitions of the variables and data sources are given in the text. Except GDPPC, all
variables are measured as percentage values. Max, min, std and CV represent maximum, minimum,
standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively.
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics. The summary includes the means,
29http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history.
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minimum and maximum values and standard deviations for different income groups.
In addition to the fact that the data set is characterized by considerable variations
within/between cross sections, a number of distinctive features of the data are
worth emphasizing. First, as expected, the mean of the financial development
measure PRV increases with economic development. Second, the average degree of
trade openness (measured by OPEN) initially increases with income level, reaches a
maximum (for upper-middle-income economies) and then declines. In contrast, the
mean level of financial openness (FOPEN) shows a marginal decrease initially, but
then increases markedly as economies develop. In particular, high-income economies
are twice as much open as low-income economies. Disaggregating the openness
measures OPEN and FOPEN reveals some interesting features. For instance, while
OPEN is more or less evenly divided into IMP and EXP, FL is much higher than FA
in all income groups. Besides, high-income economies are about six times as much
open as low-income economies in terms of their foreign asset holdings. Further
decomposing the trade openness measures, we find that the volume of trade in
goods (GIMP and GEXP) is about three times that of trade in services (SIMP
and SEXP). Given that low-income economies are highly dependent on concessional
debts to run their economies, it is clear that the amount of debts does not reflect
capital account openness in those economies.30 Hence, the (disaggregated) foreign-
assets-based indicator of financial openness (FA) seems to be a more reasonable
measure in this case.
6.2.2 Parametric regression results
Before we embark on examining the dependence of the FG nexus on openness
by means of a functional coefficient modeling approach, we begin our analysis by
applying a typical parametric regression widely used in the FG literature. Namely,
we employ a dynamic OLS (DOLS) model, where the explanatory variables in
levels are augmented with the lags and leads of their first differences to account for
potential endogeneity and serial correlation (Stock and Watson, 1993; Christopoulos
30For example, 73.4% of the external debt in all low-income economies in 2006 constitute
concessional debt (World Development Indicators online accessed on August 29, 2012).
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and Tsionas, 2004; Apergis et al., 2007). Formally, the model reads as
yit = x
′
itβ + z
′
itγ + uit, (6.1)
where yit represent GDP per capita; xit is a vector of explanatory variables
comprising PRV , GOV , OPEN , INF and FOPEN ; zit includes the fixed effect
and one lag and one lead of the first difference of the right-hand side variables xit;
and β and γ, respectively, are vectors of long-run and short-run parameters. To
allow for heterogeneous short-run coefficients, we partial out zit from (6.1). To this
end, we denote matrices collecting observations in yit, xit and zit for economy i by
Yi, Xi and Zi, respectively, and henceforth consider the partial system
y˜it = x˜
′
itβ + u˜it, (6.2)
where y˜it, x˜it and u˜it are typical elements of, respectively, Y˜i = MiYi, X˜i =
MiXi, u˜i =Miui,Mi = (Ii−Zi(Z
′
iZi)
−1Z ′i), and Ii is a (T ×T ) identity matrix.
Table 6.2 documents estimation results using data from the four income groups
and the comprehensive sample. It can be seen that financial development has
a statistically and economically significant positive long-run impact on economic
development in all the cross sections. This positive impact is consistent with much of
the empirical FG literature (see Levine, 2005, for a broad survey). The estimated FG
coefficient initially increases with income level but finally declines with high-income
economies exhibiting the weakest FG link of all income groups. This dependence
of the FG nexus on the income level is also diagnosed in the preceding chapter as
well as in Yilmazkuday (2011). A noticeable difference from the parametric results
documented in the previous chapter is that high-income economies now exhibit a
weaker FG link. This could be explained by their higher degree of financial openness
(see Table 6.1), which is now included as an explanatory variable. Indeed, we have
established in the previous chapter (specifically Table 5.2) that economies with the
highest level of financial openness benefit the least from financial development.31
31To be precise, excluding FOPEN from the model increases the coefficient attached to PRV in
high-income economies to 0.236. However, as our aim is to see the impact of PRV on GDPPC
after taking into account FOPEN ’s impact on GDPPC, we proceed by including FOPEN as a
regressor. The only reason why it has been left out of the regressions in the previous chapters is
that the FOPEN measure employed there, being an index derived from four dummy variables,
does not feature frequent, if any, variations within an economy.
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Table 6.2: Parametric regression results
Variables low lower upper high world
income middle middle income
PRV 0.113 0.215 0.289 0.104 0.216
(0.016) (0.028) (0.023) (0.017) (0.010)
GOV -0.091 -0.140 -0.217 -0.361 -0.206
(0.030) (0.038) (0.046) (0.064) (0.020)
OPEN 0.160 0.217 0.287 -0.220 0.110
(0.026) (0.039) (0.038) (0.048) (0.018)
INF 0.429 -0.517 0.177 -0.077 0.006
(0.061) (0.176) (0.079) (0.050) (0.038)
FOPEN -0.024 0.031 0.261 0.276 0.162
(0.015) (0.035) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009)
Serial corr. 82.353 76.471 65.000 70.833 73.077
Poolability 9.472 6.621 4.522 9.741 5.677
HS -3.987 -3.528 -4.020 -3.522 -4.437
DH -4.194 -3.801 -3.821 -3.882 -4.417
Notes: The dependent variable is GDPPC. The model includes a constant and contemporaneous
as well as one lag and lead of the first differences of all explanatory variables. Apart from INF,
all variables are in logarithmic form. The values provided in parentheses are estimated standard
errors. Rejections of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance are indicated by boldface
numbers. Reported numbers of the serial correlation tests of Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978)
represent percentages of economy specific regressions where tests indicate rejections of the null
hypothesis of no first order serial correlation with 5% significance. Entries corresponding to HS
and DH are obtained by applying homogeneous panel unit root tests suggested, respectively, in
Herwartz and Siedenburg (2008) and Demetrescu and Hanck (2012a) on the pooled residuals. The
null hypothesis of the employed poolability test is that reported long-run parameter estimates are
not systematically different from mean group estimates.
Table 6.2 also presents some model diagnostics: serial correlation and unit roots
tests for the residuals, and poolability tests. Except for serial correlation, we obtain
satisfactory results for the two diagnostic tests. In particular, the null hypothesis of
a panel unit root is rejected using both unit root tests (Herwartz and Siedenburg,
2008; Demetrescu and Hanck, 2012a) indicating that at the panel level the performed
DOLS regression does not suffer from spurious dependence. Poolability test results
also indicate that the pooled regression estimates are not systematically different
from mean group estimates for most cross sections. Thus, after allowing for
fixed effects and cross section- specific transitory dynamics, pooling is not overly
restrictive to uncover the long-run determinants of per capita income. However,
the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation is rejected in most of the
economies. Still, we refrain from model respecification for two reasons. First, serial
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correlation diagnostics improve if we use more than one lag of the first differences in
the DOLS regression while higher order transitory dynamics leaves the evaluation
of the FG link qualitatively unaffected. Second, eventual residual correlation does
not invalidate consistency of the long-run DOLS parameter estimates.
6.3 Functional coefficient modeling
In this section, we briefly outline a one-dimensional functional coefficient model
similar to the one suggested by Cai et al. (2000). This model is used to assess
the dependence of the long-run FG nexus as formalized in (6.2) on alternative
measures of trade and financial openness, with only one factor considered at a time.
Moreover, we introduce a bivariate state dependent model that allows us to examine
the simultaneous impact of trade and financial openness on the FG nexus. Finally,
empirical results from the employed functional coefficient models are discussed.
6.3.1 The semiparametric model
Denoting a measurable factor, for instance, OPEN, by w, a functional coefficient
representation of (6.2) looks like
y˜it = x˜
′
itβ(ω) + u˜it. (6.3)
where ω = wit, for a one dimensional factor model, and ω = (w
1
it, w
2
it) for a bivariate
factor model, with the superscripts 1 and 2 representing trade and financial openness,
respectively.
To facilitate comparability among economies, we standardize factors as
wit =
(w˜it − w¯t)
σt(w˜)
,
with w¯t = 1/N
N∑
i=1
w˜it, σt(w˜) =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(w˜it − w¯t)2
Estimation and inferential methods within the functional coefficient model are
similar to Herwartz and Xu (2009) and have been briefly reviewed in Appendix
5.A. The functional estimates are essentially weighted regression estimates, where
the weight assigned to a particular observation reflects the time local position of
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the factor in the cross section of time series. As the question of interest in this
work is the functional dependence of the FG nexus, we discuss only βˆ1(ω). For a
one-dimensional factor model, functional estimates βˆ1(ω) can be displayed in a two
dimensional graph. Given that our factors are standardized, the following grid is
used to depict functional estimates:
βˆ1(ω), ω = −2 + 0.1κ, κ = 0, 1, 2, ..., 40. (6.4)
In this case, estimates βˆ1(ω) reflect the effect of attaching relatively high kernel
weights to economies which are above (ω > 0), close to (ω = 0) or below (ω < 0)
the factor’s average time path. Similarly, estimates from the bivariate functional
coefficient model are displayed in a three dimensional graph using the same grid as
in (6.4).
6.3.2 Functional coefficient estimates
In this section, results obtained from the functional coefficient model in (6.3) are
discussed.32 We employ the factor-based bootstrap approach proposed in Herwartz
and Xu (2009) to examine state dependence of the FG relationship on trade
and/or financial openness. Accordingly, we first present the global factor-invariance
test results and then discuss the local dependence of the FG nexus on openness.
Throughout, we use the conventional 5% significance level to decide if a given
openness measure has a statistically significant impact on the FG link.
Table 6.3 documents the global factor-invariance test results. It can be seen
that, with the exception of lower-middle-income economies, the null hypothesis of
a constant FG nexus can be rejected if OPEN is used as a state variable. Even in
lower-middle-income economies, the FG link is dependent on the import-based trade
openness measure (IMP ). On the other hand, the FG link significantly depends on
financial openness (FOPEN) in low- and high-income, but not in middle-income
categories. Moreover, it is important to emphasize here that each measure of trade
and financial openness significantly affects the FG nexus in high-income economies.
The last row in Table 6.3 presents the results for the test on whether the FG link is
dependent on the bivariate factors, OPEN and FOPEN . As it turns out, it is in
32All computations are done in MATLAB 2011a.
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Table 6.3: Global factor invariance test results
Factors low
income
lower
middle
upper
middle
high
income
world
OPEN .010 .061 .000 .000 .000
EXP .092 .867 .000 .000 .000
GOODS EXP .002 .381 .000 .000 .000
SER. EXP .000 .000 .000 .009 .000
IMP .194 .000 .000 .000 .000
GOODS IMP .340 .000 .000 .000 .000
SER. IMP .104 .000 .000 .000 .000
FOPEN .006 .769 .683 .009 .002
FA .600 .238 .332 .045 .000
FL .000 .911 .004 .011 .120
OPEN, FOPEN .390 .020 .000 .970
Notes: All variables are used in logarithmic forms. Reported numbers are (bootstrap) p-values.
Except for the last row, the bivariate factors, the number of replications is 1000. As a very long
computation time is required, the number of replications used for the bivariate factors is 500.
Even then, obtaining a result for the comprehensive sample has been computationally infeasible.
middle-income economies only that the bivariate factors significantly affect the FG
nexus.
6.3.2.1 Trade openness Figure 6.3.2.1 displays the estimated functional FG
nexus obtained by employing IMP , EXP and OPEN as factor variables. One
important finding from the graphs is that using either of the three openness measures
provides very similar results. This is consistent with the international trade theory
that trade promotes efficiency not only through exports but also through the
import of goods and services that otherwise are too costly to produce domestically
(Yanikkaya, 2003). Thus, we prefer to discuss only the evidence obtained by using
the most aggregated trade openness measure, OPEN, as depicted in the third row
of Figure 6.3.2.1. Here, we can see that the impact of trade openness on the FG
nexus varies across stages of economic development. In particular, in low- and
lower-middle-income economies, while a moderate level of trade openness stimulates
the FG nexus, extreme openness could lead to a negative FG relationship. This
hump-shaped relationship between trade openness and the FG nexus corroborates
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Figure 6.1: Functional FG estimates conditional on EXP, IMP and OPEN.
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
the results reported in Yilmazkuday (2011) as a worldwide evidence. The negative
FG nexus might highlight the challenge fierce international competition is posing to
small firms in highly open low- and lower-middle-income economies, a view echoed
by trade protectionists like Young (1991). Moreover, it could also be a consequence
of open economies’ increased vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks as argued in
Rodrik (1992).
On the contrary, high trade openness increases the FG nexus in upper-middle-
income economies. This might indicate the fact that firms in those economies
are strong enough to withstand foreign competition. Furthermore, it might imply
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that those firms are able to efficiently utilize the obtained credit when they get
access to bigger markets and/or when they face strong competition of foreign firms
(Yanikkaya, 2003). In high-income economies, trade openness does not appear to
affect the FG nexus for a wide range of openness levels. When openness becomes
extremely high, then a likely negative impact is observed. The negative impact
becomes even clearer when we measure openness by IMP, but not by EXP, possibly
implying that a higher degree of imports might indicate poor performance by
domestic firms facing international competition.
Further decomposing the trade openness measures into goods and services
imports (exports) gives the functional estimates displayed in Figure 6.3.2.1.
Interestingly, the estimates demonstrate a fair degree of similarity to the results
presented in Figure 6.3.2.1 and corroborate the foregoing discussions. However,
one peculiarity is worth mentioning here. If openness is measured by the volume
of services exports as a percentage of GDP (SEXP ), then even low-income and
high-income economies are characterized by an increasing FG nexus. This is in line
with the argument by Konan and Maskus (2006) that openness in services trade
results in a more profound upgrading of economy-wide efficiency than openness in
goods trade as financial, communications, and professional services are essential
intermediate inputs into production in all sectors.
6.3.2.2 Financial openness Figure 6.3.2.1 depicts the estimated functional
dependence of the FG nexus on three alternative measures of financial openness.
Again, the functional relations obtained by using the comprehensive measure,
FOPEN , remains qualitatively unaffected by disaggregation of FOPEN into foreign
assets (FA) and liabilities (FL) holdings. Basing the ensuing discussion on the
third row of Figure 6.3.2.1, we see that financial openness has a clearly negative
impact on the FG nexus at all levels of economic development. In particular, the
functional estimates demonstrate that high-income economies could have a very
high FG nexus if they are characterized by very low financial openness and the
nexus declines as economies open up their capital accounts. This substantiates our
conjecture in Section 6.2.2 that high-income economies exhibit the lowest FG nexus,
most likely, because of the very high financial openness in those economies. This
is also consistent with the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapter
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Figure 6.2: Functional FG estimates conditional on GIMP, GEXP, SIMP, SEXP.
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
(see Section 5.2). Most importantly, there is an overlap between the roles that both
financial development and financial openness could play in economic development.
For instance, both financial development and financial openness are believed to help
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Figure 6.3: Functional FG estimates conditional on FA, FL and FOPEN.
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical and ω on the
horizontal axes. The solid line shows the point estimates and the two dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals of the model excluding functional dependence.
agents diversify inter-temporal and cross-sectional risks and consequently increase
the likelihood that high-risk, high-expected-return projects are not left out unfunded
(Obstfeld, 1994; Bekaert et al., 2011).
This evidence is in a stark contrast to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis
that economies benefit—in terms of economic growth—by opening up their capital
accounts as this helps to develop their domestic financial sector. While this
study does not examine whether financial openness promotes financial development,
it clearly shows that financial development is of little significance for economic
development in states of very high financial openness. Needless to say, our results
should not be interpreted as implying a negative or negligible consequence of
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financial openness on economic development. In this regard, we have seen from
the parametric regression results provided in Section 6.2.2 that financial openness
has a significantly positive impact on economic growth in upper-middle and high-
income economies. What our findings indicate, however, is that opening up capital
accounts does not likely have a beneficial impact on economic growth if the benefit is
expected to be delivered through enhanced growth-promoting financial development,
as advocated by Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Baltagi et al. (2009).
Figure 6.4: Functional FG estimates conditional on bivariate factors OPEN and
FOPEN.
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Note: The figures show estimated long-run effects βˆ1(ω), with βˆ1 on the vertical (z-) axes and the
factors ω on the x- and y-axes.
6.3.2.3 Simultaneous trade and financial openness One of the main
features of the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis is that a simultaneous opening
up of the trade and capital accounts is necessary for financial development. Baltagi
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et al. (2009) note that this view is in sharp contrast to most of the previous
literature (e.g. McKinnon, 1991) which promotes a sequential approach where
trade liberalization should come before financial liberalization. Therefore, testing
the validity of the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis could more directly proceed via
examining the impact of a simultaneous increase in trade and financial openness
on the FG link. To this end, we have estimated a bivariate functional coefficient
model in (3). Estimation results are depicted in Figure 6.3.2.3. Closer examination
of the bivariate functional estimates reveals that overall patterns are, by and large,
dominated by a single factor, namely, financial openness in high-income economies
and trade openness in the remaining cross sections. Consequently, strong support
for the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis comes from the data in the upper-middle-
income economies where a simultaneous increase in trade and financial openness
enhances the impact of financial development on economic growth. For the rest
of the cross sections, however, a simultaneously high level of financial and trade
openness is associated with a negligible, and at times a negative, FG nexus. This
is most likely because of the reasons conjectured in Section 6.3.2.1, for low- and
lower-middle-income economies, and in Section 6.3.2.2, for high-income economies.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined the state dependence of the FG nexus on various
aspects of trade and financial openness. Our findings, which are fairly robust
to a range of alternative and disaggregated openness measures, indicate that the
impact of financial development on economic growth significantly depends on the
degree of an economy’s trade and financial openness. Most importantly, although
financial openness might promote financial development as argued by Rajan and
Zingales (2003), it is associated with an exceedingly diminishing impact of financial
development on economic growth. The evidence on the impact of trade openness
on the FG link is, however, mixed. Higher trade openness strengthens the FG
link in upper-middle-income economies, but it has a weakening effect in low-
and lower-middle-income economies. On the other hand, it is in upper-middle-
income economies only that we find a significantly positive FG nexus in states of
simultaneously high trade and financial openness. Therefore, our findings offer only
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limited support to the Ragan and Zingales hypothesis which suggests opening up
trade and capital accounts in order to bring about economic growth through financial
development.
This study demonstrates that, if the goal is to achieve a high level of finance-
induced growth, theories or empirical findings showing that openness induces
financial development are not sufficient to suggest policies in favor of financial
and trade openness. As such, it highlights the need to coordinate the research
direction that examine the determinants of financial development with the one
which investigates state dependence in the FG nexus. Therefore, investigating
the impact of financial development, government expenditure, and institutions on
the FG relationship while studying their role in financial development will be an
interesting area for future research.
6.A List of economies included in each sample
6.A.1 Low-income economies
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo.
6.A.2 Lower-middle-income economies
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras,
Indonesia, Jordan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Vanuatu.
6.A.3 Upper-middle-income economies
Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Gabon, Grenada, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
6.A.4 High-income economies
Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
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Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
of America.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This thesis is an empirical contribution to the century-old debate on the finance-
growth (FG) nexus. Special focus has been given to two important issues in the
area: causality and state-dependence in the FG nexus. We examined the first
issue by dividing it based on time horizon. Using panel data from 74 economies
during 1975–2005, the long-run FG causality is analyzed in Chapter 2 and the
short-to-medium-run causality is investigated in Chapter 4. Regarding the short-
to-medium-run causality, there is stronger evidence in favor of the view that “where
enterprise leads finance follows” (Robinson, 1952) than the reverse causal impact.
Interestingly, this evidence is uniform across stages of economic development. The
long-run causality, however, varies across stages of economic development. Strong
evidence of causality from finance to growth—and not vice versa—is diagnosed in
low-income economies. In the remaining cross-sections, however, there is a weakened
evidence of causality from growth to finance. Nevertheless, the employed financial
development measure in middle-income economies and in the comprehensive cross
section is found to be panel stationary implying that the observed causality may not
be a long-run one. Focusing attention on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies,
we find in Chapter 3 that financial development has a significantly positive long-run
impact on economic development in the region.
Overall, our results demonstrate that economic growth generates financial
development. This evidence, however, is of lesser policy relevance. What is more
important for policy making is whether finance has an impact on economic growth
or not. In this respect, it is only in low-income economies (and in SSA region) that
our findings entail devising policies to build deeper and more sophisticated financial
systems as a means of promoting economic performance.
A key assumption in most of the empirical literature is that the FG nexus is
invariant across economies and over time, but findings repeatedly show just the
opposite. In Chapter 5, we not only test whether the assumption of invariant FG
nexus is realistic, but also try to investigate economic factors that may determine
the FG link. For this purpose, we employ a functional coefficient model—a flexible
semiparametric approach that is well-suited to allow the FG nexus to depend
on state or factor variables. We find that the FG nexus is dependent on an
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economy’s level of income, financial development, government size, trade openness
and financial openness. The following are some of the notable results: (1) financial
development has a generally positive effect on the FG nexus, with the strongest
FG link observed in low-income economies with a high level financial development;
(2) financial development could have an adverse effect on economic growth in low-
and lower-middle-income economies when they have very large government sizes
or are extremely open to international trade; (3) upper-middle-income economies
show a pronounced FG nexus when they are very open to international trade; (4)
economies with the highest level of financial openness benefit the least from financial
development.
Chapter 6 extends the approach followed in the preceding chapter to extensively
examine the impact of trade and financial openness on the FG nexus. This special
emphasis is motivated by the fact that Rajan and Zingales (2003) and accompanying
empirical studies suggest that openness is crucial for financial development. The
argument is, however, founded on the assertion that finance promotes growth
regardless of an economy’s level of trade and financial openness—a view that is
not supported by our findings in Chapter 5. Using a new data set, alternative and
disaggregated measures of trade and financial openness, and a bivariate functional
coefficient model, we obtain results that largely confirm those established in Chapter
5. In particular, finance is not growth promoting in states of very high level
of financial openness. Furthermore, high trade openness leads to a high FG
nexus in upper-middle-income economies, but it exerts a deleterious influence in
low- and lower-middle-income economies. Finally, it is only in upper-middle-
income economies that simultaneously high trade and financial openness lead to
a significantly positive FG nexus.
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